Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because you don’t seem to understand the difference between learning avoidance and reducing sensitivity. (If you notice my first comment I specifically referred to learned avoidance not simply any kind of learning.) Reflexive behavior is a predefined response to a stimulus over some predefined limit and thus on it’s own it’s reactive not predictive. In a purely neutral context there is no reason to increase the respo…
I see the distinction you're going for, but ultimately it doesn't work. >Avoidance requires the ability to predict before a negative response occurs The article discusses the mechanism by which the "avoidance behavior" they describe is learned. It mentions that the downregulation of inhibitory neurons causes heightened sensitivity to stimuli. But downregulation of inhibitory neurons is the same species of process inv…
Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
221–230 of 236 posts
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#222Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because you don’t seem to understand the difference between learning avoidance and reducing sensitivity. (If you notice my first comment I specifically referred to learned avoidance not simply any kind of learning.) Reflexive behavior is a predefined response to a stimulus over some predefined limit and thus on it’s own it’s reactive not predictive. In a purely neutral context there is no reason to increase the respo…
I see the distinction you're going for, but ultimately it doesn't work. >Avoidance requires the ability to predict before a negative response occurs The article discusses the mechanism by which the "avoidance behavior" they describe is learned. It mentions that the downregulation of inhibitory neurons causes heightened sensitivity to stimuli. But downregulation of inhibitory neurons is the same species of process inv…
“more closely correlate with the environment” that’s leaning.
A tree that grows to light will physically reflect information in learned about the environment. It’s encoded in it’s physical form rather than neurons, but it’s still encoding information. In that case lack of sunlight is clearly not what we would associate as pain and I would not say it has ethical implications, but it is a negative stimulus from a tree’s perspective.
Anyway, avoidance is assumed to already happen as a separate system. “it’s already been shown in lots of different invertebrate animals that they can sense and avoid dangerous stimuli that we perceive as painful.“ Fruit fly’s have 250,000 neurons they can encode quite a bit to their mental model. This is simply changing the thresholds before learning occurs, or updating the system that updates their mental model.
As to the encoding, I think physical damage as a negative stimulus is kind of obvious.
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#223Earlier quoted context omitted.
But fundamentally (quote) different? Morphological differences seem more superficial.
Don't morphological differences shared across a large population group indicate genetic/biological differences which are fundamental? Like if you have ginger hair and freckles then you sunburn easily, it's a fundamental heritable difference [it doesn't of course mean you deserve lesser/greater rights or opportunities].
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#224Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is reasonable to entertain the hypothesis. It is unreasonable to assume that it is true.
There is evidence supporting that hypothesis. The idea that pain trauma mainly works trough personal memories processes was the reason why PSTD in adults was long seen as character weakness. The idea that infants nervous system is more fragile should be the starting point. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ejn.12414 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4253046/
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#225Earlier quoted context omitted.
We are talking about pain, not a pain signal. Decrementing register can be a pain signal, but it can't produce feeling of pain (qualia). If humans can be simulated on a Turing machine, we can't feel that definition of pain too.
If we make a robot sufficiently similar to us, it would indeed feel pain (qualia). The real question is: Where is the complexity/similarity treshold?
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#226Earlier quoted context omitted.
> if (some) animals don't feel pain, then how do they know to avoid dangerous behaviours? What is the mechanism that keeps them from, say, jumping into the fire? This is exactly why the robot analogy originally raised by Hendrikto is so powerful. Robots/neural nets/etc illustrate that it is possible for an agent to avoid dangerous behaviours without being motivated by feelings. I agree that this doesn't prove that in…
> I agree that this doesn't prove that insects don't have feelings - it shows that an agent doesn't need to be conscious to exhibit these sorts of behaviours. This conclusion requires an understanding of what endows something with consciousness. (I won't use the word agent, because the relationship between consciousness and agency isn't clear. Agency may require consciousness, but consciousness needn't necessarily re…
Either you mean A) a "full" understanding or B) a partial understanding. If you mean A then I disagree. We can talk sensibly about markets even though we don't fully understand them. If you mean B, then I think we have it. I'll be the first to admit that it's pretty shoddy, but its not unusable. I love Dylan16807's point:
> If a doorbell is conscious then we've made "conscious" into a useless term.
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#227Earlier quoted context omitted.
Don't morphological differences shared across a large population group indicate genetic/biological differences which are fundamental? Like if you have ginger hair and freckles then you sunburn easily, it's a fundamental heritable difference [it doesn't of course mean you deserve lesser/greater rights or opportunities].
I guess "fundamental" to me spoke of more horse vs donkey differences, not palomino vs dapple vs grey.
Human races are certainly more than just skin colour, if your race can affect your healthcare requirements - which seems to me to be true - then it seems to me more fundamental than it is, let's say, superficial.
Fundamental differences aren't necessarily large; they're fundamental, I feel, because they're operative (the differences demand adjusted action in some way). Maybe blood-type is an analogue? It's not always relevant but I'd still a fundamental aspect that need consideration in health situations? (Though AFAIK it's a much stronger factor.)
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#228Earlier quoted context omitted.
I see the distinction you're going for, but ultimately it doesn't work. >Avoidance requires the ability to predict before a negative response occurs The article discusses the mechanism by which the "avoidance behavior" they describe is learned. It mentions that the downregulation of inhibitory neurons causes heightened sensitivity to stimuli. But downregulation of inhibitory neurons is the same species of process inv…
I think you are making an arbitrary distinction between levels of response. “more closely correlate with the environment” that’s leaning. A tree that grows to light will physically reflect information in learned about the environment. It’s encoded in it’s physical form rather than neurons, but it’s still encoding information. In that case lack of sunlight is clearly not what we would associate as pain and I would not…
I don't think the distinction between behavior carried out by reflex networks and behavior carried out by planning involving mental models is arbitrary. We have no reason to think reflex networks involve experience whereas we do have reason to think behavior involving mental models does. So it seems like this distinction is the critical distinction in terms of determining if some organism experiences pain.
>Anyway, avoidance is assumed to already happen as a separate system.
You're projecting more onto the term "avoidance" than is warranted, and you haven't defended your reading of the term. I take something like the withdraw reflex as an example of an avoidance behavior. Clearly you don't, but since your argument rests on your different understanding of the term, and your assumption that the authors of the article intend your reading of the term, its the key disagreement and deserves more attention.
Continuing the quote from the article you started "...In non-humans, we call this sense ‘nociception’, the sense that detects potentially harmful stimuli like heat, cold, or physical injury". So it doesn't seem like the authors are intending to reference predictive behavior, but simply protective behavior in response to noxious sensory perceptions, what you called reactive behavior.
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#229Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think you are making an arbitrary distinction between levels of response. “more closely correlate with the environment” that’s leaning. A tree that grows to light will physically reflect information in learned about the environment. It’s encoded in it’s physical form rather than neurons, but it’s still encoding information. In that case lack of sunlight is clearly not what we would associate as pain and I would not…
>I think you are making an arbitrary distinction between levels of response. I don't think the distinction between behavior carried out by reflex networks and behavior carried out by planning involving mental models is arbitrary. We have no reason to think reflex networks involve experience whereas we do have reason to think behavior involving mental models does. So it seems like this distinction is the critical dist…
Which is why I am saying learn avoidance behavior is simply not the topic of this research.
PS: That also includes some examples of complex behaviors.
Re: Insects feel persistent pain after injury, evidence suggests
#230Earlier quoted context omitted.
I never pulled legs off arthropods, nor did I ever use magnifying glasses to burn them. I did witness other children doing these things, and it always upset me intensely. I'm probably an outlier. My mother tells me that from the time I could walk I captured bugs in the house and carried them outside to prevent them being killed. I've continued the habit of rescuing animals from bad situations into adulthood and rapid…
You’re not alone. I never tortured any insects or animals as a child and it weirds me the fuck out that that is apparently considered normal behavior. I haven’t seen signs of this in my own kids but then again I’ve taught them explicitly that harming sentient beings is wrong.
Or maybe not. Joseph Campbell claimed that a common feature of tribal mythology is ceremonial apologies and restitutions to animal spirits to make restitution for the need to kill them.