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Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

perell.com

11–20 of 234 posts

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#11
post #2

> Why did Boeing buy McDonnell-Douglas? Because the airplane manufacturing industry is consolidating, and Boeing is pursuing profit at the expense of human lives. Was it really necessary to add the second part to explain why the merger occured? 'industry is consolidating' seems reason enough. The mixing of explanation with moralism in every sentence is grating. Put the moralism and ethics in it's own paragraph so we…

It’s a hyperbolic statement. Boeing employees and engineers also fly on those planes with their families. It isn’t like they are making decisions with the intent of compromising safety.

i have quite the video for you (timestamped, but the whole thing is worth watching): https://youtu.be/rvkEpstd9os?t=2499

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#13
post #3

Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator? It’s easy to look back with retrospect and make sweeping judgements about the entire company and the FAA. But fundamentally this was all over, as the author mentions, a single software bug and a lack of backup sensors to offset the risk. In addition it was the technical pilots who asked for the stick to be harder…

The article is not a complete overview of the situation. For that we go to Wiki.

"Boeing considered MCAS part of the flight control system, and elected to not describe it in the flight manual or in training materials."

It... "could not be overridden by pilot resistance against the control wheel as on previous versions of the 737."

"Following the Lion Air accident, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB)[13] which outlined the many indications and effects resulting from erroneous AOA data and provided instructions to turn off the motorized trim system for the remainder of the flight, and trim manually instead. Until Boeing supplemented the manuals[14] and training, pilots were unaware of the existence of MCAS due to its omission from the crew manual and no coverage in training.[12]"

It wasn't just "a software bug". It wasn't just culture cutting corners. Even after the first crash they continued to cover up that MCAS was the cause. After the second crash they still refused and it wasn't until airlines started grounding planes that they caved in.

There's a lot more than regulatory oversight could have done. We haven't reached the limits in the slightest.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#14

Silly corporations, pursuing profit instead of the good of everyone. Why would we expect any corporation to cut corners to improve profits, which is definitely not what private for-profit corporations are explicitly organized to accomplish? What a weird thing that nobody could have predicted. Really tickles my nose. Makes me want to sneeze actually. aaaa AAAA AAAAAACHSEIZETHEMEANSOFPRODUCTION that was a weird one, so…

Er, we have through the stock market.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#15
post #3

Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator? It’s easy to look back with retrospect and make sweeping judgements about the entire company and the FAA. But fundamentally this was all over, as the author mentions, a single software bug and a lack of backup sensors to offset the risk. In addition it was the technical pilots who asked for the stick to be harder…

[deleted]

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#16
post #3

Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator? It’s easy to look back with retrospect and make sweeping judgements about the entire company and the FAA. But fundamentally this was all over, as the author mentions, a single software bug and a lack of backup sensors to offset the risk. In addition it was the technical pilots who asked for the stick to be harder…

Its not that it was just a difficult bug.

Its that politics got in the way of doing the right thing, which is declare the airplane "new" and re-train the pilots (vs a plain modification). Boeing didn't want to do that as customers didn't want the retraining expense so they used lobbying and cut the corner.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#17
post #3

Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator? It’s easy to look back with retrospect and make sweeping judgements about the entire company and the FAA. But fundamentally this was all over, as the author mentions, a single software bug and a lack of backup sensors to offset the risk. In addition it was the technical pilots who asked for the stick to be harder…

No its not to the standards of a modern design. It's one of the primary reasons they grandfathered the airframe in, not having to address safety concerns like their doors.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#18
post #3

Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator? It’s easy to look back with retrospect and make sweeping judgements about the entire company and the FAA. But fundamentally this was all over, as the author mentions, a single software bug and a lack of backup sensors to offset the risk. In addition it was the technical pilots who asked for the stick to be harder…

It also relied on a the pilot as a critical control - which is why there was no real automated backup or redundancy.

Not unreasonable, doing stab trim cutout is a memory item for most operating manuals - pilots were already the circuit breaker for other stab trim issues.

Automation working - great. Maintenance failures? Provide error messages (which occured here). Maintenance issues not resolved and automation misbehevior? Stab trim cutout memory item.

Despite all the claims that the stab trim cutout did not work all real evidence is that it did. Other issues around pressure on flight surfaces not explored properly making recovery in overspeed and other conditions very hard.

Badly designed system? Definitely. Brittle when facing poor maintenance? Clearly! Not taking into account broad pilot population. Of course. Definitely should be fixed, and frankly automation probably will be increased to decrease assumptions around pilot behavior which can be variable.

This accident was the result not only of this bug but a chain of issues. That's why flying in the US is pretty safe, the chain from procurement to maintenance to pilot training is strong so compensates for poor elements.

If you follow SAA technical for example there is evidence overseas that bogus parts are making it into plane repairs, with predictably bad results. We are not seeing that in the US (yet), though if inspections get soft I'm sure it would show up here too. Those bogus repairs will mean that some automation will break and the plane may not behave properly in ways that could have been designed around with better assumptions.

My prediction? We are going to get iphone style authentication / serial number chips in key plane parts with electrical connections and the plane will eventually refuse to fly without the right parts - just like your coffee maker and iphone. Right now it is trust based.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#19
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s a hyperbolic statement. Boeing employees and engineers also fly on those planes with their families. It isn’t like they are making decisions with the intent of compromising safety.

i have quite the video for you (timestamped, but the whole thing is worth watching): https://youtu.be/rvkEpstd9os?t=2499

Seems like a totally unbiased source. /s

I mean, do you really not understand how that sort of thing is done? They ask 100 people and then edit it down to the 5 most extreme responses.

Re: Boeing Engineers Lost Control of the Company

#20
post #17
post #3

Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator? It’s easy to look back with retrospect and make sweeping judgements about the entire company and the FAA. But fundamentally this was all over, as the author mentions, a single software bug and a lack of backup sensors to offset the risk. In addition it was the technical pilots who asked for the stick to be harder…

No its not to the standards of a modern design. It's one of the primary reasons they grandfathered the airframe in, not having to address safety concerns like their doors.

They grandfathered the frame--and added MCAS-- to avoid a new certificate and added cost/time to their customers. What you point out is one of many consequences, not the reason.

(Aircraft doors are interesting on their own as well, due to the assumptions that drive design, testing, and certification.)

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