Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens • Hacker News Board

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#51

Post by aguyfromnb » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:57 PM UTC

MaupitiBlue wrote: post #22

philshem wrote: post #9

November 2019 New Yorker piece about what went wrong at Boeing https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/18/the-case-again... tl;dr engineers vs. accountants

BS! Which of these was done by the accountants? 1. Drive MCAS with only one AOA sensor. 2. Don't tell MCAS to look for (or even think about) bad AOA data or AOA disagreements. 3. Don't actually bother to tell pilots that they don't have AOA disagree warning lights. 4. Don't bother to tell pilots that MCAS exists at all. 5. Don't test MCAS subsystem to see what it actually does with bad AOA data. 6. Give MCAS a ridicu…

>BS! Which of these was done by the accountants?

HackerNews, generally, has a hate on for "business people", who are seen as evil, ne'er-do-wells, while the "engineers" are innocent employees, merely following orders.

I think it's because most people here see themselves as the engineer type, and this mindset allows them to feel better about the work they're doing, be it emissions scandals, ad-tech, building the surveillance state apparatus or phony medical devices: "don't blame me, I'm just following orders!"

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#52

Post by ben509 » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:57 PM UTC

unstatusthequo wrote: post #19

Ill_ban_myself wrote: post #7

Started as an intern at Boeing in 1985. 34 year career down in flames. Ouch.

Seems to me he may have been part of the culture problem then? Bad habits develop...

Certainly having started from scratch at the company would help him as a leader as the rank and file knew that he had been in their shoes, at one time. But, yeah, being steeped in the culture may very well have been part of this problem as well.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#53

Post by bb123 » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:57 PM UTC

MaupitiBlue wrote: post #22

philshem wrote: post #9

November 2019 New Yorker piece about what went wrong at Boeing https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/18/the-case-again... tl;dr engineers vs. accountants

BS! Which of these was done by the accountants? 1. Drive MCAS with only one AOA sensor. 2. Don't tell MCAS to look for (or even think about) bad AOA data or AOA disagreements. 3. Don't actually bother to tell pilots that they don't have AOA disagree warning lights. 4. Don't bother to tell pilots that MCAS exists at all. 5. Don't test MCAS subsystem to see what it actually does with bad AOA data. 6. Give MCAS a ridicu…

The design of the plane was a financially motivated one and lead to the MCAS system being required in the first place. And your note on lack of redundancy and not providing additional training - surely the costs there are obvious?

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#54

Post by CodeSheikh » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:58 PM UTC

Why don't they just kill the 737 MAX program and start on another aircraft? As a consumer it will build confidence and trust in me.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#55

Post by ulfw » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:58 PM UTC

Marsymars wrote: post #44

> Chairman David Calhoun will take over as CEO and president, effective Jan. 13, the company said, adding that a change in leadership was necessary to restore confidence in the company. If they wanted to restore my confidence, they’d have picked an engineer, not an accountant.

You mean like the guy they literally just replaced?

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#56

Post by armada651 » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:58 PM UTC

samcheng wrote: post #26

devit wrote: post #11

Why isn't it enough to retrofit all past and future models with enough hardware redundancy and create a properly written MCAS software? Wasn't the design sound, except for the lack of hardware sensor redundancy and naively written software? Why do they need to stop production and so on?

My understanding is that the design is fundamentally flawed; the engines are too large to fit under the wings with the existing landing gear, so they were moved forward, thereby upsetting the balance between the center of thrust of the engines and the center of lift of the wings, thereby requiring a brittle MCAS system to attempt to compensate. The MCAS system itself is flawed in a number of ways, but the core proble…

Actually it's important to remember that MCAS was not fitted to make the plane safer. It was fited to make it behave the same way as a 737 so that pilots don't need to be retrained.

If you would retrain pilots then the 737 MAX can be safely flown without MCAS. Pilots just need to be familiar with the different aerodynamics.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#57

Post by stetrain » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:58 PM UTC

devit wrote: post #11

Why isn't it enough to retrofit all past and future models with enough hardware redundancy and create a properly written MCAS software? Wasn't the design sound, except for the lack of hardware sensor redundancy and naively written software? Why do they need to stop production and so on?

The fundamental promise made to customers (a more efficient 737 that doesn't require new pilot training) seems impossible to deliver at this point, and probably wasn't possible from the outset.

At this point they could probably still turn the 737 Max into a sellable product, but it will be different from the one promised if it requires a new type certification for pilots due to the different flight characteristics (which Boeing was trying to hide/minimize with MCAS).

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#58

Post by MaupitiBlue » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:58 PM UTC

jacobush wrote: post #40

MaupitiBlue wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

BS! Which of these was done by the accountants? 1. Drive MCAS with only one AOA sensor. 2. Don't tell MCAS to look for (or even think about) bad AOA data or AOA disagreements. 3. Don't actually bother to tell pilots that they don't have AOA disagree warning lights. 4. Don't bother to tell pilots that MCAS exists at all. 5. Don't test MCAS subsystem to see what it actually does with bad AOA data. 6. Give MCAS a ridicu…

4 and 7 were the raison d'être for MCAS in the first place. Clearly above engineer level.

FTA “Boeing considered the mcas feature to be so minor that it removed mention of it from the 737 max’s pilot manual.“ The accountants don’t write the pilot manuals.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#59

Post by jvp » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:59 PM UTC

kiba wrote: post #18

jonnypotty wrote: post #6

Watched an aljazira documentary about falling standards at a Boeing factory a couple of years ago and been waiting to see if something like this would happen. Now they're gonna sacrifice a lamb, keep same corporate struture and philosophy, keep on making billions, remember to appologise even more next time.

If the culture don't change, then people are going to keep repeating the same mistake, and someone will die unnecessary death.

Didn't 346 people die in unnecessary deaths?!

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#60

Post by chrisseaton » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:59 PM UTC

Marsymars wrote: post #44

> Chairman David Calhoun will take over as CEO and president, effective Jan. 13, the company said, adding that a change in leadership was necessary to restore confidence in the company. If they wanted to restore my confidence, they’d have picked an engineer, not an accountant.

Someone like Dennis Muilenburg then?

If the last one was an engineer, why would another engineer restore your confidence any more?