Live data from Hacker News

Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

techcrunch.com

151–160 of 161 posts

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#151
post #87

This is a bigger issue than 'credit agencies have poor security'. This is an issue of 'standard authentication in the US is negligently weak'. Knowledge of a SSN and other public information should never be enough to authenticate any person. That means no credit issued based on that, no tax returns filed or viewed based on that, no checks sent based on that. The solution is not better security with credit companies.…

I agree, SSN's are a poor form of authentication. What's missing from these conversations is realistic approaches to fixing it. It's a lot like healthcare: plenty of people want to get rid of Obamacare, but they fail to explain what will replace it. > For the public system, assign to every participant a true unique identifier, rather than the SSN which explicitly states should not be used as such. This will work for…

> What's missing from these conversations is realistic approaches to fixing it.

Do you really want to mandate that?

Valuing someone's personal information at $100,000 per person and then fining the snot out of companies that lose it seems like a much more "market driven" solution.

It also means that companies will work really hard to minimize any personal information at all--which is really what you want in the first place.

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#152
post #150

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'll preface this by saying that I haven't seen any official resources confirming that it was an S3 bucket issue (although the statement from hacker mentioned releasing "buckets" so it very well could be). S3 provides server side encryption that encrypts the files at rest. This is done entirely on the server side and does not require any additional keys from the client. However, it is possible to do your own file enc…

> it's possible a WAF issue allowed the remote attacker to query the internal endpoint from an external source But then it's literally a configuration issue, right? WAF is just Rule -> Block/Allow. It doesn't proxy traffic or anything, it just attaches to a load balancer, API Gateway or CloudFront. More puzzling, what is the WAF-Role they're talking about? WAF doesn't use IAM roles, so is this just a role they used t…

Yeah, that part is confusing. Since I posted the above a few more details came out, but it seems like the WAF may have been involved because it wasn't configured to block requests to the IAM instance metadata endpoint, which would have allowed the attacker to operate in the scope of the instance, which seems to have had the S3 permissions. But again, entirely conjecture on my part at this point.

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#154

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ireland also does not have mandatory ID, nor do the Nordic countries. I don't think it's as clear cut as you make it out to be.

The Irish (PSC) Public Services Card is getting close to being a de facto ID card at this point.

Agreed - it's turned out to be a privacy and security fiasco. Hopefully, the ICCL challenges will put an end to it.

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#155
post #87

This is a bigger issue than 'credit agencies have poor security'. This is an issue of 'standard authentication in the US is negligently weak'. Knowledge of a SSN and other public information should never be enough to authenticate any person. That means no credit issued based on that, no tax returns filed or viewed based on that, no checks sent based on that. The solution is not better security with credit companies.…

To this point: does “identity theft” really exist, or is this simply a reframing of banks, etc., completely failing at authentication?

Today, you are not you, you are your data, a persona. And you are somehow responsible for it or anything that casts a similar shadow.

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#156
After my identity was stolen, likely from Equifax, I closed my Capital One account and advised everyone I knew to do the same. I was shocked to discover how easy it was to get past the forgot password screen: you are immediately logged in with full privilege if you answer all the easy to guess PII questions! No email notification. No text. No 2 factor. Full logged in access!

Lesson learned: always check the forgot password/trouble logging in feature on sites where security matters.

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#157
post #87

This is a bigger issue than 'credit agencies have poor security'. This is an issue of 'standard authentication in the US is negligently weak'. Knowledge of a SSN and other public information should never be enough to authenticate any person. That means no credit issued based on that, no tax returns filed or viewed based on that, no checks sent based on that. The solution is not better security with credit companies.…

I agree, SSN's are a poor form of authentication. What's missing from these conversations is realistic approaches to fixing it. It's a lot like healthcare: plenty of people want to get rid of Obamacare, but they fail to explain what will replace it. > For the public system, assign to every participant a true unique identifier, rather than the SSN which explicitly states should not be used as such. This will work for…

> I agree, SSN's are a poor form of authentication. What's missing from these conversations is realistic approaches to fixing it.

> This will work for a time, but what happens when the next breach occurs? How do people renew their UUID's? Expire compromised ones?

The unique identifier would be an identifier only, not something for authentication. But before you can authenticate any identity, you need a way to identify that identity. Hence I consider that a base-requirement. Then we need to build a system of authentication points around this identifier. Heck, if SSNs were unique just re-purposing those for the ID would work just fine.

> Physical authentication probably means fingerprints, face data, correct? These are already compromised. Worse yet, they cannot be changed.

No, I mean going to a physical desk and authenticating however you already can do this. This would be something like a valid government-issued ID and a birth certificate. Essentially, whatever is needed to get a passport, have the same system here. Because that is essentially your weakest link already. I added this option to appease the American fear of government tracking.

As for a proposal to fixing it, I would point to two systems.

* The Estonian system, where every citizen is given an ID-card that is also a smart-card with a public key. * The Dutch system, which I am most familiar with.

Let me expand on how the dutch system (called DigID) works. Though I should note the system has flaws, and there are valid criticisms. However, it hasn't had any big failures. The system works as follows:

Anyone can apply for an account, at which point the government will mail you instructions for setting up a simple username-password based authentication. Key behind this system is the 'Basis register of persons'. It is a national database (maintained by the municipalities) of all legal inhabitants and some info about them. Most importantly for this system, an address. This is what makes it possible for the government to send mail to a citizen.

To my mind, the above system of mail could/should be replaced by a visit to the municipal administration, where your ID-card is verified. (Notably, everyone over the age of 14 needs a valid government-issued ID)

Obviously, implementing something like this in the US would be hard. Mostly because mandated ID-cards and a government database of addresses would not be politically acceptable. I don't know the details of the Estonian system, maybe that would require less invasive tracking of citizens

I'm guessing most European countries have similar systems of government-based authentication.

Really though, these systems start with knowing who your citizens are and being able to identify them. And should this not be a basic requirement of a government?

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#158
post #113
post #87

This is a bigger issue than 'credit agencies have poor security'. This is an issue of 'standard authentication in the US is negligently weak'. Knowledge of a SSN and other public information should never be enough to authenticate any person. That means no credit issued based on that, no tax returns filed or viewed based on that, no checks sent based on that. The solution is not better security with credit companies.…

> For the public system, assign to every participant a true unique identifier, rather than the SSN which explicitly states should not be used as such. How do you make this proposed new unique identifier more secure than the (admittedly very unsecure) SSNs?

Only use it as an identifier, not as a part of authentication. The issues with using an SSN as a identifier (username) are:

1) Explicitly not meant as an identifier

2) Not unique

If not for 2, then the SSN could simply be repurposed to be this identifier.

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#159

> The Equifax incident should have sparked a fire under the credit giants. I get what the author is trying to say, but based on the entire remainder of this article, the large credit firms are doing exactly the right thing (for their shareholders) by not spending tons of money on security.

> the large credit firms are doing exactly the right thing (for their shareholders) by not spending tons of money on security. Isn't this due to the fact that there are no serious penalties for losing customer data, aka regulation?

Yeah, as much as I would like to see a market-based solution to this, I'm not sure how it would work exactly.

Equifax seems to be the exception to the rule that most of the data lost in most of the breaches we hear about was given voluntarily; the customers are the ones getting screwed and they still willingly hand over their data to anyone who offers a small discount or even just a newsletter sign-up.

It seems like most people don't care about privacy, at least not enough to pay more for it.

Re: Capital One’s breach was inevitable, because we did nothing after Equifax

#160
post #63

In my opinion organizations still don't rely enough on "defense in depth" techniques to protect sensitive data. Breaching the WAF and gaining access to S3 files shouldn't suffice to gain access to the raw data. Personal data that is not required for transactional use should be either encrypted, pseudonymized or anonymized. I couldn't find information about the exact use case of the data but as it was stored in S3 I w…

I find that in large organizations, business only cares about business. Maybe because they can't be bothered with IT or security or any of the geeky disciplines. I'm pretty sure it's all about soft skills: they just can't handle dealing with folks that lack soft skills and those geeky, nerdy folks running the technology stack lack soft skills and only ever ask to spend money ... If you, tech geek, learn enough to spe…

I've found that at large companies, employees touted as having great soft skills often lack the ones that I consider key for productivity: communication, integrity, responsibility, and work ethic.

Meanwhile, engineers possessing all of the above traits as well as hard skills are told to develop their other soft skills (i.e. positive attitude, courtesy, and professionalism) to make themselves more palatable to the inept.

In a vicious cycle, the feeling that everything is focused around appeasing those that contribute the least is enough to erode many engineers' soft skills.

Enter the dead sea.

Post reply on HN