Earlier quoted context omitted.
The general idea was that pilots would correctly recognize large amounts of undesired and uncommanded trim being runaway trim and perform the checklist to resolve that issue that they are expected to know by memory, since there is a need to execute it fast, without paging through the Quick Reference Handbook. This is not a checklist that was introduced with the 737 MAX, but one that has existed since the introduction…
> "Boeing's designs reflect a US-centric expectation of pilots" So we are expected to believe that Boeing never connected the dots between: 1. We design planes for US pilots 2. We sell planes abroad 3. Incidents abroad can ground an entire aircraft series This makes them seem more incompetent, not less. It's not like they have no say in what's considered standardized training for the series.
Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
241–250 of 317 posts
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#242Earlier quoted context omitted.
Better avoid Airbus, then, because there's a massive control law between the pilots and the actuators to create a "do what I mean" interface with envelope protection and all kinds of characteristics tamed. https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Flight_Control_Laws#Norm... Boeing has mostly avoided that. MCAS is kind of an unusual form of control augmentation as far as Boeing is concerned.
Thanks. I couldnt agree more. It would make sense if the bar was higher for adding control software than training pilots. To me it seems like the type cert problem was backwards.
Automation definitely has directly killed people, though, too.
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#243Earlier quoted context omitted.
In aviation we tend to look at failure chains . There are many, many things that went wrong: 1. The stuck AOA instrumentation on the plane. 2. MCAS not using redundant AOA information and being fooled by the stuck instrumentation. 3. Lack of clear indication of what MCAS was doing contributing to flight crew confusion. 4. Improper execution of the runaway trim procedure/checklist by flight crew. 5. Training shortcomi…
Agreed! Your comment reminds me a lot of this 1998 article about the ValuJet crash in Flordia https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/03/the-les... Specifically it's the argument in the article that large disasters often have multiple causes. "Perrow says, Murphy's Law is wrong—what can go wrong usually goes right. But then one day a few of the bad little choices come together, and circumstances take an air…
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#244Using the top 1% talent or whatever is sure to gloss over flaws that will bite avg pilots in the ass in real life
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#245Which is a pretty bad standard.
A better standard is that the 20% percentile commerical pilot can land the plane.
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#246Actually they must use the worst pilots. If they use average pilots that means 50% of the pilots might be out of their depth flying that plane. What kind of insanity is this?
I agree. Though I would also feel pretty disheartened if I got a call from them after that decision was made - "Hey, we need someone of your skill level to come in and fly some test planes" "...okay"
The Max needs to ensure that 80% ("average" is too low a standard) of tested pilots recover the plane.
The other 20% take remedial classes.
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#247Earlier quoted context omitted.
In aviation we tend to look at failure chains . There are many, many things that went wrong: 1. The stuck AOA instrumentation on the plane. 2. MCAS not using redundant AOA information and being fooled by the stuck instrumentation. 3. Lack of clear indication of what MCAS was doing contributing to flight crew confusion. 4. Improper execution of the runaway trim procedure/checklist by flight crew. 5. Training shortcomi…
Nope, the excessive authority given to MCAS in combination with the hard to rewind trim (particularly at high speeds) were a mousetrap to be sprung. There are many ways to trigger this mousetrap. This is not a chain, this is a cluster with many chains hanging from it.
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#248Earlier quoted context omitted.
"Simplify and streamline" is exactly not the solution here, in fact the issue was that the relevant information was invisible and hidden from pilots, not that there was too much. Not everything in good design needs to end up looking like a Fischer-Price toy. The main problems from my limited understanding were: pilots didn't know the subsystem existed; they didn't know it had activated; they didn't know what it was d…
True, but too much instrumentation is also a problem. I'm into synthesizers, which run the gamut from bleep-bloop toys to movie-soundtrack in a box. Mostly, synths are marketed like 'Not only can the Omnicron Neutron Wrangler produce any sound imaginable, it can produce more of them more loudly than the competition and audiences will surely be impressed by your mastery of its mind-bogglingly vast control surface.' Bu…
The well-loved classics you describe sound more like making a plane that's aerodynamically hard to lose control of... which is kind of a holy grail, but the MCAS design came after all of that was fixed by earlier design decisions.
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#249Earlier quoted context omitted.
A friend of mine was once told to make his product idiot-proof. He said "sure, as soon as you give me the spec for the standard idiot."
That's a really old joke and its purpose is to deflect rather than to illuminate. Your friend was trying to sound smart to distract from his unwillingness or inability to come to grips with the underlying design issues.
And I think it says something useful about the impossibility of the task. The domains we work in are all about the expected inputs and expected outputs, and it takes a special kind of imagination to come up with parameters outside of those.
Re: Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 Max Crashes
#250Earlier quoted context omitted.
A friend of mine was once told to make his product idiot-proof. He said "sure, as soon as you give me the spec for the standard idiot."
That's a really old joke and its purpose is to deflect rather than to illuminate. Your friend was trying to sound smart to distract from his unwillingness or inability to come to grips with the underlying design issues.
Stout claim.
So I presume that you've witnessed any design or engineering firm that was able to deal with every 'idiot' within their problem domain?
I think OPs interpretation of the saying is more correct. The saying is bringing up the impossibility of designing something for everyone , not the deflecting of labor in some snarky way.