Is there a solid alternative to TrueCrypt with most of the features that’s been implemented with a proof-checking system such as OcaML Mirage?
German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
51–60 of 86 posts
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#52"... in the simplest case a user can mount a Truecrypt volume that contains a file with suid root permission that will open a shell. Golem.de was able to replicate this scenario in a current version of Veracrypt."
Can I just point out that this is just one vivid example of why tying setuid permissions to a file is a terrible design to begin with? Permissions should be derived from the execution context at run time. (People might hate me for saying this, but this is one of those design decisions Windows fundamentally gets right.)
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes; that is why it is recommended that untrustworthy drives be mounted with the `nosuid` flag.
Ah, so even though filesystems don't go through files, they still can block the operation of suid. This suggests then that Veracrypt can simply enable the nosuid option when mounting a device.
And they should also add nodev, to block a similar attack where you add a bunch of block devices with 777 permissions, in an attempt to make the block device "/" is mounted from be readable to a user and thus able to read (and write) any file on the host.
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#54Earlier quoted context omitted.
This surprised me the most―never thought about this before. Aren't all permission-supporting filesystems vulnerable to this if mounting by a user is permitted? I presume filesystems don't go through the files and downgrade root ownership.
This is also nice for breaking in/out of Docker containers with bind mounts.
Not if you use user namespaces (which you really should).
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#55"... in the simplest case a user can mount a Truecrypt volume that contains a file with suid root permission that will open a shell. Golem.de was able to replicate this scenario in a current version of Veracrypt."
Can I just point out that this is just one vivid example of why tying setuid permissions to a file is a terrible design to begin with? Permissions should be derived from the execution context at run time. (People might hate me for saying this, but this is one of those design decisions Windows fundamentally gets right.)
Even Windows gets this wrong at times, with several UAC bypass techniques exposed by auto-elevating binaries. Still, Microsoft has done a great deal of work with the Windows privilege model to prevent things like this, and these issues are steadily being resolved.
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can I just point out that this is just one vivid example of why tying setuid permissions to a file is a terrible design to begin with? Permissions should be derived from the execution context at run time. (People might hate me for saying this, but this is one of those design decisions Windows fundamentally gets right.)
Even Windows gets this wrong at times, with several UAC bypass techniques exposed by auto-elevating binaries. Still, Microsoft has done a great deal of work with the Windows privilege model to prevent things like this, and these issues are steadily being resolved.
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#57I use VeraCrypt and none of this are of my concern in my daily use of it. Can anyone tell me if my containers are still safe from prying eyes since I upload them to cloud? I need specific answers from anyone working on VeraCrypt, not general answers of "yeah, they are unsafe" that usually HN does.
Burn everything and flee to the woods. Can't be too careful.
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#58Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even Windows gets this wrong at times, with several UAC bypass techniques exposed by auto-elevating binaries. Still, Microsoft has done a great deal of work with the Windows privilege model to prevent things like this, and these issues are steadily being resolved.
https://www.networkworld.com/article/2295224/microsoft--uac-...
Pasting a random article from 2007 with no other comment is not a great rebuttal of what they said.
A _lot_ has changed since 2007.
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
https://www.networkworld.com/article/2295224/microsoft--uac-...
Pasting a random article from 2007 with no other comment is not a great rebuttal of what they said. A _lot_ has changed since 2007.
I'm pretty sure the fact that it's not a security boundary has not changed since 2007. They should've probably marketed it better to clarify this, but that's not a technical issue. It was always a horrible idea to run a malicious program under your credentials relying on UAC to enforce any security. That's never changed.
Re: German BSI withholds Truecrypt security report
#60I use VeraCrypt and none of this are of my concern in my daily use of it. Can anyone tell me if my containers are still safe from prying eyes since I upload them to cloud? I need specific answers from anyone working on VeraCrypt, not general answers of "yeah, they are unsafe" that usually HN does.
Since you're uploading them to the cloud do keep in mind that given 60 years of computer advancement, today's encryption standards will be unlikely to withstand tomorrow's hardware...