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Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

arstechnica.com

121–130 of 130 posts

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#121
post #73
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> then only outlaws will use encryption Which makes them easy to find in a dragnet unless they're also using stenography.

Which is exactly what would happen. Low-effort E2E encryption (Signal, iMessage) primarily benefits lawful users; but bad actors are sufficiently motivated to invest the effort in getting around encryption restrictions by disguising communications as legitimate data.

You conflate unlawful with bad. Everyone is unlawful.

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#122
post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not even close to the same thing.

It's pretty close. For a while crypto was classified as munition and placed under very strict export control in the United States.

[flagged]

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#123

> The cost of encryption, he said, is measured in "victims" who might have been saved from crime if law enforcement had been able to lawfully intercept communications earlier. The cost of backdoors is measured in hospitals paralyzed by ransomware, personal information stolen by hackers, government secrets obtained by hostile nations. Not to mention the threat of pervasive surveillance by our own government, which has…

Look, same applies for example to 2nd amendment. But people find it plausible and vote for more gun control.

I want to make sure that I understand your analogy.

- The right to secure encryption is like the right to bear arms

- Government mandated weakened encryption are like gun control

- The victims of weak encryption (stolen data for example) are similar to innocents harmed by gun control? (I'm not sure on this one, please correct me if I'm wrong).

- Saying weak encryption is bad is like saying gun control is bad

I'm not trying to straw man you, if that's not what you mean, please correct me.

Also, I completely disagree.

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#124

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It takes a prohibitively long time to knock on 2^256 bricks. The real risks aren't from the crypto; they're from the humans who have access to the back door. Can they be trusted? Can they be compromised? That's not to mention the business damage this would cause. The US is trying to block Huawei products due to back doors. Other countries will block US products if the US government starts requiring back doors.

GPUs have been shown to be very good at complex math problems. A nation state with unlimited money could find a weakness built into crypto in a matter of days at most. A bored hacker would probably find it in a few hours.

You've been watching too much TV. Actual encryption primitives are often used with keys that would require a computer the size of the solarsystem to brute force. Bored hackers and nation states do not have such computers, no matter how well they are funded.

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#126

Earlier quoted context omitted.

GPUs have been shown to be very good at complex math problems. A nation state with unlimited money could find a weakness built into crypto in a matter of days at most. A bored hacker would probably find it in a few hours.

You've been watching too much TV. Actual encryption primitives are often used with keys that would require a computer the size of the solarsystem to brute force. Bored hackers and nation states do not have such computers, no matter how well they are funded.

I'm not talking about brute forcing good encryption, I'm solely talking about nation states ability to find the back door entry. I may have confused the issue taking about GPUs.

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#127
post #39

We don't need to make arguments like "I trust the state, but what about criminals?". All US administrations have exhibited strong evidence of criminality and work to suppress dissent and oppress minorities. The current administration makes AG Barr's machinations exceptionally clear as they employ an ever more viscous kidnapping force and (incompetently) attempt to start wars around the world. If you want to be able t…

A "viscous kidnapping force" is an especially sticky problem. ^__^;

One day I will learn to spell. T_T

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#128
post #83
post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>what are you going to do to someone who simply forgot their PIN code? Put them in jail indefinitely, apparently. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/man-jailed-indef...

> In deciding against Rawls, the court of appeals found that the constitutional rights against being compelled to testify against oneself were not being breached. That's because the appeals court, like the police, agreed that the presence of XXXXXXXXXX on his drives was a "foregone conclusion." The Fifth Amendment, at its most basic level, protects suspects from being forced to disclose incriminating evidence. In thi…

> foregone conclusion

If it's a foregone conclusion they can start a trial, if it's not they should release him.

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#129

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>And I'm having trouble finding a contemporary example of someone making this claim. Maybe you were looking for someone notable, but I'll make it for you right now.

Just out of curiosity, does that extend to things like chemical or biological weapons? I suppose such an interpretation would have the side effect of making literally any hazardous substance legal to possess.

The definition of "arms" can reasonably be limited to conventional arms, i.e. the weapon is controlled by a human and its damage can be targeted. Weapons of mass destruction and contagion are not compatible with the purposes of self-defense, defense of the nation, and protecting society against tyranny.

Re: Tech firms “can and must” put backdoors in encryption, AG Barr says

#130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because a gun is a physical object, whereas a vulnerability is information.

Why would that difference matter to coolspot's argument?

Because of the economics of distribution. Information gets distributed by duplication, whereas physical objects get distributed by transfer. That makes control of distribution of physical objects more plausible, because the number of instances you need control over is limited by physical constraints.

Note: more plausible. You can easily point to examples where physical object distribution control has failed, and where information distribution control has succeeded (Prohibition and video DRM are the examples which most obviously spring to mind), but those cases are the extremes.

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