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Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

nickbostrom.com

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Re: Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

#21

Post by skrebbel »

Wow, I always thought of Pascal's Mugging as a satirical illustration of how stupid it is to take enormous (or extremely small) numbers seriously. Turns out people like John Carmack (see other comments in this thread) aren't picking up on the satire. Or am I reading him wrong? I think he's smarter than me, so what am I missing?

Given Bostrom's general love for mixing tiny probabilities with enormous outcomes, what's the point of this article? It seems delightfully self-critical. How can the conclusion be anything other than that we should not be taking the AI/singularity crowd too seriously, as doing so would be akin to voluntarily handig over a wallet to a mugger?

Re: Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

#22

Post by Erlich_Bachman »

skrebbel wrote: post #21

Wow, I always thought of Pascal's Mugging as a satirical illustration of how stupid it is to take enormous (or extremely small) numbers seriously. Turns out people like John Carmack (see other comments in this thread) aren't picking up on the satire. Or am I reading him wrong? I think he's smarter than me, so what am I missing? Given Bostrom's general love for mixing tiny probabilities with enormous outcomes, what's…

Sounds more like you are taking the argument too seriously and are trying to read more into it than what it is.

It is just a philosophical story created to provide a certain line of reasoning, as certain possible structure of an argument. People are free to apply this argument however they want, it doesn't prove anything by itself, it doesn't say anything about the world, it's up to the user of it. It does not make any conclusions, it's just a story. Carmack used it to illustrate his own beliefs (which are therefore: AI is possible and the payout for the AI is exteremely high, even if probability for it during the next couple of years is low).

Carmack did not mean that you should believe or not believe in AI or anything else based on this argument. He just used it to illustrate what he himself chose to do. He did not base it on this argument alone, he did not just hear the argument and suddenly decide "now because of that I have to work on AI", he based it on his experience and knowledge of the actual field. The mugging argument is just a cute way of quickly explaining it.

> I think he's smarter than me, so what am I missing?

Wisdom and context.

Re: Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

#23

Post by MaxBarraclough »

ivansavz wrote: post #18

In case someone is not familiar with Pascal's wager , here is a table that shows the expected values: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager#Analysis_with... (the appearance of infinity breaks the decision theory...)

Pascal's Wager fails for the simpler reason that it ignores the possibility that believing in god could send you to hell.

I see a similar problem here. Pascal should consider the possibility that the mugger will use his (Pascal's) silly action as the basis for punishment, in place of the promised reward. Slim probability, potentially very high cost. The fact that this risk has gone unstated doesn't mean it isn't there.

Re: Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

#24

Post by ralfd »

roenxi wrote: post #20
petters wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but it is still not trivial to formalize mathematically without running into trouble: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/a5JAiTdytou3Jg749/pascal-s-m...

It is pretty simple to formalise - if there is a pool of people who routinely accept positive-expected-value gambles where there is a P = 99.999999999% chance of going broke then we expect everyone in that pool will be broke unless the size of the pool is comparable to 1/(1-P). Tighten up the bounds on 'comparable' a bit and that is formalised. The mistake is accepting uncritically that expected value is the best met…

> Tighten up the bounds on 'comparable' a bit and that is formalised.

Is this like „draw the rest of the owl“?

Re: Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

#25

Post by garmaine »

ralfd wrote: post #24
roenxi wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is pretty simple to formalise - if there is a pool of people who routinely accept positive-expected-value gambles where there is a P = 99.999999999% chance of going broke then we expect everyone in that pool will be broke unless the size of the pool is comparable to 1/(1-P). Tighten up the bounds on 'comparable' a bit and that is formalised. The mistake is accepting uncritically that expected value is the best met…

> Tighten up the bounds on 'comparable' a bit and that is formalised. Is this like „draw the rest of the owl“?

What owl?

Re: Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

#27

Post by YeGoblynQueenne »

I don't know the background to this but if I understand correctly, it kind of pivots on the probability that the mugger is indeed an Operator from the Seventh Dimension, that Pascal places at 1 in a quadrillion.

In that case, I have to wonder where this estimate comes from? I get that it's just an arbitrary number and that any number would do, as long as it wasn't zero, but that's exactly the point: why can't Pascal place the probability of his mugger being an Operator from the Seventh Dimension at zero?

Is there any evidence at all to support the mugger's claim? Is there any evidence at all that there is such a thing as a "Seventh Dimension" for which the only thing we know is that its "Operators" have magickal, utility-maximising powers?

And does the whole thing only work if we assume that the probability that there is such a place and such people is more than 0?

Re: Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

#28

Post by Strilanc »

YeGoblynQueenne wrote: post #27

I don't know the background to this but if I understand correctly, it kind of pivots on the probability that the mugger is indeed an Operator from the Seventh Dimension, that Pascal places at 1 in a quadrillion. In that case, I have to wonder where this estimate comes from? I get that it's just an arbitrary number and that any number would do, as long as it wasn't zero, but that's exactly the point: why can't Pascal…

If you set the probability at zero, you won't be convinced when they actually are an operator from the seventh dimension. That is to say, you run into the opposite problem of being Pascal's Muggle [1].

1: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Ap4KfkHyxjYPDiqh2/pascal-s-m...

> A wind begins to blow about the alley, whipping the Mugger's loose clothes about him as they shift from ill-fitting shirt and jeans into robes of infinite blackness, within whose depths tiny galaxies and stranger things seem to twinkle. In the sky above, a gap edged by blue fire opens with a horrendous tearing sound - you can hear people on the nearby street yelling in sudden shock and terror, implying that they can see it too - and displays the image of the Mugger himself, wearing the same robes that now adorn his body, seated before a keyboard and a monitor.

> [...] "Unfortunately, you haven't offered me enough evidence," you explain.

Re: Pascal's Mugging (2009) [pdf]

#30

Post by edflsafoiewq »

YeGoblynQueenne wrote: post #27

I don't know the background to this but if I understand correctly, it kind of pivots on the probability that the mugger is indeed an Operator from the Seventh Dimension, that Pascal places at 1 in a quadrillion. In that case, I have to wonder where this estimate comes from? I get that it's just an arbitrary number and that any number would do, as long as it wasn't zero, but that's exactly the point: why can't Pascal…

> I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cromwell%27s_rule

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