171–180 of 199 posts
ello mates ;) good ev'nin,as they say on the streets of england!!!!! i was just waggling my willy the other day when i googled something into yahoo...callled "porno".....oh man me mates you gotta check this out!!! all these boobies and bums for all the eye can see!!!!!my willy has never been so overwhelmed!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!imwagglingmywilllyyyaAaaAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!MY WILLY!…
These should not fly for a decade. They're rewriting the avionics from scratch. This should require a years-long process of testing, external auditing, and approvals. I'd even go so far as to say in flight, we should require competitor review. That's right, no trade secrets. If you want your Hello World up in the air, you better let your competitor vet the source code. This is an engineering boondoggle and an embarra…
The 737 Max is stable, as all commercial aircraft have to be. MCAS is not a system to take an unstable 737 and make it stable. It's a system that was meant to take a changed 737 and make it fly nearly identical to a previous 737, so pilots didn't have to get a new type rating (a very big deal for airlines).
Juan Brown, a commercial pilot and certified flight mechanic, on YouTube has a (great series of videos)[https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL6SYmp3qb3uPp1DS7fDy7...] talking through the mess that is Boeing made of MCAS, including what the actual problem is.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is my understanding it is only necessary to make the Max 'compatible' with the 737 so nobody needed to be retrained and recertified.
My understanding is that, without MCAS or some other design change to fix its unacceptble handling characteristics near the stall, the 737 MAX would have been uncertifiable even as a new type. It is the way that Boeing went about implementing that fix, in an attempt to avoid an additional training requirement, that has caused all the trouble.
They also probably could have succeeded, too, if not for other systemic problems within the company.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not sure the FAA is at fault here. From a big-picture perspective, the industry has never been safer. Obviously, continuous improvement is a core part of quality, and the FAA can always learn and improve their processes, but you can't expect a regulator to shoulder the core responsibility of certifying a plane. The primary responsibility is always going to be on the manufacturer because no regulator will ever hav…
They absolutely can with the right amount of funding to maintain attractiveness. The regulator should be adversarial; period. A well-meaning adversary, but adversarial never the less. Cutting manufacturers as much slack as has been is exactly what got us to the point we're at; a regulator that collected rubber stamped reports and only heard about things going wrong after tragedy has already struck. It is better to ha…
The can of worms has been officially opened, and this may turn out to be a case study in how bad software and outsourcing your centers of excellence can bankrupt a company. If TFA is to believed, Boeing has embarked on a project to take what is currently a master-slave failover design and jury-rig it into a master-master real-time system. This is based on bad performance in the simulator—not because of MCAS—but while…
The can of worms has been officially opened, and this may turn out to be a case study in how bad software and outsourcing your centers of excellence can bankrupt a company. If TFA is to believed, Boeing has embarked on a project to take what is currently a master-slave failover design and jury-rig it into a master-master real-time system. This is based on bad performance in the simulator—not because of MCAS—but while…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Boeing could've said no.
In which case American would have bought exclusively new A320neo's. Boeing was caught flat-footed and underinvested in a new product in 2011. So while Boeing management could have said "No" to their largest (?) customer, that would have been a hard decision to make. And probably would have led to the board chopping C* heads for breach of fiduciary duty.
Of course every customer ever is always going to ask for products on a faster timeline at a cheaper price. That doesn't absolve the manufacturer of its responsibility to build a safe product.
I’m a rational person who enjoys flying, and I just never want to fly on a Max.
Based on one story from Bloomberg? That might be a tad premature - they never did address concerns with their "reporting" on the China server spying issue.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
>at least one of the pilots who flew the scenario in a simulator found it difficult to respond And I'm guessing their not using pilots of average skill here...
According to [0] the FAA was looking for numerous candidates to get a good range of experience, so I would think that you might’ve had at least a few average pilots. [0]: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-faa-boe...
...but on mission critical testing with billion dollar implications. You want to tell me they're pulling that name out of a hat?
The can of worms has been officially opened, and this may turn out to be a case study in how bad software and outsourcing your centers of excellence can bankrupt a company. If TFA is to believed, Boeing has embarked on a project to take what is currently a master-slave failover design and jury-rig it into a master-master real-time system. This is based on bad performance in the simulator—not because of MCAS—but while…
> bad software The software was fine (or at least not to blame). Unstable aeronautic design and lack of redundant sensors was the real problem.