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[1] https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/24/linkedin-ireland-data-prot...
Would that ruling mean that sites could no longer refuse to show content based on how they're accessed? For example, sites that won't load if the browser is in headless mode, or sites that depend on javascript as a way of blocking wget/curl.
hiQ asked the court for a preliminary injunction to stop Linkedin from denying them access, won it, and this is the result of Linkedin's appeal of that injunction. This is not the end of the case. The title is wrong. The 9th Circuit just ruled that hiQ has a decent enough argument to move forward. The question of whether them scraping a public site can violate the CFAA is not settled. > We therefore conclude that hiQ…
A preliminary injunction is considered very strong. So it's not that "nothing is final here", it's actually almost pretty much final unless something comes out of left field.
hiQ asked the court for a preliminary injunction to stop Linkedin from denying them access, won it, and this is the result of Linkedin's appeal of that injunction. This is not the end of the case. The title is wrong. The 9th Circuit just ruled that hiQ has a decent enough argument to move forward. The question of whether them scraping a public site can violate the CFAA is not settled. > We therefore conclude that hiQ…
I think you've mischaracterized the state of things. In the underlying case, LinkedIn asserted that HiQ violated the CFAA and HiQ said LinkedIn tortiously interfered with its business. The trial court said LinkedIn couldn't assert the CFAA. LinkedIn appealed, asking the appellate court to overturn the trial court and also to hold that the tortious interference claim is preempted by the CFAA. The appellate court said…
> It is likely that when a computer network generally permits public access to its data, a user’s accessing that publicly available data will not constitute access without authorization under the CFAA. The data hiQ seeks to access is not owned by LinkedIn and has not been demarcated by LinkedIn as private using such an authorization system. HiQ has therefore raised serious questions about whether LinkedIn may invoke the CFAA to preempt hiQ’s possibly meritorious tortious interference claim.
So yes, HiQ and LinkedIn need to go back and finish the trial, but the language used is in no way ruling on whether or not the CFAA preempts state law, just that even if there is pre-emption that hiQ still has a decent argument.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Ahh so if a company leaks data it's the viewer's fault, not the companies?
Yes. That's the general rule--negligence of a victim does not negate the culpability of the criminal. "It was easy to commit the crime" is not a defense. If you find yourself with access to something you think you're not supposed to have access to, you're supposed to do the right thing.
This action does more than that. The court left the preliminary injunction against LinkedIn in place: "The district court granted hiQ’s motion. It ordered LinkedIn to withdraw its cease-and-desist letter, to remove any existing technical barriers to hiQ’s access to public profiles, and to refrain from putting in place any legal or technical measures with the effect of blocking hiQ’s access to public profiles." So Lin…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The real issue here is somewhere between both you and GP. What is required to trigger the CFAA? Does accessing a page the site owner doesn't want you to violate the CFAA or do you need to hack through access controls?
As a real-world analogue: you can indeed be guilty of trespassing on someone's property even if you don't have to jump over any fences or pick any locks to get there. In some places, they don't even have to have a "no trespassing" sign. Simply being present on someone else's property without an invitation from them is illegal, and no, an open door does not count as an invitation.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
As a real-world analogue: you can indeed be guilty of trespassing on someone's property even if you don't have to jump over any fences or pick any locks to get there. In some places, they don't even have to have a "no trespassing" sign. Simply being present on someone else's property without an invitation from them is illegal, and no, an open door does not count as an invitation.
this is bad comparison because when scraping a site, you don't cross any borders, you just send and receive information. You can compare this to a phone call or to talking to someone.
To take it a step further, the information on said website is also personal property, and accessing the information without permission is also trespassing. Specifically, this is called trespass to chattels [1] (trespass is most usually legally defined as trespass to person, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels). Even more specifically, this is the actual part of the CFAA that's being debated: computer trespass gets its roots from trespass to chattels. [2]
1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trespass_to_chattels
2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trespass_to_chattels#In_the_el...