Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you look at IBM's TPM 2.0 implementation[1], you can see that they don't use any well tested libraries for crypto primitives, but rather uses what looks like home-cooked crypto implementation. Microsoft, on the other hand, seems to support OpenSSL and wolfSSL in their simulator[2]. [1] - http://ibmswtpm.sourceforge.net/ibmswtpm2.html [2] - https://github.com/microsoft/ms-tpm-20-ref
IBM's implementation is really scary. I read through the codebase and my WTF meter went through the roof. It looks like the codebase of some evil genius that invented a world of coding practices of his own.
TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
21–30 of 33 posts
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#22Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you look at IBM's TPM 2.0 implementation[1], you can see that they don't use any well tested libraries for crypto primitives, but rather uses what looks like home-cooked crypto implementation. Microsoft, on the other hand, seems to support OpenSSL and wolfSSL in their simulator[2]. [1] - http://ibmswtpm.sourceforge.net/ibmswtpm2.html [2] - https://github.com/microsoft/ms-tpm-20-ref
You're not supposed to use the IBM TPM emulator for anything except developing software that talks to a real TPM without using a real TPM.
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're not supposed to use the IBM TPM emulator for anything except developing software that talks to a real TPM without using a real TPM.
Sure, but what exactly do you think real TPM manufacturers are putting inside them? They must run some crypto code, do you think they won’t just reuse IBMs emulator? Or that they will come up with something more secure?
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#24Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#25Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#26I have not read the paper, and I could be wrong. However, these appear to be attacks against the crypto implemented inside a TPM/fTPM. The reference implementation of TPM 2.0 leaves the choice of the crypto library up to the platform vendor. If my suspicions are correct, it sounds like some of the platform vendors decided to use crypto libraries vulnerable to timing attacks. Hmmm...
If you look at IBM's TPM 2.0 implementation[1], you can see that they don't use any well tested libraries for crypto primitives, but rather uses what looks like home-cooked crypto implementation. Microsoft, on the other hand, seems to support OpenSSL and wolfSSL in their simulator[2]. [1] - http://ibmswtpm.sourceforge.net/ibmswtpm2.html [2] - https://github.com/microsoft/ms-tpm-20-ref
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#27The PoC mentioned in the ZDNet article ( https://www.zdnet.com/article/tpm-fail-vulnerabilities-impac... ) seems to be out... https://github.com/VernamGroup/TPM-Fail/
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#28Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#29Are there many uses of signing with a TPM on consumer hardware? I can see the issue with servers, but not much else.
It's used to store th private key of user certificates, but those are PIN protected presumably. But a key that isn't supposed to be extractible may well be so.
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#30Are there many uses of signing with a TPM on consumer hardware? I can see the issue with servers, but not much else.