All theories of value integrate the idea of circumstance into their workings; Ricardo himself realized this. The spirit of the marginalist objection to an "objective" theory of value (I put objective in quotes because it's a mistake to view it as anything but as Marx put it a "phantom-like objectivity") was put by Whatley in 1832: "It is not that pearls fetch a high price because men have dived for them; but on the contrary, men dive for them because they fetch a high price" but as Cockshott and Cottrel put in
Classical Econophysics, "if pearls washed up on the beach, they would not collect anything like their current price".
Ricardo's reply was that the precondition to a commodity having value is that it is firstly an object of demand. Smith's, Ricardo's and Marx's theories of value (the commonalities of which tend to be overstated, even by the likes of greats such as Samuelson) all describe the case in which if I decide to make a product and nobody (or not enough people) want it, this leads to my realization that what I've been doing is useless and subsequently moving my capital elsewhere.
I think Carchedi and Kliman defend Marx's version of the "labour theory of value" quite well, as do Shaikh and Tonak on empirical grounds, and from an opposing perspective Dumenil and Levy do as well. Others, such as Moseley and Patrick Murray, relax their conditions a litle and argue that it is a mistake to apply the theory to individual commodities, rather, it can only be applied to "aliquots representative of the lot".
I have a comment here with some (slightly outdated) information as to the status of the classical (mostly Ricardian and Marxian) theories of value among the people who still study it (usually heterodox economists): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18490388