I am.
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the...
Yes, you are correct in that part of the reason for it was to mimic the control forces of older 737's for avoiding the burden of simulator training.
However, you have to look at why it was a manufacturer would take the risk to make such a boneheaded implementation in the first place. Nothing goes into a mass-produced highly complex system without being very carefully thought through. It wasn't some "accident". It was a calculated act of value engineering. On the one hand, someone had wind tunnel results that said there would be a divergence from the old 737 force curves. On the other, you had a pile of solutions capable of fixing the problem, each with varying degrees of cooperation with regulators, time taken, and a price tag attached.
The FAA (if provided with the benefit of a doubt that they aren't covering their asses which I'm not necessarily willing to give given reports from the IG) has signalled that if they'd known what MCAS was, they'd have demanded more intense scrutiny and testing.
There was whistleblower testimony alleged in the 60 Minutes expose on the MAX, that Boeing intentionally engineered the system in such a way as to minimize outside scrutiny of the system (I.e. regulator attention) in order to get development done, and planes out the door.
What this signals is that there was pressure from management to get things done, which meant minimizing external exposure and exploiting every trick they knew to get a rubber stamp out of the regulator.
Now in terms of not being certifiable, I offer a brief bit of Boeing history. The D.P. Davies interview w.r.t the the certification of the 727 by the U.K. CAA. As a well-known test pilot, Davies goes into great detail to describe how the U.K. regulator was very particular about control forces on approach to stall for that aircraft; to the point that the 727 only got conditional airworthyness certification for civil transport via the addition of a stick pusher; a device intended to make it very clear the pilot was approaching a stall.
https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interv...
Some people at Boeing knew, or were in a position to know the behavior they were dealing with was of a type previously uncertifiable. Someone knew that if they could sneak the plane past the FAA, that reciprocity would shield the plane from further scrutiny unless something catastrophic happened.
I don't know who it was, nor do I know whether the paper trail will be enough to bear it out. American management nowadays tends to go out of their way to minimize paper trail and maximize "fill-in-the-blank" style communication to facilitate plausible deniability.