Earlier quoted context omitted.
Their logic was that pilots are trained to deal with runaway trim, a MCAS failure is runaway trim, ergo pilots are trained to deal with a MCAS failure. Obviously that logic turned out to be faulty but it's not like Boeing made some outlandish leap here.
You're right. Boeing did not make an outlandish leap of logic, or any leap of logic at all in this context, because it was fully their intent to get away with no training. They worked their butts off to minimize the training, to minimize even the very idea that training was needed, and to prevent the Max from having to be re-certified by the FAA.
Of course, we can just as easily blame the FAA. If it's so hard to establish a differential training program then maybe the re-certification program the FAA requires (to certify a pilot to fly a slightly different aircraft) is too onerous. It's easy for the government to require too much work and seize up innovation, and I think we see that at work here. If the re-certification program wasn't so onerous, we could have seen Boeing put in some new warning conditions, or a better control layout that more clearly indicates the presence and activation of the MCAS, train pilots on that, and have a better, safer, airplane.