On the question of "Are reserves too low" posed by the article:
Reserves are simply a low pass filter, making it very unlikely that high frequency events (routine events) will cause a crisis. But they still allow low frequency events to potentially cause problems.
Since the "cutoff frequency" of the "filter" is determined by the political process, then to answer the question about whether reserves are adequate we must consider how effectively the political process addresses these sorts of issues in general.
Consider the PBGC, the government coordinated insurance system for pension funds. It is dramatically under-funded, and if more than one or two large firms with big pension obligations went under, so would the PBGC. What this means is that it would be up to the political system to bail it out.
Underwriting capital (reserve capital, or capital that is generally kept idle) is useful for financial contracts because it is far more reliable than the uncertain outcome of the political system. It is also much faster to access pre-arranged underwriting capital than it is to wait for the political system to resolve an issue.
We learned in 2008 that underwriting requirements were too low, and the policy response was actually to reduce them further, allowing firms to use riskier assets for underwriting and the government buying some of those assets (QE).
From the perspective of a politician, the response to the 2008 crisis was superb. The Fed and Treasury teamed up to prevent more widespread insolvency of financial firms and even automakers. This led to both industries being increasingly beholden to politicians and the political process in general.
But imagine if the underwriting levels prior to 2008 had actually been adequate to prevent the cascade of insolvency. There would simply have been no crisis.
From the perspective of an insurance company or banker, reserve capital is sitting idle and going to waste. If the US requires more reserve capital, this gives a competitive advantage to foreign firms whose governments require less caution. So reducing underwriting requirements is a view supported by economic nationalists.
So considering that most policy discussion these days is dominated by the political class and by economic nationalists, of course the conclusion is that everything is being done in a very smart, sensible way.
In the past, before bailouts were so commonplace, we could expect the firms' selfish interests to moderate their appetite for risks to the firm's solvency, but this check is not really a factor anymore.