As I understand these RCEs (in general; perhaps not this particular one), a frequent root cause seems to be saving instruction pointer on the stack adjacent to untrustworthy data which may have propagated down the call chain. Are there no initiatives being attempted to change this convention? Like not save the IP on the stack? Perhaps at the CPU architecture level or at the compiler level?
Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
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Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#32As I understand these RCEs (in general; perhaps not this particular one), a frequent root cause seems to be saving instruction pointer on the stack adjacent to untrustworthy data which may have propagated down the call chain. Are there no initiatives being attempted to change this convention? Like not save the IP on the stack? Perhaps at the CPU architecture level or at the compiler level?
Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#33As I understand these RCEs (in general; perhaps not this particular one), a frequent root cause seems to be saving instruction pointer on the stack adjacent to untrustworthy data which may have propagated down the call chain. Are there no initiatives being attempted to change this convention? Like not save the IP on the stack? Perhaps at the CPU architecture level or at the compiler level?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Return-oriented_programming
Note that this was a heap attack (free after use)
Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#34Attacking a Korean news website hey? I wonder who might want to do that...
Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#35I wonder if this exploit would be possible if Chrome was packaged using the UWP Desktop Bridge on Windows 10. I doubt the sandbox prevents UAF, but surely it would have prevented executing an EXE file.
(not sure if chrome is available as an official snap)
Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#36Tragedy of our generation is that people who are so smart and determined to find and exploit these vulnerabilities, can't find better uses for their talents.
Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#37Well, Chrome is indeed the new Internet Explorer. A new favorite target for threat actors.
Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#38I wonder if this exploit would be possible if Chrome was packaged using the UWP Desktop Bridge on Windows 10. I doubt the sandbox prevents UAF, but surely it would have prevented executing an EXE file.
I wonder the same thing with Linux contained executables, such as snap. (not sure if chrome is available as an official snap)
Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
Or maybe society isn't providing them an accessible application for their talents.
Don't improve the product, just find dumber customers! Don’t lose weight, just buy bigger trousers! Don’t take personal responsibility, just blame society!
Personal responsibility is important. And even if you're bored, there are things to do other than hacking.
But working mind-numbing jobs , way below one's skills and talents happens to such a large share of people.
Maybe it's a sign to a problem with society ?
Re: Chrome 0-day exploit used in Operation WizardOpium
#40Tragedy of our generation is that people who are so smart and determined to find and exploit these vulnerabilities, can't find better uses for their talents.
In this day and age, it could also be well paid nation state hackers. It is well understood that places like the NSA actively seek out zero day exploits and use them to perform whatever operations they need to do. They don't report them to software devs that can patch them.