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Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

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Re: Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

#11

It is amazing to see how large, fat, over-engineered frameworks are taking over the internet. Not only it is easy to backdoor but usually they consume an enormous amount of memory and CPU. Not sure how we ended up here.

Bloat and corruption is the only conceivable way to keep X billion people employed?

Re: Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

#12

> The problem lies in the fact that Electron ASAR files themselves are not encrypted or signed Resources on macOS get signed as part of the application bundle. I wonder why this isn't possible for Electron apps as well.

This appears to be the issue that is referenced in the article about why they don't sign currently:

https://github.com/electron/electron-packager/issues/656#iss...

Re: Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

#14
post #8

At this point in time, it's reasonably healthy to assume that everything has backdoors. The only place where information can be kept safe and hidden is deep within our minds. Any method used to share said information with another human being is subject to surveillance and backdoors. Only share what you don't mind being read by the state and it's friends.

For some reason, the key to my mind’s backdoor is beer.

This literally made my day.

Re: Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

#16

At this point in time, it's reasonably healthy to assume that everything has backdoors. The only place where information can be kept safe and hidden is deep within our minds. Any method used to share said information with another human being is subject to surveillance and backdoors. Only share what you don't mind being read by the state and it's friends.

You heard it here first, friends. Or maybe you heard it earlier from Huxley or Orwell.

Re: Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

#17
For those that do not read the article:

>Tsakalidis said that in order to make modifications to Electron apps, local access is needed, so remote attacks to modify Electron apps aren't (currently) a threat. But attackers could backdoor applications and then redistribute them, and the modified applications would be unlikely to trigger warnings—since their digital signature is not modified.

Re: Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

#18

It is amazing to see how large, fat, over-engineered frameworks are taking over the internet. Not only it is easy to backdoor but usually they consume an enormous amount of memory and CPU. Not sure how we ended up here.

Cross-platform guis are hard or ugly and html+css came to save the day

Not Qt/QML

Re: Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

#19

It is amazing to see how large, fat, over-engineered frameworks are taking over the internet. Not only it is easy to backdoor but usually they consume an enormous amount of memory and CPU. Not sure how we ended up here.

Because app development insited on a high barrier to entry approach to paradigms and tooling that put it out of reach of most developers, enough of whom valued a pragmatic approach to getting their ideas out into the world.

The fact that billion dollar companies insist on continuing to take the shortcut approach when they have the resources available to "be better" is not the fault of framework developers who originally innovated to fill the demand

Re: Basic Electron Framework Exploitation

#20
I feel like the headline is a bit click-baity but I don't want to jump to conclusions.

> Tsakalidis said that in order to make modifications to Electron apps, local access is needed, so remote attacks to modify Electron apps aren't (currently) a threat. But attackers could backdoor applications and then redistribute them, and the modified applications would be unlikely to trigger warnings—since their digital signature is not modified.

So the issue is that Electron app distributions dont include a signed integrity check so there's no way for end-users to detect if they got a modified version. I thought that the MacOS builds did do this, but maybe the ASAR bundles aren't included in the hash, or maybe I'm wrong entirely.

I assume the a solution would store the signing pubkey on initial install and then check updates against that. The only way the signing key could be checked other than trust-on-first-install would be through some kind of registry, which is what I assume the Windows and Mac stores are geared toward. Am I correct on all this?

EDIT: Either way, it seems like the solution is to only use the projects' official distribution channels. Signed integrity checks would be useful but probably not change the situation that dramatically. Is that accurate?

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