Time to Abolish "Statistical Significance"?

Isn't consensus essentially a majority agreement, and thus not a complete agreement?

Furthermore, a consensus today does not need to hold up indefinitely.

Sometimes I wonder if the discussion about p > 0.05). Whether or not statistical significance is a useful concept at all is a separate question, but I suspect the discussion of whether the threshold of 0.05 is useful might be out of touch with actual practice.

From the discussion on this I've read, I think a good direction would be to consider statistical tests like this as simply not "publishable" at all the way we currently think of it.

That is, if you have a theory about how a Gene relates to height on tomatoes, and you do a test, that test would show you you're likely on the wrong track if it falls below some p value, but the only thing it tells you by being above is that "there may be something here."

I think this is true for many fields with a replication crisis. The problem isn't statistical, the problem is no theory. If you have a functional theory there's all kinds of things you do to gain confidence in it, and mostly those will contribute to the ability to predict statistical results, but that is completely different on kind than sending out a survey and noting that question 2 and 6 are statistically correlated.

When a field thinks that the kind of early suggestive work like this is worth talking about, they should probably just talk about it in conferences and similar venues, rather than "publish" it where journalists will pick it up in a "science shows" story that 95% (lol) of the time turns out to be wrong.

In other words, I think it is fine that fields talk about early non-theory results -- that can be interesting for specialists to advance faster. "Publishing" this mostly-going-to-be-wrong stuff is leading to confusion among the public about what the scientific process demands and how trustworthy it is. That is not a good outcome in my opinion.

Here's a good example, take a look at the recently published articles in PloS Computational Biology: https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/ Just scanning through them... there aren't really any that are a simple "we made a single hypothesis, performed a significance test, and because p < 0.05 we attempted to publish it". In my experience that's just not the usual way science is actually performed (but my experience is very limited to certain branches of biology). I don't mean to say that p-values aren't used at all, just that their application seems to be limited and used mostly to bolster very specific sub-arguments buried in a larger story. I guess the story is that the unit of work that a particular journal article represents is often the union of many statistical tests/ hypotheses / models / simulations / etc that together form a possibly-compelling story about how something works. Not really sure if that's better or worse from a statistical sanity perspective...

Could you expand on what you mean by the 'abuse of knowledge'?

I agree that the focus on this metric negatively influences research outcomes, which extends to university structuring, but I'd like to hear your thoughts on how this extends to abuse of knowledge in general.