Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've noticed a trend on BBC news. '[X market/stock] slumps as [thing related to X] [does something]' Yet when you go and look at the long-term graph, it's well within normal variance. There's no evidence they're connected at all. I'm sure it happens with other media providers too. Why? Because they didn't have the numbers right, or just didn't check at all. Well, if I'd written a statement like that in an essay durin…
The problem is that "Sellers outnumber buyers as equity markets fall" and "Buyers outnumber sellers as equity markets post gains" are not compelling headlines. As you've noted, financial news is post-hoc analysis. It is narrative-based, and not fact-based. Sometimes the narratives and facts coincide, though.
Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
131–140 of 147 posts
Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#132Off topic, but ?mod=rsswn in the url allows me to access any article for free on WSJ.
Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#133My question is, who is to say that X "FICO Score" correlates to anything too meaningful -- or that the score itself has not become harder or easier to obtain? Perhaps the data exists on this, but to my unresearched mind there's a lot of "fudging" potential within it all by itself. For instance, maybe the current 'borrower state' that gets you a 690 previously would have given you a 725; or maybe it's the opposite. I…
You, as a lender, can't call Equifax (a CRA) and say "Hey you said 690 but I think really 725." Their information says what it says regarding tradelines (the fact that they were delinquent on a CC 2 years ago is a fact on record that you can't alter), and you have no easy interface to modify that (though you can, and you do, encourage customers in marginal situations to do their own work on their credit).
You ask why don't banks defraud the GSEs on a retail level for marginal loans. The short and perhaps unsatisfactory reason is that if the GSE is dissatisfied with a particular loan they'll put it back on you (you have to repurchase rather than securitizing) and that if you make a practice of this you're going to go to jail.
Anecdotally, every time I look at my credit score I cringe The video game player in me understands that being told one has a score one wants to increase it, but, do you care about this number? Why? If you don't anticipate buying a house in the next 6 months it is all but irrelevant to you. If that is in your near term plans, then you have a fairly straightforward path to increasing it. (Stop paying off earlier than the reporting date, which can result in tradelines looking like they're dormant and therefore not counted towards your score.)
Furthermore, every time I've ever applied for credit I end up with scores (and offers of credit) far in excess of the numbers...
Yep, because the offers of credit are an actual fact about the world and the credit score is a point-in-time snapshot of a model which predicts a model that partially influences a decision that might be relevant to your interest. In the case where reality and your model differ, reality takes precedence, so why do you care what the model outputs?
Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#134Earlier quoted context omitted.
Journalism is a noun.
Metaphorically it's a verb. It is the things you do or not. For example, fact check. The problem is, the belief that it's a noun and a noun one can assign to themselves; that has no formal definition. If we want to user the word journalism / journalist properly and fairly then the easy way to do is to think of it as being a verb - like leadership. Leader isn't a title. It's actions you take. Just like journalism.
Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#135Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#136> Some $2.5 billion worth of subprime loans, those with FICO credit scores below 690, ended up in mortgage bonds in the first quarter of 2019. That is more than double a year earlier and the highest level since the end of 2007, according to Inside Mortgage Finance. There was $1.9 billion worth of subprime mortgage bonds in the second quarter. Statements like this are hard to evaluate without knowing the denominator:…
The problem is that most journalists are innumerate. As Matt Yglesias notes, "many reporters and editors don't really understand what they're doing. Reputable colleges hand out degrees to people who have almost no understanding of quantitative methods." [1] These journalists see the numbers as garnishes on a narrative point. They're not trying to put the numbers in some sort of mathematical context to draw sound conc…
The best journalists are aware of this and also remember the other lesson from English class, which is to consider counterarguments. But even then, there is never enough space for all the counterarguments, so those are cherrypicked too.
Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#137> Some $2.5 billion worth of subprime loans, those with FICO credit scores below 690, ended up in mortgage bonds in the first quarter of 2019. That is more than double a year earlier and the highest level since the end of 2007, according to Inside Mortgage Finance. There was $1.9 billion worth of subprime mortgage bonds in the second quarter. Statements like this are hard to evaluate without knowing the denominator:…
The problem is that most journalists are innumerate. As Matt Yglesias notes, "many reporters and editors don't really understand what they're doing. Reputable colleges hand out degrees to people who have almost no understanding of quantitative methods." [1] These journalists see the numbers as garnishes on a narrative point. They're not trying to put the numbers in some sort of mathematical context to draw sound conc…
(Anecdata, but why not?) In the run-up to 2008 I was having regular random conversations with non-technical people about the fact that the bubble was about to pop. It was obvious to them that valuations were divorced from all common sense.
But most expert economists and/or bankers were insisting the valuations were correct, and there was no cause for concern.
In this kind of context - and there's a very long history of it in finance and banking, so it's hardly a one-off - it seems a little strange to be picking on journalists for alleged innumeracy.
Put crudely, it isn't journalists who do the damage.
Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#138My question is, who is to say that X "FICO Score" correlates to anything too meaningful -- or that the score itself has not become harder or easier to obtain? Perhaps the data exists on this, but to my unresearched mind there's a lot of "fudging" potential within it all by itself. For instance, maybe the current 'borrower state' that gets you a 690 previously would have given you a 725; or maybe it's the opposite. I…
Hrm -- I'd love to be enlightened! I didn't word it very well, but my questions are primarily: What oversight is there on the ratings agencies themselves? How do we know the distribution of scores is the same today as 10 years ago (and proportionate to credit-worthiness)? Is there anything that prevents credit-ratings companies from under/over valuing the credit-worthiness for large swaths of the population? Is there…
When your business is extending credit (typically very low margin) you walk a very fine line between being overly permissive in lending and not lending enough. Minor movements of that line can be the difference between profitability and not.
If a ratings agencies algorithm was shown to be changing to be too aggressive (either historically or against its peers) the lenders will dial back its importance in their own decisions. In the extreme to the point of not paying for it anymore.
This internal competition does a pretty good job of making sure the algos represent the current state of the world.
There is a question of about this system causing future systemic risk to be underpriced because no one is incentivized to investigate it fully and add it to their algorithm.
Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#139Earlier quoted context omitted.
>The term does not mean that the bank is offering a rate below the prime interest rate to "trick" potential borrowers into taking on debt. Its not a trick, just something the Borrower's en mass did not understand. They just understood the initial low payments, anyway as I replied above, leading to the mortgage crisis over 90% of subprime loans were ARMS that started off below prime and gradually increased. I did use…
It is safe to say that most people don’t understand algebra. In theory the banks didn’t put a proper interest rate on the loan, since interest rates are mainly to compensate for the risk of lending to the borrower. Although it doesn’t matter since the banks bundled the mortgages together, sold them to each other, and were bailed out.
Yes, but most people are not entering legal agreements that require them to understand algebra. One would think, especially with the most uneducated and highest risk borrowers, it would be necessary to understand the initial payment under ARMs are temporary for 3/5 years (depending on the terms, but 3/5 year were the most common) and thereafter the monthly payments will go up (statistically by 75% - so your $1,000/month mortgage payment will go up to $1,750).
>In theory the banks didn’t put a proper interest rate on the loan
Yes, that was one part of the problem (obviously the most uneducated and riskiest borrowers should not have been eligible for these complex adjustable rate mortgages), why on Earth would the riskiest borrowers have gotten loans with temporary interest rates below prime? These were the most likely borrowers to not understand adjustable rates. Other major issues were of course stated income (no proof of income required) and 100% to even 103% financing (no downpayment, banks will even pay your closing costs).
>Although it doesn’t matter since the banks bundled the mortgages together, sold them to each other, and were bailed out.
That is exactly why it matters, because laws were passed to prevent these kinds of loans, and here we are full circle, and the banks are offering these loans again.
Re: Mortgage Market Reopens to Risky Borrowers
#140Earlier quoted context omitted.
We bought in 2010 and we're up 40%, but now we want to upgrade in the next 1-3 years. While we'd lose value on our current house in a downturn, I assume we'd come out better with a larger value drop on more expensive properties (we're looking to spend 2-3x what we did in 2010).
> I assume we'd come out better with a larger value drop on more expensive properties So in other words, you think that more expensive homes value changes at the same rate as a basic home? Did you look at any data to make that claim or just an educated guess? I'm thinking about getting data from the local property appraiser to check that out.