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Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

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Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#131
post #35

Does doing something seriously evil necessarily imply secrecy? I am thinking it might but I am not exactly sure why I think this. Ae there examples of evil things (known to be evil at their time) done in a widely public way? On the other hand, the converse is not true; this is far more straighforward: something secret is not necessarily evil In any case I have decided that I have to be EXTRA SUPER cautious that I am…

I think game/app developers getting children hooked on gambling through lootboxes is evil, and that's out in the open. Luckily governments are starting to crack down on it.

It's very similiar to running a casino

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#132
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>id argue one cannot change the composition of congress. I hope that if term limits ever become a thing, it would only take a few elections of well informed voters to start making the change. I think that congress is supposed to be a fluid body of people that are supposed to represent the population, and change as the population's interests change. What we have now is career politicians making it to congress, and the…

While terms limits solve one problem, it creates a far bigger one. Most well meaning “good people” have to sacrifice their career in order to serve in Politics. Yes, it is a career. But what is wrong with it? What do you think they should do with rest of their life? Moreover, it takes more than one term to achieve any meaningful change. Things like Obamacare didn’t just start with Obama. Major changes takes 10+ years…

Your point is valid here, but I'll mention that the type of people you feel would possibly be excluded are very likely already excluded by the current system.

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#133

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The limit is that you have actual secrets to protect, whether codes or names. You don't want these public because everyone could destroy you then. Secrets are a necessary evil. Managing secrecy as a function of some more or less independent entity — three-letter agency, direct governmental body, army... — is a balancing act, to put it mildly. Ever since the dawn of time, and periodically throughout history, you hear…

It's not clear that secrets are a necessary evil. They are, however, greatly desired by exactly the kind of people who definitely shouldn't be allowed them. So that's a bad sign. Inappropriate reliance upon secrets is a recurrent security design mistake. Remember passwords? Well not so much remember, we still have passwords, and they're still terrible. Compare a FIDO Security Key. No secrets, much better. If I'm wron…

I'm not sure what you're talking about. I suppose we have different backgrounds.

- I've never heard a single ranking officer in the army or intelligence circle or the judiciary branch ever claim that "it's not clear that secrets are necessary" — you'd be right many don't think it's an evil though. (I've personally interviewed such people among others for research, many times between 2006-2014, and this question was central to some discussions because we were indeed designing political regimes).

- You seem to confuse "secrets", the general idea of hidden information (e.g. a Christmas gift, the location of a weapons repository, the name of a lover) with secrets as a security device (PIN codes, passwords, the layout of a physical key). The former are content, the latter are means to restrict access (meaningless in and of themselves). You seem to argue that the latter can do better with less "remembering" (security practices, FIDO, etc), and sure go for it; but that has nothing to do with the former, actual secret information (content) which you seek to protect by way of such security devices.

- My point was about secrecy as a function of States, well before digital computers even existed, and well after. Modern computing compounds effects but doesn't change the nature of institutions. You'll always need to secure 'dangerous' stuff. I'm not sure how you envision a hostile invading army on your ground, but if you picture that suddenly many red lines appear clearly.

I'll tell you the dirty secret: the less they have an actual enemy to fight, the more they idle, the more "these people who desire secrets" become threats to the wider population — people report that it's such a parallel world view as an insider that focus can get fuzzy, undetermined, self-harming. This is why historically you see many governments pretty much making up enemies: a mundane observer would tell you it's to a classic to unite the population (or your base versus rival groups), but a historical perspective shows it's also to curb the 'natural deviance' of all the shadowy things in a State, to focus them for good when their idling becomes too evil.

None of this black and white. Nothing's fundamentally changed with computers or electronics — it's more game theory, math, and obviously philosophy, psychology, than whatever implementation of a system throughout history.

For another round at not-so-simple-secrecy-management, consider now corporations, first between them, then in interaction with States. You'd think it's all new, unseen before. Go read some account of the 16th century or even before. See how this is just part of human nature. As I tell myself, "deal with it".

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#134
post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The result of Citizens United was the death blow on American democracy. First, companies can put as much money as they want on elections, second, rich people control companies, and third, foreign countries also control companies. Put this together and the USA has no functioning democracy anymore, it is at the whims of billionaires and/or foreign powers.

If money is so powerful, why is Michael Bloomberg not going to get the democratic nomination?

Really influence is a commodity which can and is bought and sold (see enorsements) and money may be used to purchase it but the two aren't identical. You can't just compare budgets and pick a winner unless both have comparable strategies and influence.

It brings to mind a quixotic approach of trying to value influence quantitatively. Like trying to figure out how much value could be extracted from a celebrity endorsement.

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#135

From the article: "Judge Ellis said: "For Wikimedia to litigate the standing issue further, and for defendants to defend adequately in any further litigation, would require the disclosure of protected state secrets, namely details about the Upstream surveillance program's operations. For the reasons that follow, therefore, the standing issue cannot be tried, or otherwise further litigated, without risking or requirin…

Also worth mentioning that Judge TS Ellis III is the same activist judge who gave Paul Manafort a ridiculously lenient sentence due to living "an otherwise blameless life." This is a judge whose jurisprudence should probably not be taken seriously.

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In cases where the state has evidence that it can not show the case should proceed as if such evidence does not exist.

The state has an advantage here. They can use evidence that can't be presented in court to construct a case in parallel. That is, after enough surveillance, they'll know when to expect e.g. a conversation that will appear incriminating when stripped of context. They'll fake an anonymous tip in order to get a real warrant for surveilling that conversation. If this scheme doesn't work the first time, they'll repeat unt…

>They'll fake an anonymous tip in order to get a real warrant for surveilling that conversation.

The reason this works is because of the Good-faith exception[0]. The police acting on the tip, must investigate first. The investigation can lead to a finding which gains a search warrant. The executed warrant finds above and beyond the tip so The state is notified.

[0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good-faith_exception

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#137
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

He knows the CIA did something illegal, but is protecting them. If a mafia member shoots an innocent man, and a judge says "I feel bad for the guy, but the mafia is good for this city, so no can do; yunz are screwed!" it's fairly obvious what's happening. He's preventing criminals from feeling the consequences of the law because of perceived value.

No, he's upholding the law, whether he agrees with it or not, which is his job. A judge's job is to adjudicate based on the law and he adjudicated that states secrets was lawfully invoked.

The Constitution comes before every other law, and allowing the Constitution to be waived is against his job.

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#138
post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The result of Citizens United was the death blow on American democracy. First, companies can put as much money as they want on elections, second, rich people control companies, and third, foreign countries also control companies. Put this together and the USA has no functioning democracy anymore, it is at the whims of billionaires and/or foreign powers.

If money is so powerful, why is Michael Bloomberg not going to get the democratic nomination?

Because Bloomberg is not the only one with a lot of money trying to get the presidency.

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The limit is that you have actual secrets to protect, whether codes or names. You don't want these public because everyone could destroy you then. Secrets are a necessary evil. Managing secrecy as a function of some more or less independent entity — three-letter agency, direct governmental body, army... — is a balancing act, to put it mildly. Ever since the dawn of time, and periodically throughout history, you hear…

It's not clear that secrets are a necessary evil. They are, however, greatly desired by exactly the kind of people who definitely shouldn't be allowed them. So that's a bad sign. Inappropriate reliance upon secrets is a recurrent security design mistake. Remember passwords? Well not so much remember, we still have passwords, and they're still terrible. Compare a FIDO Security Key. No secrets, much better. If I'm wron…

>If I'm wrong and some secrets are truly necessary we're still best served by restricting ourselves to just those secrets and not creating a Matryoshka doll of secrets kept for their own sake and little more.

Therein lies the problem. How can you restrict secrets to "just those secrets" when you can't ever find out what the secrets are and you are promised that "this secret is definitely one of THOSE secrets, honest."?

Re: Judge dismisses Wikimedia case against NSA over Upstream surveillance

#140

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This line of reasoning doesn't hold up at all. The best practice advice 'avoid security through obscurity' has nothing to do with what you're talking about. Also, FIDO absolutely relies on secrets: that's what a security key stores. I'd be interested to hear how you think law enforcement and intelligence could still work without confidentiality.

Although the typical design for a FIDO key uses what is technically a symmetric ("secret") key that's an implementation detail and the purpose of the FIDO device is to maintain asymmetric (private) keys. If you've been under the impression that FIDO is just a shared secret system like TOTP then I've got great news, it's much cleverer than that. By not relying on secrets the system is robust against total incompetence…

You've totally lost me, and it's not because I misunderstand FIDO. The private key you refer to must be kept secret or the credential is compromised. Yes, this is undoubtedly better than passwords, because the system automatically prevents credential re-use across services and is more resilient than a password hash, but it still requires secrecy. You're not providing an example of a system that functions without the need for secrecy, you're providing an example of a system that uses a very tightly controlled secret, known only to the party that needs it i.e. the FIDO key. Sounds a bit like the principles of need-to-know and compartmentation used by intelligence services...

Open source is useful, to be sure, but so are informants / agents, and the safety of those sources and their continued usefulness is completely dependent upon secrecy. If that's too Hollywood then consider undercover law enforcement.

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