Earlier quoted context omitted.
Stab trim cutout has been the response item for a long time. Before the stab trim was turned on again the plane was climbing. "unstoppable MCAS" * Leave stab trim cut * Hold electric trim up * Control airspeed * etc... AoA senor is not a single point of failure. The 737 is not a fully automatic / flight protected plane. ie, the plane will continue flying with very little sensor input at all - you can even dispatch wi…
Thank goodness it's so safe! I am glad we are only talking about theoretical crazy combinations of events that can lead to a crash... You brought up faulty replacement parts yourself as a contributing cause, but when challenged you switch to methods to stop the unstoppable, undocumented MCAS. To which faulty part were you referring? The unimportant, non-SPOF AOA sensor?
In the US there were close calls, but fewer. If you beleive in the chain of safety better maintenance and pilot response may have saved the day a few times when faced with the MCAS problems. The safety reports from US pilots certainly sound scary (nose down on takeoff GPWS alerts etc).
I brought up maintenance as a contributing cause in the 737MAX crashes. I didn't realize I had been challenged on this. I would really encourage you to read some of the source reporting.
The FAA had a safety notice on this precise topic
"FAA has determined it is necessary to advise operators of the importance of performing proper operations and maintenance on AOA sensors”
This is the detail on the previous lionair flight before the crash flight - from wikipedia to save time:
"it had problems maintaining a constant altitude, with passengers stating that it was like "a roller-coaster ride".[109] The chief executive officer of Lion Air, Edward Sirait, said the aircraft had a "technical issue" on Sunday night, but this had been addressed in accordance with maintenance manuals issued by the manufacturer. Engineers had declared that the aircraft was ready for takeoff on the morning of the accident.[110][111] A later report claimed that a third pilot was on the flight to Jakarta and told the crew to cut power to the stabilizer trim motors which fixed the problem. This method is a standard memory item in the 737 checklist.[112] Subsequently, the National Transportation Safety Committee confirmed the presence of an off-duty Boeing 737 MAX 8 qualified pilot in the cockpit but did not confirm the role of the pilot in fixing the problem.[113]
Even worse is the history before that flight - REPEATED problems with the senor.
We are also now hearing that evidence submitted by lion air supposedly showing the proper fix for the sensor may have been faked.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/questions-raised-about...
In terms of faulty replacement parts - my point was issues occur overseas that do not seem to happen within the US MROs. I'll do a quick recent example:
https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sunday-times-1107/2...
This follows the ex-president of south africa appointing a school teacher to head SAA (who also ran his private foundation and rumors around their relationship existed).
I'm not sure why you claim AoA is unimportant. In the chain of safety you want every advantage you can get, the more accurate data the better. So you want the AoA working. This reduces risks from MCAS. You are correct - AoA is not a single point of failure system (system is not working / plane falls from sky). There was a poster here claiming that it was.