A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts • Hacker News Board

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#11

Post by henryfjordan » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:27 PM UTC

toomuchtodo wrote: post #6

tjr wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Connecting entertainment systems to flight control sounds very wrong. Connecting entertainment systems to flight management would be common; it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers.

> it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers. Would you agree that this logical boundary should be physically enforced? Such as an opto-isolator?

> Boeing maintains that other security barriers in the 787's network architecture would make that progression impossible.

They probably do something to that effect

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#12

Post by tjr » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:27 PM UTC

toomuchtodo wrote: post #6

tjr wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Connecting entertainment systems to flight control sounds very wrong. Connecting entertainment systems to flight management would be common; it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers.

> it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers. Would you agree that this logical boundary should be physically enforced? Such as an opto-isolator?

Yes.

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#13

Post by toomuchtodo » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:27 PM UTC

henryfjordan wrote: post #11

toomuchtodo wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers. Would you agree that this logical boundary should be physically enforced? Such as an opto-isolator?

> Boeing maintains that other security barriers in the 787's network architecture would make that progression impossible. They probably do something to that effect

The longer I'm alive the more firmly I commit to never assume anything.

I have seen things. Terrible things.

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#14

Post by throw7 » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:29 PM UTC

...an FAA spokesperson wrote in a statement to WIRED that it's "satisfied with the manufacturer’s assessment of the issue."

Can't help but read this as: "We don't have a clue and depend on the manufacturer to tell us everything is 5 by 5."

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#15

Post by camgunz » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:29 PM UTC

I would assume in-flight entertainment is Level E and wasn't ever subjected to verification. And yeah that requires physical separation from higher-level systems. So... surprisingly I think I'm on Boeing's side here?

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#16

Post by std_throwaway » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:29 PM UTC

sushisource wrote: post #3

It seems insane that all this code isn't just open source by default. No one's going to be able to rip off airlines by stealing it, you still need to have a company that, you know, sells planes. Keeping it closed seems like a full admission that "there are probably a bunch of bugs in here and we don't want people to see them"

It's kind of the same reasoning why voting machines are closed source and can only be audited by authorized personnel.

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#17

Post by mjevans » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:33 PM UTC

toomuchtodo wrote: post #6

tjr wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Connecting entertainment systems to flight control sounds very wrong. Connecting entertainment systems to flight management would be common; it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers.

> it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers. Would you agree that this logical boundary should be physically enforced? Such as an opto-isolator?

There should actually be three distinct "air-gaped" networks (or at least classifications of network).

Secure: The network that connects and controls the airplane. Absolutely only essential things allowed on, and if possible isolated using mathematically proven secure vlan/isolation techniques.

"Employee": pilots, crew, etc. This is more just a distinct network for corporate operations security.

"Customer": Still try to keep this one secure so that virus and just don't spread, but this is the 'DMZ' area.

Communication from the secure network should be outbound only, and might best be done over a fixed rate serial data connection of some sort.

The modern version might be to configure a point to point network link on a CDMA based system and just disconnect the secure side's RX path entirely. Then you just export the data blind via UDP with like 10X redundancy.

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#18

Post by tlb » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:34 PM UTC

kps wrote: post #2

Who thought that having any communication path from the passenger entertainment system to flight control was a good idea?

You want communications from the flight controls to the maintenance system. And you want communications from the entertainment system to the maintenance system, so technicians have a single list of everything that needs fixing.

It's hard to implement strict one-way communications -- usually you at least need some kind of ACK for reliable transmission.

Put all those together with a vulnerability in the middle, and you have an attack.

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#19

Post by sagebird » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:34 PM UTC

If I owned a 787, would I be likely to have the rights to lend it to security researchers to test the exploits, or would it be prohibited through a contract that Boeing requires customers to agree to?

Is there a reason that an individual would own a 787 for personal use— eg - is it a plane that people change the interior layout for use as a private jet, or are these planes all tied up in commercial use?

If I owned one, I would lend it to the researcher as I would want to know the flaws and risks more clearly.

Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts

#20

Post by kps » Wed, Aug 07, 2019, 8:34 PM UTC

debatem1 wrote: post #9

toomuchtodo wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers. Would you agree that this logical boundary should be physically enforced? Such as an opto-isolator?

Used to be done with a literal diode.

Well, an optoisolator is a literal diode plus a literal transistor. I'm okay with that much hi tech.