Live data from Hacker News

A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

googleprojectzero.blogspot.com

71–80 of 202 posts

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#71
A while ago, Google showed messages at the top of Gmail for some users "We believe state-sponsored attackers might be attempting to compromise your account or computer".

If they had send some OAuth tokens for a honeypot gmail account to the C&C server used for these attacks, they could then track the usage patterns of that token, and find all the other attacked users. Perhaps thats how they identified who was being attacked?

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#72
post #55

The list of apps being monitored which are hardcoded directly in the implant[1] include : com.yahoo.Aerogram com.microsoft.Office.Outlook com.netease.mailmaster com.rebelvox.voxer-lite com.viber com.google.Gmail ph.telegra.Telegraph com.tencent.qqmail com.atebits.Tweetie2 net.whatsapp.WhatsApp com.skype.skype com.facebook.Facebook com.tencent.xin [1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teard...

This is an odd list. Some big messaging apps like Signal and Line are notably missing, while tools like Mail Master and Voxer seem like pretty minor players compared to the rest. Is there a particular region of the world or community where this specific list makes most sense?

> Some big messaging apps like Signal and Line are notably missing

Line is mostly used in Japan, Signal is mostly used by nerds. So you can assume neither japanese peopel nor nerd were their primary target. Given that this is true for the vast majority of the world population I'd not call this odd.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#73
post #62
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

These are all social networking services. Maybe, just maybe, this was tied to the PRISM program led by the NSA?

Maybe, just maybe, this was tied to the space program at NASA? Tremendously unlikely, PRISM was something very different from this.

PRISM would have had to migrate to methods like this with the rise in e2e encryption.

I doubt they'd have written such shoddy and simple implant code though. At a minimum, they would have encrypted the data uploaded, since intelligence agencies love to steal data from other intelligence agencies, and sniffing wires I'm sure isn't unique to the USA.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#74
post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is an odd list. Some big messaging apps like Signal and Line are notably missing, while tools like Mail Master and Voxer seem like pretty minor players compared to the rest. Is there a particular region of the world or community where this specific list makes most sense?

> Some big messaging apps like Signal and Line are notably missing Line is mostly used in Japan, Signal is mostly used by nerds. So you can assume neither japanese peopel nor nerd were their primary target. Given that this is true for the vast majority of the world population I'd not call this odd.

There is also Facebook Messenger which seems to be missing, and "Messenger Lite", made for parts of the world without good connectivity, neither of which are on the list despite being very popular.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#75
post #55

The list of apps being monitored which are hardcoded directly in the implant[1] include : com.yahoo.Aerogram com.microsoft.Office.Outlook com.netease.mailmaster com.rebelvox.voxer-lite com.viber com.google.Gmail ph.telegra.Telegraph com.tencent.qqmail com.atebits.Tweetie2 net.whatsapp.WhatsApp com.skype.skype com.facebook.Facebook com.tencent.xin [1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teard...

This is an odd list. Some big messaging apps like Signal and Line are notably missing, while tools like Mail Master and Voxer seem like pretty minor players compared to the rest. Is there a particular region of the world or community where this specific list makes most sense?

I suppose this list must be combined with the following explanation: "To be targeted might mean simply being born in a certain geographic region or being part of a certain ethnic group."[^1]

So the suspects are countries that fight against the autonomy of a region where the population is ethnically different. The most obvious suspect is China: they have gulag camps in Xinjiang where Uygurs are interned, up to 1.1 million according to the UN[^2]. The dominant ethnic in China is Han, and Uygurs have been oppressed for decades.

Of course, other countries could do this, but the probabilty of Birmania/Rohingya, SaudiArabia/Yemen… seems much lower. On a side note, Voxer seems to be quite proeminent in China, according to the popularity of their Android app[^3].

[^1]: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-d...

[^2]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/11/if-you-enter-a...

[^3]: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.rebelvox.v...

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#76
post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe, just maybe, this was tied to the space program at NASA? Tremendously unlikely, PRISM was something very different from this.

PRISM would have had to migrate to methods like this with the rise in e2e encryption. I doubt they'd have written such shoddy and simple implant code though. At a minimum, they would have encrypted the data uploaded, since intelligence agencies love to steal data from other intelligence agencies, and sniffing wires I'm sure isn't unique to the USA.

No, PRISM had nothing to do with this at all. PRISM didn’t involve any sort of attack or offensive capability, and anything doing that would not be PRISM.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#77
post #47

As a side note: given all the security resources Google has, why Android is still not considered safer than iOS? What mistakes has Google made with Android, and how could they be fixed?

Why?

2 decades of advertising has misinformed people that Apple products are safer.

The longer I live, the more I think nothing is safe.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#78
post #54
post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree. 2FA makes it profoundly more difficult to compromise an account. Most people are using a phone as a second factor, so even if the apps don't store files and credentials directly on the device (always in doubt, as seen here), if you have root on a phone you can compromise an account without any user interaction. What's more, every time you download a banking app on your phone, you have to place a little bi…

> 2FA makes it profoundly more difficult to compromise an account. Just because the attacks are dumb. If your computer is pwned, it should wait for you to 2FA, and then when you "log out"-- don't, do malicious stuff instead.

That's why 2FA should be performed at transaction confirmation time for sensitive operations, not just at login or periodically.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#79
Given the depth of China's interest in controlling and accessing dissidents worldwide, I would think it highly likely that China is behind the entire exploit. What I did not see in the articles (too many to read everything) is the requirement to inject the implant from a website. Did the article indicate what sites were compromised?
Post reply on HN