Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
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Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
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Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#2https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hC-JCvFyjlo
The 787 Dreamliner is a nightmare. Bad code produced by offshore teams. International teams totally violating safety procedures.
Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#3> That second barrier, the company argues, allows only data to pass from one part of the network to the other, rather than the executable commands that would be necessary to affect the plane's critical systems.
Assuming planes don't use something like CAN-bus but regular TCP protocol, this can't really be true right? Perhaps they talk about which services are allowed to connect (listen for incoming connections).
Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#4It seems to me as someone with no experience of designing aircraft control software, avionics or anything to do with planes, that the entertainment system should be on a physically separate network to anything safety critical. Like, different everything: power supplies, switches, cables, control panels, the works. There should be no entryway into the flight control network except from the cockpit.
Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#5[deleted]
Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#6Their "rebuttal" almost seems like a taunt to other security researchers to prove them wrong. Calling the researchers irresponsible and their tools rudimentary was a dick move.
Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#7It seems to me as someone with no experience of designing aircraft control software, avionics or anything to do with planes, that the entertainment system should be on a physically separate network to anything safety critical. Like, different everything: power supplies, switches, cables, control panels, the works. There should be no entryway into the flight control network except from the cockpit.
The issue is that for every kilogram you need to get into the air, is another kilogram of fuel that you need to carry onboard. Airlines, and by association, Boeing are very conscious of weight over something like airgapping.
Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#8> That second barrier, the company argues, allows only data to pass from one part of the network to the other, rather than the executable commands that would be necessary to affect the plane's critical systems. Assuming planes don't use something like CAN-bus but regular TCP protocol, this can't really be true right? Perhaps they talk about which services are allowed to connect (listen for incoming connections).
AFDX protocol stack is unidirectional with no ACKs or anything like that, which makes use of physical data diodes trivial.
Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#9It seems to me as someone with no experience of designing aircraft control software, avionics or anything to do with planes, that the entertainment system should be on a physically separate network to anything safety critical. Like, different everything: power supplies, switches, cables, control panels, the works. There should be no entryway into the flight control network except from the cockpit.
There are three separate networks, with data diodes used for cases where information flows between them.
HW separation was enforced by FAA back when 787 was in prototype stage.
Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787
#10There is IMO exactly one valid way to get data from the flight systems to the entertainment network: use a literal one-way connection. Not “the only supported requests are data retrieval.” Not “the software folks only transmit.” A bona fide physical connection where one side has a transmitter, one side has a receiver, and there is no physical mechanism to send any information whatsoever the other way.
These devices are often called “data diodes”. They are cheap. They cannot be hacked from the output side — at best a severely malfunctioning destination could send so much power the wrong way on the fiber or so much voltage the wrong way on the wire that the data diode fails. This would be surprising to say the least.