One comparison I don't see yet, which is the easiest and most non-technical I know: E2EE communication is just a long-distance version of
speech. The usual comparison for E2EE is physical mail, but the entire argument happens over the flaws of the metaphor. The lack of bulk mail analysis or systematic mail fraud means that the good and bad parts of encryption are both mostly hypothetical.
Talking make a much better comparison. When you say something, someone can listen or record you, just like E2EE doesn't protect against shoulder-surfing or a compromised device. But once you've said a thing, it's gone. It's not just inadmissable but inaccessible. No police tactic in the world can physically reconstruct it, and the Fifth Amendment says you can't be forced to confess anything incriminating that you've said. (The comparison for encrypting illegal media is messier, but a spoken threat is a crime composed only of words, so we could compare that to an encrypted picture.)
And vitally, all the things governments warn about E2EE apply to speech. People use speech to plot all sorts of heinous acts. Criminals gravitate towards in-person speech instead of using letters or phone calls. Whether it's clergy covering up child abuse or terrorists plotting bombings, talking is the standard method of coordinating crimes without leaving evidence. There's speech which is itself criminal, like threatening bodily injury, which leaves no evidence after it's said. When people resort to speech instead of calls or letters, the job of the police gets harder. If everyone had to carry a running voice recorder or make phone calls, it would be much easier to convict criminals, and bulk analysis could be used to be proactive about terrorism and abuse instead of investigating after the fact.
It's hopefully intuitive to most people why "all speech needs to be recorded for police use" is unacceptable. "Nothing to hide" doesn't justify letting the police in on your pillow talk. Bulk analysis of who's talking about what is abhorrent, but warrant-only access isn't tolerable either. The government would abuse the system, private people would try to break into the logs, and the breach of privacy is fundamentally out of bounds regardless. And policing still happens just fine without such a log. Officers listen as people speak, just like they can monitor a device before it sends a message. People who hear bad things said report them. When physical crimes are plotted, the crimes leave evidence. And for speech like threats, we can still collect witness accounts or convict over follow-through. The government doesn't need a log of everything we say.
In the same way that all the horrors of cryptocurrency are grandfathered into cash, the menace of encrypted texts is already present in everyday speech, but the world keeps turning.