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Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

bbc.com

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Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#181

Post by rosybox »

MSeven wrote: post #110
torgian wrote: post #28

"""On the matter of parts being lost, in early 2017 a review by the Federal Aviation Administration upheld Mr Barnett's concerns, establishing that the location of at least 53 "non-conforming" parts was unknown, and that they were considered lost. Boeing was ordered to take remedial action""" That's not just bad; this is really, _really_ bad. In my eight years of the Navy, working on aircraft, parts and tool accounta…

Just last week i heard a story from an older friend about a fighter jet crash investigation he was involved in, where the cause basically was that an engineer wired down some bolts (as required) but trimmed the ends of the wires without recovering the trimmed part. That little piece eventually found its way into the main stick mechanics, causing enough resistance at the wrong moment, preventing the pilot from recover…

I am really impressed that we are able to fly safely at all if a tiny little piece of debris like this can cause plane crashes. Debris is a fact of life. Things fall apart, small pieces come off whatever substance or piece they were attached to. Are maintenance crews constantly just taking aircraft apart and vacuuming every surface they find?

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#182

Post by DayDollar »

selectodude wrote: post #162
dgemm wrote: post #153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The 757 was made to replace the 727 and serves a different market segment than the 737.

I think you're missing the point, here. The 757 was a 727 replacement because the 737 was never meant to be flying the routes and carrying the pax that it is today. The 737 MAX 10 has become, pax wise, a direct competitor of the 757-200. Airlines are demanding a 757 that doesn't require a new type rating, which is how you get this frankensteins monster of an airplane.

Now, now, frankensteins monster could hold its ballance and had two sensors to sense the pitchfork wielding crowd.

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#183

Post by cmurf »

CaptainZapp wrote: post #142
cmurf wrote: post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This. The consternation and blame direct at Boeing, while appropriate, distracts from the real source of the problem: airlines. And Southwest Airlines was possibly one of the largest sources of the 737 MAX negative incentives, by having a contract reportedly require $1 million per airplane if a certain threshold of pilot training was exceeded. And to this day Southwest still doesn't think MAX specific simulator train…

The consternation and blame direct at Boeing, while appropriate, distracts from the real source of the problem: airlines. And Southwest Airlines was possibly one of the largest sources of the 737 MAX negative incentives, by having a contract reportedly require $1 million per airplane if a certain threshold of pilot training was exceeded Well, in this case I'd argue that it was totally Boeing's responsibility to commu…

In no possible reading of what I wrote is there an excuse for Boeing's culpability. I'm suggesting split culpability.

If I offer you $1 million to shoot someone, and you go do that, two crimes have been committed. Pointing out that I'm also culpable in no way excuses your culpability. I would be the real source of the crime, as the instigator, having set out a strong incentive to commit the crime against your otherwise better judgement.

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#184

Post by Franciscouzo »

Balgair wrote: post #129
missosoup wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. Spent some years working on an a class 2b diagnostic device. Potential for harm not that high, but the lack of rigour in testing leaves me wondering to this day whether it worked at all as advertised. If medical devices are ever open sourced, millions of critical bugs are going to fall out.

http://www.opensourcediabetes.org/ Already happening with Diabetics. I know a girl that has cracked her pump for closed loop performance and she says the results are mostly better, but take close monitoring and an active hand. It's a tricky thing still. Yes, the devices are buggy (all things are), but half of medical devices are used by people with below average intelligence (by definition). It's still a balancing ac…

Why would that be true by definition? Diabetes and IQ could be somehow correlated [0] (and other disorders too).

[0] https://diabetes.diabetesjournals.org/content/42/2/341.short

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#185

Post by phantomread »

inferiorhuman wrote: post #174
mopsi wrote: post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Airbus has similar long-standing issues. On ground / airborne detection logic was broken in 1993 and is still broken in 2019, to a point that it can cause loss of flight controls. Boeing, in contrast, uses simple radar altimeter. Whenever altitude reads 10 feet or less, the aircraft is considered to be "on ground" and things like thrust reversers become available. I personally avoid praising or preferring Airbus when…

Boeing, in contrast, uses simple radar altimeter. Which is problematic and has killed 134 people. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/easa-cautions-737... things like thrust reversers become available. Boeing rather famously had a problem with in-air thrust reverse deployment (not on the 73 though).

This doesn't change the point you're making, but thankfully it was only 9/134 people according to the article's tagline. The mix of the word "nine" and the number "134" makes it hard to spot

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#186

Post by innocenat »

tormeh wrote: post #135
salex89 wrote: post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The A380 might actually live the destiny of the 767 or 757. Sure, it was a handful for the manufacturer, luckily pulled it off, kinda broke even after some time. But it will be long gone when it will be really needed, when large hubs become even more congested or certain P2P lines heavily overgrow on themselves.

Good riddance. Despite being so big, its fuel efficiency is unimpressive. Something must be wrong with the design.

Yeah, the A380 designed for a longer fuselage so it's inefficient in the -800 variant.

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#187

Post by inferiorhuman »

phantomread wrote: post #185
inferiorhuman wrote: post #174

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Boeing, in contrast, uses simple radar altimeter. Which is problematic and has killed 134 people. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/easa-cautions-737... things like thrust reversers become available. Boeing rather famously had a problem with in-air thrust reverse deployment (not on the 73 though).

This doesn't change the point you're making, but thankfully it was only 9/134 people according to the article's tagline. The mix of the word "nine" and the number "134" makes it hard to spot

This doesn't change the point you're making, but thankfully it was only 9/134 people according to the article's tagline. The mix of the word "nine" and the number "134" makes it hard to spot

Yeah I'm familiar with the accident in question in passing so I just skimmed the article itself (whoops). RA failure on the 737 isn't unheard of:

https://avherald.com/h?article=4924e9ea (2015)

https://avherald.com/h?article=48c031e2 (2015)

https://avherald.com/h?article=4bc252c2 (2018)

https://avherald.com/h?article=417e726c (2009)

https://avherald.com/h?article=41e84cb5 (2009)

The in-flight thrust reverser deployment killed everyone on the plane, thankfully Niki Lauda took Boeing to task.

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#188

Post by inferiorhuman »

mopsi wrote: post #175
CaptainZapp wrote: post #141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Airbus has similar long-standing issues. On ground / airborne detection logic was broken in 1993 and is still broken in 2019, to a point that it can cause loss of flight controls. So you're claiming that Airbus knowingly leaves a critical defect in their planes, which may cause the loss of flight controls and which they refreain from fixing for almost 30 years? Either come up with a reliable source for this statement…

> So you're claiming that Airbus knowingly leaves a critical defect in their planes, which may cause the loss of flight controls and which they refreain from fixing for almost 30 years? A320's computers monitor gear for uncompression of 1 second or longer. Computers are not in sync. If landing gear decompresses due to bouncing for long enough to be seen for 1 second by one computer, but short enough to get missed by…

Especially so considering that there have been multiple hull-loss accidents with fatalities (LH2904, TAM3054), where air/ground detection has been a contributing factor. Throughout the years, the aircraft has been unable to tell whether it's on the ground or in the air.

With the Lufthansa flight the problem was not the aircraft design but rather that the pilot remained on only one main gear for too long. The Airbus design requires weight on both wheels (this had nothing to do with computers being out of sync) in order to prevent things like the Lauda Air (Boeing 767-300ER) crash where the thrust reversers deployed in flight causing the plane to drop out of the sky, killing everyone.

Same deal with the TAM flight. For whatever reason the pilots didn't properly position the thrust lever on one engine. That had nothing to do with computers being out of sync and had absolutely nothing to do with ground detection.

Meanwhile with the Boeing 737, a single (unreliable) radar altimeter (RA) is used as part of the ground detection and a single failed RA caused a Westjet 737 to start pulling back on the throttles.

http://avherald.com/h?article=41e84cb5

As far a the Turkish 737 crash:

http://avherald.com/h?article=41595ec3

During the accident flight, while executing the approach by means of the instrument landing system with the right autopilot engaged, the left radio altimeter system showed an incorrect height of -8 feet on the left primary flight display. This incorrect value of -8 feet resulted in activation of the ‘retard flare’ mode of the autothrottle, whereby the thrust of both engines was reduced to a minimal value (approach idle) in preparation for the last phase of the landing.

...

The problems with radio altimeter systems in the Boeing 737-800 fleet had been affecting several airlines, including Turkish Airlines, for many years and were known to Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America.

...

Despite the fact that Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America had been aware for many years that the radio altimeter system was causing many problems and was affecting the operation of other systems, this situation was not designated as a safety risk. Reports of problems with the radio altimeter system that could not be resolved by Boeing justified an effort to analyse the radio altimeter system and other related systems. Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America could have recognised the fact that the problems caused by the radio altimeter system, especially the potential for activating the autothrottle retard flare mode, posed a safety risk.

That sounds a lot like the engineering that went into MCAS - using only one input for something safety critical.

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#189

Post by LegitShady »

londons_explore wrote: post #46
piva00 wrote: post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Al Jazeera is in general completely biased against Israel and YES, I MENTIONED that I have issues with a lot of their reporting. At the same time watch the report and get your own conclusions before shooting it down based on YOUR biases and prejudices, that reporting is solid, it has video evidence from an employee walking inside the Charleston factory and chatting with co-workers regarding the safety of the planes a…

One ends up with the most rounded view of the world by reviewing media with many different slants and biases and assuming the truth probably lies somewhere between all the biased news stories.

What if it doesn't? What if there are 60 liars and 1 truth teller?

The assumption that everyone is telling the truth in a biased fashion is an incorrect assumption and leads to accepting lies from people who don't deserve your trust.

Re: Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen system

#190

Post by mopsi »

inferiorhuman wrote: post #174
mopsi wrote: post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Airbus has similar long-standing issues. On ground / airborne detection logic was broken in 1993 and is still broken in 2019, to a point that it can cause loss of flight controls. Boeing, in contrast, uses simple radar altimeter. Whenever altitude reads 10 feet or less, the aircraft is considered to be "on ground" and things like thrust reversers become available. I personally avoid praising or preferring Airbus when…

Boeing, in contrast, uses simple radar altimeter. Which is problematic and has killed 134 people. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/easa-cautions-737... things like thrust reversers become available. Boeing rather famously had a problem with in-air thrust reverse deployment (not on the 73 though).

> Which is problematic

Not at all. Its malfunctions are clear and obvious. If autothrottle starts moving thrust levers in unexpected ways, you turn the autothrottle off and assume manual control.

Thrust levers, reversers, braking or any other systems were not blocked or deployed unexpectedly. The aircraft simply reduced thrust too much while in control of speed, which is something one should always look out for, it's an expected failure, a known unknown.

The Turkish airplane crashed because the crew was flying an unstable approach and did not pay attention to warnings because their style of flying was expected to trigger warnings. This obscured the malfunction.

They came in too fast and too steep, ignored aural warnings, let thrust levers move to idle (which they expected because of high speed), failed to monitor airspeed and didn't notice last minute warnings because they were occupied with checklist that they should've already been through.

No-one was actually flying the airplane, despite the fact that there was an extra third safety pilot in the cockpit who was tasked with observing the flight.

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