Earlier quoted context omitted.
Entering with an armed team is SOP, mostly to protect policemen. These are just guys doing a job, in the vast majority of cases a good and just job, who want to go home to their wives and children in the evening. Some (most) raids could theoretically be done by just knocking on the door; but sometimes some crazy man will start shooting back, or running away, or try to destroy evidence. Rush-entry raids with flashbang…
Well, around here the cops know who has guns, as well as whether they're known to be a bit crazy. The police are also usually not treated like an invading army, so it's apples for oranges. I'd at least suggest holstering the weapons until they're needed and weighing the probability of encryption against the probability of forceful self-defense, case by case. If for some reason there's reason to believe that the perso…
(emphasis mine)
This shows you don't understand the point (I'm not so much talking about this specific case or even raids on computer criminals anymore, rather in general). The exact point is that sometimes it does happen, but you don't know why. That's why you need to treat every opportunity, no matter how minute, as more dangerous than it actually is, or than you actually think it will be, because the consequences are so out of balance.
Let me put it this way: do you feel that 500 unnecessarily forceful raids, each destroying a door and 2 pieces of furniture, and taking a night of sleep away from 500 individuals, are better or worse than 1 policy officer shot in the leg (not even deadly)?
I think the shot wound is worse, and therefore wouldn't mind authorizing a raid even when I'm not 100% sure there is acute danger. Actually I'd authorize when there's even just a 1% chance of forceful resistance with a knife.
(the trade off may get different when suspects are harmed in the raid, I'm assuming sufficiently trained police people)
"and weighing the probability of encryption against the probability of forceful self-defense,"
This I don't understand. I'm quite sure no suspect will try to fire at policeman with their Truecrypt USB drive.
"If for some reason there's reason to believe that the person is working next to both a loaded gun and an encrypted disk"
The 'and' between 'loaded gun' and 'an encrypted disk' should be an 'or'. Just one of the two is enough to warrant force.
Assuming that, well that's already the trade off being made. I just think you underestimate the amount of criminals using encryption. Even if only 5% of them do use it, that already makes it likely enough that any random one (because remember, before you enter you don't know what you will find) will use it to warrant force. QED.