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A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

googleprojectzero.blogspot.com

61–70 of 202 posts

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#61
post #6

These are fascinating. It would be very interesting to know what the character and subject matter of the infecting sites were. Outside of the great tech writeup, what is particularly interesting about this, to me, from a geopolitical perspective is the level of restraint. The malicious actors in this case leveraged zero-days for iOS for years and yet do not seem to have overextended themselves or risk exposure by ove…

> leveraged zero-days for iOS for years Isn't that a problem with the iOS walled garden, not even security researchers can properly investigate users devices and detect infections like this, like they can with desktop operating systems...?

Absolutely. It is such a disgrace to open society that we have allowed our phones, computers and cars to be so taken over by corporate interest that we cannot even peek inside.

NB I heard some infosec research companies actually get rooted phones from Apple with some big caveats.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#62
post #60
post #55

The list of apps being monitored which are hardcoded directly in the implant[1] include : com.yahoo.Aerogram com.microsoft.Office.Outlook com.netease.mailmaster com.rebelvox.voxer-lite com.viber com.google.Gmail ph.telegra.Telegraph com.tencent.qqmail com.atebits.Tweetie2 net.whatsapp.WhatsApp com.skype.skype com.facebook.Facebook com.tencent.xin [1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teard...

These are all social networking services. Maybe, just maybe, this was tied to the PRISM program led by the NSA?

Maybe, just maybe, this was tied to the space program at NASA?

Tremendously unlikely, PRISM was something very different from this.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#63
post #38
post #6

These are fascinating. It would be very interesting to know what the character and subject matter of the infecting sites were. Outside of the great tech writeup, what is particularly interesting about this, to me, from a geopolitical perspective is the level of restraint. The malicious actors in this case leveraged zero-days for iOS for years and yet do not seem to have overextended themselves or risk exposure by ove…

> Earlier this year Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) discovered a small collection of hacked websites. The hacked sites were being used in indiscriminate watering hole attacks against their visitors, using iPhone 0-day. Crazy that the Implant was never detected directly on a phone. It's certainly visible to iOS itself, but apparently iOS isn't looking for unexpected processes running on the phone. As well, the Im…

It would be fun to check, but the attackers could just turn it off.

It's a user-facing option: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202100

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#64
post #6

These are fascinating. It would be very interesting to know what the character and subject matter of the infecting sites were. Outside of the great tech writeup, what is particularly interesting about this, to me, from a geopolitical perspective is the level of restraint. The malicious actors in this case leveraged zero-days for iOS for years and yet do not seem to have overextended themselves or risk exposure by ove…

> leveraged zero-days for iOS for years Isn't that a problem with the iOS walled garden, not even security researchers can properly investigate users devices and detect infections like this, like they can with desktop operating systems...?

A step in the right direction: Apple recently announced that next year security researchers will have access to special iPhones: https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/8/20756629/apple-iphone-secu...

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#65
post #6

These are fascinating. It would be very interesting to know what the character and subject matter of the infecting sites were. Outside of the great tech writeup, what is particularly interesting about this, to me, from a geopolitical perspective is the level of restraint. The malicious actors in this case leveraged zero-days for iOS for years and yet do not seem to have overextended themselves or risk exposure by ove…

> the malicious actor chose to limit their intended recipients

I wonder how many people you would need to infect, on average, until you were detected?

I would guess, with this exploit chain, and the lack of auditing available of iOS internals, that the actual exploit could run 1 Billion + times before detection. The biggest risk is someone noticing the wedged webkit renderer process and going to try and debug it. I bet that causes oddities when hooked up to a mac with devtools open.

Of the whole thing, the HTTP network traffic is probably by far the biggest red flag - and perhaps 1 out of 10 million people might notice/investigate that. Simple things like never connecting over wifi (cell network is far harder to sniff), and redirecting traffic, encrypted, via a popular CDN would be a good way to hide it.

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#66
post #55

The list of apps being monitored which are hardcoded directly in the implant[1] include : com.yahoo.Aerogram com.microsoft.Office.Outlook com.netease.mailmaster com.rebelvox.voxer-lite com.viber com.google.Gmail ph.telegra.Telegraph com.tencent.qqmail com.atebits.Tweetie2 net.whatsapp.WhatsApp com.skype.skype com.facebook.Facebook com.tencent.xin [1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teard...

This is an odd list. Some big messaging apps like Signal and Line are notably missing, while tools like Mail Master and Voxer seem like pretty minor players compared to the rest.

Is there a particular region of the world or community where this specific list makes most sense?

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#67
post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because the entity who supplied the exploit has no relation to the entity who supplies the implant and control framework. The latter is commodity developer work, easily done in house or via a defense contractor. It’s not unlikely that the exploit developer had no idea what it was being used in or how.

In my experience infosec people tend to be pretty awful programmers. They are experts at mining other people's code bases for common exploit patterns but not so great at the wider systems/engineering stuff. But agreed it was probably purchased from some vuln dev and put together by some hack gov employee with some Microsoft certifications or (far less likely) some indifferent blackhat with powerful weapons well out o…

> In my experience infosec people tend to be pretty awful programmers.

Awful at using good design patterns, unit tests, and neat code maybe... But not "write everything to /tmp, tar it up and upload it cleartext".

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#68
post #55

The list of apps being monitored which are hardcoded directly in the implant[1] include : com.yahoo.Aerogram com.microsoft.Office.Outlook com.netease.mailmaster com.rebelvox.voxer-lite com.viber com.google.Gmail ph.telegra.Telegraph com.tencent.qqmail com.atebits.Tweetie2 net.whatsapp.WhatsApp com.skype.skype com.facebook.Facebook com.tencent.xin [1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teard...

This is an odd list. Some big messaging apps like Signal and Line are notably missing, while tools like Mail Master and Voxer seem like pretty minor players compared to the rest. Is there a particular region of the world or community where this specific list makes most sense?

[deleted]

Re: A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild

#70
It seems the webkit renderer process goes into an infinite sleep when this exploit is used. Since iOS doesn't use a seperate renderer for different web domains/iframes, that would mean the entire tab will freeze.

Surely that would be a pretty big giveaway for the user - "I was just browsing round the bombmaking-for-dummies webpage, and my browser just froze, and I had to kill it and reopen it".

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