I’m genuinely curious how this happens. I remember my first job in the industry, just out of university. I knew nothing about security, but still wouldn’t have done that. My first gig was in a credit union software company, and the security standards were nonexistent, yet we still had more reasonable passwords than this (which sounds like an installation default).
Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
41–50 of 227 posts
Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#42I’m genuinely curious how this happens. I remember my first job in the industry, just out of university. I knew nothing about security, but still wouldn’t have done that. My first gig was in a credit union software company, and the security standards were nonexistent, yet we still had more reasonable passwords than this (which sounds like an installation default).
To keep high security at all times you need:
1) Process aka bureaucracy. Mandatory checklists. Checklists are returned and inspected by others. Anything missing or uncertain is checked again and fixed.
2) People who are responsible for security are independent from other concerns. They can have adversarial relationship with people responsible for getting things done if there is conflict of interest. People responsible for security must have status and power to enforce it.
Consider a scenario where you need to take the system down and fix something quickly. It's completely reasonable to allow dummy password few hours when people are around fixing the problem until the system is back online.
But if there is no process in place to remove security temporarily and then restore it something is always forgotten. People who would order password to be changed is not using it and forgets the whole thing. People who use it don't say anything and it becomes new normal.
You need to mandate checklists. You force people to use them and return them. It's costly and makes things slower.
Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#43I’m genuinely curious how this happens. I remember my first job in the industry, just out of university. I knew nothing about security, but still wouldn’t have done that. My first gig was in a credit union software company, and the security standards were nonexistent, yet we still had more reasonable passwords than this (which sounds like an installation default).
Usually they rely on some other mechanism for security. Like you can only access the portal admin page from the intranet or a few IP addresses. That has failed, not the fact that they didn't change the password.
Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#44I'm using that headline as our thought of the day in group chat at work. Because that is just egregious and negligent. Nobody thought to raise that? to anyone? Although I can understand. I have several people who now call themselves DevOps on a project who have practically zero experience with systems operations _or_ development, and have done some utterly incomprehensibly stupid things. It doesn't matter how fancy y…
IMO, the first step to fixing the problem is give DevOps the proper amount of time to design the required permissions. It sounds easy from the outside, but again IAM can be very complex.
Additionally, DevOps must think security first. That means a newly deployed service has zero access and goes from there. Developers are going to be annoyed, but DevOps needs work with them and vice versa.
Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#45I’m genuinely curious how this happens. I remember my first job in the industry, just out of university. I knew nothing about security, but still wouldn’t have done that. My first gig was in a credit union software company, and the security standards were nonexistent, yet we still had more reasonable passwords than this (which sounds like an installation default).
I'll tell you how this happens: Colleague #1: "What password shall we set?" Colleague #2: "Just leave it default for now as we're still testing, we will change it later".
Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#46Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#47At least they had a password /s
Are you being serious? If a bank "locked" its vault by tying the door closed with yarn, would you say "at least they locked it"?
Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#48On a serious note: there should be a mandated, periodic, third-party security audit by neutral parties for all entities which deal with user data beyond a certain specified level of sensitivity. It should not be left to their discretion when to run such an audit from their end. Whether an entity similar to SEC for the stock exchange is desirable can be debated, but the current laissez faire approach to data will lead to even more such disasters.
Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#49I’m genuinely curious how this happens. I remember my first job in the industry, just out of university. I knew nothing about security, but still wouldn’t have done that. My first gig was in a credit union software company, and the security standards were nonexistent, yet we still had more reasonable passwords than this (which sounds like an installation default).
Re: Equifax securities fraud class action [pdf]
#50I'm using that headline as our thought of the day in group chat at work. Because that is just egregious and negligent. Nobody thought to raise that? to anyone? Although I can understand. I have several people who now call themselves DevOps on a project who have practically zero experience with systems operations _or_ development, and have done some utterly incomprehensibly stupid things. It doesn't matter how fancy y…
You'd be surprised how much "inertia" there is in other sectors, some stuff keeps happening even when alternatives are not just better, but also cheaper.