> What you call "executive asserted zone in which [the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply]”
The editorial insertion is not correct, and is the source of the problem. Neither the statute (which is ambiguous as to exact geographic extent) nor the executive interpretation asserts the inapplicability of the Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches within the zone, it authorizes an extremely narrow category of warrantless searches (the courts have consistently held that warrantless searches can be reasonable, and that statutory authorization for a sufficiently narrow and appropriate purpose is a significant factor in favor of finding a warrantless search reasonable; there is no serious debate over whether what the statute seeks to authorize is Constitutionally appropriate and within some geographic boundaries, the entire debate, after you get past the hyperbolic posturing, is over two questions: whether 100 miles is more than is reasonable, and whether the failure of the statute to explicitly say a reasonable boundary impermissibly delegates the boundary-setting to the executive.)
> As far as activism goes, the way I see it: we can either use plain language to convey a pretty good approximation of the situation
It's not a good approximation of the situation, as taking it as even an approximation suggests things like your upthread misapprehension that it would be germane to a search of data on devices rather than a search of vehicles for unauthorized immigrants.
Look, I agree with what the ACLU is seeking to acheive with it's hyperbolic portrayal and even think that most uses that the ACLU makes of that portrayal are warranted for that purpose (and I think both that 100 air miles is too great a distance and the failure of Congress to set explicit boundaries makes the statute unreasonable.) But it's not even remotely a good approximation of the actual situation, except perhaps in the narrow context of discussion narrowly focussed on immigration enforcement.