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Homomorphic encryption

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Re: Homomorphic encryption

#42
If anyone is interested in playing with Fully Homomorphic Encryption, we (NuCypher YC S16) built NuFHE (https://github.com/nucypher/nufhe/). It's written in Python and has excellent documentation, so you can try building some circuits and playing around with it. It requires a GPU to run, but it's also the fastest implementation of FHE in the world (that I know of).

Let me know what you think! :)

Re: Homomorphic encryption

#43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd think there's a simpler way to accomplish what you said above (though in both cases, any voting mechanism that lets the voter verify their vote after the fact also runs into the problem of people complaining about encouraging vote buying). i.e. imagine every polling place would output to you (after you voted) a random number in the 128 bit space. the votes are recorded with this random number. we can verify after…

You open yourself to vote buying and voter cohersion attacks, historically the most common voting fraud mechanism in the states.

any verifiable voting mechanism opens oneself up to vote buying.

if I can use homomorphic encryption to verify my vote I can give the same info needed (say this 128 bit number) to someone else.

Re: Homomorphic encryption

#44
post #15
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Some of the newer schemes are much faster. The recent progress feels like deep learning in 2010, right before everyone realized it worked

> The recent progress feels like deep learning in 2010, right before everyone realized it worked Does it work, though?

It’s starting to, yes, in particular for machine learning. There is a yearly competition called iDash where people show the performances of their homomorphic schemes. This year should be very interesting

Re: Homomorphic encryption

#46
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd think there's a simpler way to accomplish what you said above (though in both cases, any voting mechanism that lets the voter verify their vote after the fact also runs into the problem of people complaining about encouraging vote buying). i.e. imagine every polling place would output to you (after you voted) a random number in the 128 bit space. the votes are recorded with this random number. we can verify after…

Well, no, if you do it cryptographically, at least with the proper mechanism, you can prevent votes from being buyable. In your case, if someone wants to buy your vote, they can ask you to text the number to them before it has appeared as a matter of public record—and if you voted for the Right Person they will pay you. The 128-bit number makes this very hard to forge, whereas to destroy vote-buying you want to make…

maybe I'm missing something, but I can't see any system that allows me to verify my vote after the fact not enabling a vote buying mechanism.

As I understand it (perhaps incorrectly), the primary thing that makes vote buying financially difficult is the fact that a person's vote can't be verified. how does homomorphic encryption enable me to verify my own vote but prevent anyone else from using the info I'd give them that I'd use myself to verify my vote.

Re: Homomorphic encryption

#47

For a layman like me it sounds really cool, almost like magic. Consider a trivial operation like finding a maximum value in a list. How is that supposed to work on encrypted values while simultaneously providing strong encryption? So something like adding N to everything in the list is not an acceptable encryption.

Today is the first time I heard of Homomorphic Encryption so I have 0 knowledge about this. But just to show this is not magic, you can provide N*N number of lists where each list has totally different results and then get the max index for each list as a return. Since you know what original list was the right one, you can keep that result and discard rest

Re: Homomorphic encryption

#48
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Any political voting system will need a trusted third party to run the voter registration/identity system, so I doubt the lack of practical homomorphic encryption is blocking this. There are other voter-verifiable systems that don't rely on HE for trustworthy counting: https://www.chaum.com/publications/AccessibleVoterVerifiabil... The major problem with online voting is that people can be coerced into voting against…

> The major problem with online voting is that people can be coerced into voting against their wishes The main problem is guaranteeing one vote per eligible voter. Coercion is a related but smaller problem. It's much harder to coerce most of the people most of the time than it is to stuff the ballot.

Worth mentioning that ballot stuffing is a problem with the people counting the votes/running the polls, not the voters. So it would be more accurate to say that the problem is preventing the entity that organizes the vote from accessing discrete votes.

Re: Homomorphic encryption

#50
Why do people always talk about arbitrary computation in relation to homomorphic encryption? What I really want is a homomorphic encryption system which allows me to arbitrarily slice and concatenate strings without knowing their contents. This would be immensely useful for implementing end-to-end encrypted collaborative editing of documents. Is homomorphic encryption there yet?
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