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Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

spiegel.de

121–130 of 138 posts

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Forgive me a great deal of cynicism here. I suspect that a more accurate statement is "he learned that it works well for him to argue that every plane crash can be traced back to a single, simple cause." We don't ask lawyers to do surgery. We don't ask them to design bridges. And we don't ask them to do root cause analysis. We leave all of those things to those who actually know what they're doing in those areas.

> learned that every plane crash can be traced back to a single, simple cause. That's silly, but if I were playing that game, I'd say the single, simple cause was a failure of Boeing and the CIA to keep abreast of A320new development. Boeing were caught flat-footed by the launch of he A320neo and, facing a loss of potentially thousands of sales, were forced to quickly develop and release a modified 737 rather than cr…

> Corporate espionage would have prevented all this.

I believe Boeing knew exactly what was going on with Airbus. US does corporate espionage to favor domestic companies, and creating a new plane is such a big project that there's no way to miss that.

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#122
post #75
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How is it obvious to you that they didn't investigate the first crash sufficiently? I'd say some time after the first accident it was reasonably well understood what had happened, and the FAA (and many others!) concluded that it was still safe to fly the plane, as the pilots could easily interrupt the accident chain by doing the right thing quick (as the pilots on the Lion Air flight preceding the accident flight had…

"as the pilots could easily interrupt the accident chain" -- No they couldn't! To survive a runaway trim, pilots had to know the rollercoaster maneuver and have enough altitude to aerodynamically relieve airloads off the jackscrew so they could manually trim the plane back. If FAA and many others knew this then they should have instantly communicated it to all boeing max pilots. Instead none of that happened.

This jives with what I've seen from blancolirio, MentourPilot and others sources. The pilots should've had memory items to disable automation control of trim for the duration of the flight rather than all electric control of trim (including yoke-mounted switches), because aerodynamic forces were too large and altitude was too low to manually spin the trim wheels. I do hope Ralph Nader sues the pants off Boeing for murdering his goddaughter through negligent homicide. The FAA is also culpable for failing to oversee self-certification properly and getting too cozy (regulatory capture) with Boeing. As a consequent, equipment models including the whole line of 737 NG (-600 to -900; 2010 Ducommun structural parts scandal), 787 Dreamliner failures and 737 Max 8 and 9 are models I would not step foot on without a gun to my head.

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#123
> Boeing developed a software program that constantly monitored the angle of attack. As soon as this angle became too risky, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) would automatically lower the plane's nose without the pilot having to do anything at all. To do so, it doesn't manipulate the rudder, but the horizontal stabilizer trim, the most forceful control surface on the entire aircraft.

How could the rudder possibly be used to change the angle of attack? Isn't the horizontal stabilizer the only control surface that can do this?

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#124
post #123

> Boeing developed a software program that constantly monitored the angle of attack. As soon as this angle became too risky, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) would automatically lower the plane's nose without the pilot having to do anything at all. To do so, it doesn't manipulate the rudder, but the horizontal stabilizer trim, the most forceful control surface on the entire aircraft. How cou…

It's the horizontal stabilizer. Which has two parts. The control surfaces controlled by the pilots yoke. And the trim system which adjusts the entire horizontal stabilizer. MCAS uses the trim motors.

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#125
post #123

> Boeing developed a software program that constantly monitored the angle of attack. As soon as this angle became too risky, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) would automatically lower the plane's nose without the pilot having to do anything at all. To do so, it doesn't manipulate the rudder, but the horizontal stabilizer trim, the most forceful control surface on the entire aircraft. How cou…

It should say elevator, not rudder. I think it's just a typo.

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#126
post #90
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You don't need to be able to analyze causes in order to count them.

No, but if you want to prevent future incidents, it usually helps to have a more systemic view of failure. E.g. questions like: “what kind of management lead to decisions that made such misbehaviour possible?” are usually completely uninteresting for a lawyer, as they either play a legal role or not. In real life a incident may be the emergent behaviour enabled by complex circumstances and a certain culture, all culm…

And that's all well and good ... but his role isn't about preventing future incidents, it's seeking restitution for the victims and their families, nothing more, nothing less.

It is the job of regulators to figure out how to prevent future incidents, and it seems that the EASA will be taking the hardline lead on that as there seems to be a general mistrust of the FAA this side of the pond.

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#127
post #96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We don't ask lawyers to do surgery No, but when they're in a court debating about e.g. doctor's negligence, we do expect them to have a rudimentary understanding of what's going on.

Generally, they find, and pay for an expert to argue whatever point they want. The great thing is, if you pay enough, you'll find an expert being willing to argue anything you want.

Yes, but that works for both parties, though.

The expert more capable of conveying their message will be the one who gets the most credibility, and this often (though unfortunately not always) aligns with the expert telling the factual truth.

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not really. Market forces drove Boeing to rush out a more fuel efficient 737. Even absent regulatory incentives, market forces drive them to want to deliver a 737-dimensioned plane, because a huge selling point for the NG and MAX is that they're still compatible with decades' old infrastructure at rarely-upgraded regional airports. Bolting large enough engines to deliver the market-desired fuel efficiency on the mark…

So if the A320neo isn't suitable for a large portion of the customer base, how is it a competitor to the 737MAX 8?

It was significantly more fuel efficient on the sorts of routes the non-MAX 737 dominated, to the point where airlines and airports were starting to redo their infrastructure to accommodate it because the fuel savings were cheaper in the long run.

Rushing out the MAX let them shore up their advantage in that market — get the fuel savings AND save on the upgrades you won’t need.

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#129
post #41

This is probably the best piece I've read about this: "How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer" https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-...

Obligatory further reading repost. https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the... EDIT: What? It's one of the better written articles that actually includes most of the technical details, plus some of the corporate environment related ones. The two articles together are basically guaranteed to contain all the essentials one needs to understand what happened.

The Seattle times has had some of the best reporting on this, presumably because they have been covering aviation for a long time. I've found some of the tech press have (not surprisingly) treated it too much as a technical issue in the sense of it being about broken software or hardware.

This whole disaster has been a great example of the importance of good systems and safety engineering, of effective oversight, and of a good safety culture. What is depressing about it is that the aviation industry worked hard for decades to develop an open and effective safety culture, and Boeing seem to have forgotten a lot of the painful lessons of the past.

Hopefully, if anything good comes out of this situation, it will be a reinforcement of the culture and mindset that has made commercial flight incredibly safe.

Re: Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings

#130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> learned that every plane crash can be traced back to a single, simple cause. That's silly, but if I were playing that game, I'd say the single, simple cause was a failure of Boeing and the CIA to keep abreast of A320new development. Boeing were caught flat-footed by the launch of he A320neo and, facing a loss of potentially thousands of sales, were forced to quickly develop and release a modified 737 rather than cr…

> Corporate espionage would have prevented all this. I believe Boeing knew exactly what was going on with Airbus. US does corporate espionage to favor domestic companies, and creating a new plane is such a big project that there's no way to miss that.

> US does corporate espionage to favor domestic companies, and creating a new plane is such a big project that there's no way to miss that.

Pardon my ignorance but I thought the Chinese government was the one doing this sort of thing. Surely the US government does not engage in espionage on behalf of it's companies

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