Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company • Hacker News Board

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#191

Post by bigiain » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 1:51 AM UTC

salawat wrote: post #177

OnlineGladiator wrote: post #173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd love for Tesla to be transparent about this as well, but the onus is on the driver to understand how their car works. Maybe we need higher standards for getting a driver's license.

Why does Tesla get a pass in terms of pitching that their system is something that it isn't except in the obligatory fine print? Hell, both Boeing and Tesla can be said to have indulged in the same sin: not accurately communicating the nature and capabilities of their product to the end user Taking the viewpoint that caveat emptor absolves the manufacturer of any complicity in mass producing and delivering for use da…

> not accurately communicating the nature and capabilities of their product to the end user

I think it's becoming clear that at least Boeing have also indulged in "actively deceiving the regulator" as well as the end user.

(It may be that Tesla have also done that, but at least so far nothing like as egregiously as Boeing's recently revealed internal comms...)

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#192

Post by salawat » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:05 AM UTC

privateSFacct wrote: post #170

salawat wrote: post #163

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One more thing, the flight computer was eventually found to be a single point of failure after being subjected to testing that should have been done in the first place. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/newly... Another regulatory no-no that wasn't brought up until the certified aircraft had been out in the wild long enough to kill people.

Is this the five independent bit flips in worst possible order and combination from cosmic rays failure? First -> if this is your worst failure mode (ie, worse than pilot error, mechanical fatigue and failure, engine failures, fueling issues, crazy passengers etc) then you have a plane and overall safety system that is incredible. Second -> this wild set of events again does not crash the plane - though it would put…

>First -> if this is your worst failure mode (ie, worse than pilot error, mechanical fatigue and failure, engine failures, fueling issues, crazy passengers etc) then you have a plane and overall safety system that is incredible.

Or would be, if it didn't violate design constraints that demand no single point of failure can have the capability to result in loss of the aircraft. I.e. components with failure profiles of catastrophic severity MUST have redundancy. You test the least likely events to ensure you have sufficient fault tolerance for that very reason.

>Second -> this wild set of events again does not crash the plane - though it would put the pilots in a bad spot similar to the existing MCAS issues.

Actually, one of the three test pilots did in fact lose the plane in the simulator. Hence the reclassification of the flight computer as a component with a catastrophic failure potential.

Look, I'm about the last person you're going to get to buy into the awesome safety of an aircraft that can't even pass a textbook test case for computing in adverse environments. If the bloody thing was so safe and high quality, it wouldn't have been able to suffer that induced failure in the first place. It would have been designed out. The fact Boeing was caught off guard by that failure means they weren't looking very hard, and were banking that no one else would either. Which is generally a really bad assumption to make, because Murphy finds a way. Every time.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#193

Post by D_Alex » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:24 AM UTC

na85 wrote: post #74

platz wrote: post #2

> Why did Boeing buy McDonnell-Douglas? Because the airplane manufacturing industry is consolidating, and Boeing is pursuing profit at the expense of human lives. Was it really necessary to add the second part to explain why the merger occured? 'industry is consolidating' seems reason enough. The mixing of explanation with moralism in every sentence is grating. Put the moralism and ethics in it's own paragraph so we…

>The mixing of explanation with moralism in every sentence is grating. At the fundamental level, Engineering is a social/ethical process, not a technical one. Yes, engineers tend to have technical skills but when you use those skills to design a bridge you must always keep society (the users of your product) at the forefront of your mind. What separates engineers from "skilled people" is professional ethics. An engin…

>why they find this comment so inappropriate

It is just wrong.

>Engineering is a social/ethical process, not a technical one

This is just bizarre.

>Yes, engineers tend to have technical skills

...tend to have???

>What separates engineers from "skilled people" is professional ethics

I'd argue that it is specialized education

> when you use those skills to design a bridge >An engineer... who does not consider the ethics of their work cannot credibly claim to be an engineer at all.

A bridge is usually designed by a team of engineers, who will get a specification (usually from another team of engineers and other professionals).

One engineer may be a geotechnical expert, another might design piling, a third will specify the cement and aggregates in the concrete etc etc. Each contribution must meet the applicable technical standards and specifications. Apart from making sure your work is correct, how do you bring ethics into calculating the amount of rebar in your concrete slab??

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#194

Post by downrightmike » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:28 AM UTC

jl2718 wrote: post #180

downrightmike wrote: post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unless you look at long term focused companies like Amazon, which is creating all kinds of value without bowing down to short term market analysts. Had Boeing looked beyond the immediate future and planned to upgrade the 737 frame, or make a new one so it could support the much larger engines, they wouldn't be in this situation. But short term costs and profits, outsourcing and negligence is running the company. Brea…

Amazon is a case of purposely cultivating long-term investors and analysts. Somehow they made a case that their intangible NPV is much larger than other companies with similar profits. However, history indicates that a CFO will soon take over, start outsourcing, and they will be more profitable, but their long-term investors will sell to short-term investors and give them short-term valuations (lower NPV).

Jeff would never give up any control, at least not until there are O'neil cylinders in orbit.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#195

Post by na85 » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:30 AM UTC

D_Alex wrote: post #193

na85 wrote: post #74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>The mixing of explanation with moralism in every sentence is grating. At the fundamental level, Engineering is a social/ethical process, not a technical one. Yes, engineers tend to have technical skills but when you use those skills to design a bridge you must always keep society (the users of your product) at the forefront of your mind. What separates engineers from "skilled people" is professional ethics. An engin…

>why they find this comment so inappropriate It is just wrong. >Engineering is a social/ethical process, not a technical one This is just bizarre. >Yes, engineers tend to have technical skills ... tend to have??? >What separates engineers from "skilled people" is professional ethics I'd argue that it is specialized education > when you use those skills to design a bridge >An engineer... who does not consider the ethi…

>...tend to have???

I don't know about you, but there are lots of people I know who call themselves engineers but aren't actually very skilled at all.

>Apart from making sure your work is correct, how do you bring ethics into calculating the amount of rebar in your concrete slab??

I think it's pretty obvious that I was using "design a bridge" as a proxy for any engineering work. But to answer your question: by making sure you do your due diligence with your work, and push back against superiors who want you to cut corners in your analysis for money, of course.

The same way it works in any discipline of engineering. The engineers at Boeing appear to have been unsuccessful in changing the cost-cutting culture of their company, and the executives who ordered the cost cutting are ethically deficient. To put the ethics aside is to absolve the executives of responsibility. If you want a technical writeup of the MCAS debacle, the issue has been discussed ad nauseam in the crash reports. But those reports will lead to no material change if the CEO and other execs aren't willing to change their expectations.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#196

Post by hannasanarion » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:32 AM UTC

AnimalMuppet wrote: post #184

hannasanarion wrote: post #153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because the owner isn't the state, it's the employees. That's not nationalization, that's cooperative-ization. Corporations aren't dictated on what to do from above, they are organized democratically from below. My understanding of the Sanders plan is to require that all quarterly dividends include a stock issuance to employees of a company, with the eventual requirement that all corporations above a certain size mus…

If Boeing (management, or board, or shareholders) wants to give part of the company to the employees, that's their business. But if Sanders makes them, that's taking the company from the shareholders. That's nationalization. The fact that he then gives it to the employees doesn't change the fact that the government took it in the first place.

That's patently absurd, and you know it.

>Nationalization:

>the transfer of a major branch of industry or commerce from private to state ownership or control.

Employee ownership is not state ownership.

By this logic, the US already has state-owned healthcare, since the government mandates that employers provide health coverage. Do you also believe that the US government is seizing business revenue by requiring that employers pay wages?

You're just desperate to find a snarl-word you can attach to this obviously reasonable and largely undisruptive plan.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#197

Post by na85 » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:38 AM UTC

ChuckMcM wrote: post #83

platz wrote: post #2

> Why did Boeing buy McDonnell-Douglas? Because the airplane manufacturing industry is consolidating, and Boeing is pursuing profit at the expense of human lives. Was it really necessary to add the second part to explain why the merger occured? 'industry is consolidating' seems reason enough. The mixing of explanation with moralism in every sentence is grating. Put the moralism and ethics in it's own paragraph so we…

I don't disagree, it is grating, but I read it more as an observation than as an intent. When you are in senior management, you make decisions based on their overall effect on the company's financial health or future growth. That is your job, just like it is the engineer's job to make decisions based on overall safety and reliability or future capability. The debate, or perhaps the proof, is what happens next. Every…

>When you are in senior management, you make decisions based on their overall effect on the company's financial health or future growth. That is your job, just like it is the engineer's job to make decisions based on overall safety and reliability or future capability.

I find this statement very troubling. You seem to be absolving the corporate/C-level class of any moral or ethical culpability when it comes to the consequences of their decisions, so long as "it makes business sense".

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#198

Post by WalterBright » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:39 AM UTC

salawat wrote: post #190

WalterBright wrote: post #172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Boeing relied on the pilot noticing runaway stabilizer and doing what they're trained to do on runaway stabilizer - turn off the trim motors. The first of the 3 sets of pilots did this, and landed without incident. The next set overrode MCAS successfully 25 times, inexplicably did not turn off the trim, did not override it the last time, and crashed. The last set successfully countered MCAS twice, then turned off the…

>The first of the 3 sets of pilots did this, and landed without incident. Extra pilot in cockpit. Not a CRM situation that's a given. >The next set overrode MCAS successfully 25 times, inexplicably did not turn off the trim, did not override it the last time, and crashed. They didn't know why the trim was kicking in in the first place, and the senior pilot was the one countering the trim. He handed it off to the juni…

> They didn't know why the trim was kicking in in the first place

Unknown cause is symptomatic of runaway trim.

> The behavior did not present as a classic stabilizer runaway

How is runaway trim different from classic runaway trim? The trim was mysteriously turning on and trying to drive the nose into the ground. If that isn't runaway trim, I have no idea what runaway trim is.

BTW, I worked for 3 years on the Boeing 757 stabilizer trim gearbox. I know what runaway trim is. The cutoff switches are there as the last resort to stopping it, and they're prominently and conveniently on the center console for darn good reason.

> if pilots were really held to account for knowing the hardware they're operating

The point being, even if they knew what MCAS was, the corrective action is the exact same thing as in the instructions provided by Boeing, before and after the Lion Air crash.

> They did follow it actually

I'm glad you read it, but read it again. They did not follow it.

> clearly communicating the severity of the problem

Considering that it was an emergency mandatory notification, and the LA pilots had already crashed, I don't know how to harder communicate the severity. I'm not a pilot, but if I was a MAX pilot, I'd certainly not want to die the same way the LA pilots did, and I'd pay attention to an AD explaining how not to die.

But I do agree that evidently pilots needed more training to understand what to do about runaway trim, which they need to understand regardless of whether MCAS is causing the runaway trim or some other problem. There's a reason the runaway trim procedure is something that is a memory item, meaning pilots are supposed to know what to do about it without needing to consult the checklist. Training in this is clearly insufficient.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#199

Post by Obi_Juan_Kenobi » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:43 AM UTC

mltony wrote: post #85

> The new engines were too big to fit in their traditional spot under the wings. To combat the problem, Boeing mounted them forward on the wings. Moving the engine position forward shifted the plane’s center of gravity, which altered the aerodynamics of the aircraft. The position of the new engines pulled the 737 tail down, pushed its nose up, and put it at risk of stalling. Can someone explain to me how this is poss…

The pitch-up moment caused by the engine placement only occurs at high AoA. Basically, as you start to pitch up more and more, eventually the engine nacelles 'catch the wind' forward of the wings and CoM, and try to flip the nose up.

For whatever reason, the basic facts of this whole debacle are consistently wrong in reporting and discussion. Common falsehoods:

* The 737MAX is inherently unstable. No, it is a stable aircraft as required by FAA regulation that all passenger aircraft be as such. Nothing about the airframe or design is even that remarkable, beyond the simple fact that it is different from the older models.

* MCAS is anti-stall. No, MCAS does exactly what it's named for, to modify and augment the 'feel' of the flight stick for the pilot. Because Boeing uses a 'pilot in the loop' design approach, the physical feedback from the flight stick is critical to safe flying, and cannot be faked.

What MCAS does is make is to that you have to apply a proportional amount of force on the flight stick to pitch up a given amount (regulations define how far from linear this relationship can be). With the new engine placement, it would not require as much force as you would expect from earlier planes, which could lead to pilots approaching stall conditions unknowingly without that feedback. There are still anti-stall measures to prevent an actual stall (e.g. stick shakers), but the intuitive 'feel' of flying would be lost.

The initial MCAS design was reasonable, but test pilots felt that it wasn't strong enough, so it was changed. It is at this point, with no critical review being triggered, that the failure took place. The stronger system put pilots in a catastrophic situation in the event of a malfunction, and two independent flight crews failed to overcome the error.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#200

Post by Iv » Mon, Oct 21, 2019, 2:49 AM UTC

jl2718 wrote: post #44

Note two contradictory popular trends: 1. AI is going to replace cheap labor 2. Engineering companies are outsourcing because of cheap labor The reality is that trend #2 is orders of magnitude larger. Any reversal of that by ‘AI’ would be the biggest jobs boom in decades for western nations, and according to this article, would increase quality and therefore trade balance as well. The other reality is that manufactur…

I think China's development stalled automation efforts for two decades.

Now finally that China starts being too expensive, once investors will realize it is complicated and costly to outsource to Vietnam, India or African countries, I hope this effort will resume.