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Details of the Cloudflare outage on July 2, 2019

blog.cloudflare.com

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Re: Details of the Cloudflare outage on July 2, 2019

#41
post #8
post #7

Note: Golang's stdlib regexp ( https://golang.org/pkg/regexp/ ) is guaranteed to run in time linear to the size of input. Russ Cox has a detailed article https://swtch.com/~rsc/regexp/regexp1.html

Golang's regexp is derived from RE2, referenced in footnote four of the post.

Russ Cox also wrote RE2: https://swtch.com/~rsc/regexp/

Re: Details of the Cloudflare outage on July 2, 2019

#45

Always appreciate the transparency from you and Cloudflare. :) My main fright during this outage wasn't really the outage itself, but the fact that I couldn't log into the dashboard and simply click the orange cloud to bypass Cloudflare in the meantime. I'm assuming that this is now covered by this mitigation: >> 6. Putting in place an emergency ability to take the Cloudflare Dashboard and API off Cloudflare's edge.…

I've always been a proponent of separating the monitoring from the infra. Otherwise your insight is binary: the service is either up or down. You don't have an context as to why. Edit: Additionally, from a competitive standpoint, I don't see a problem with using a third-party platform for a monitoring service.

Absolutely agree about an external monitoring service being a necessity. I was more referring to cloudflare.com (and specifically dash.cloudflare.com) being entirely served through Cloudflare itself, or the AWS console being hosted on AWS, etc.

Re: Details of the Cloudflare outage on July 2, 2019

#46
I love how the post basically concludes with: "This problem has been known since 1968, which is detailed in this paper written by Ken Thompson".

Incredible write up. Really appreciate the detail, and am really impressed by how mature their response coordination seems to be.

Re: Details of the Cloudflare outage on July 2, 2019

#47
post #13

So in response to a catastrophic failure due to testing in prod, they're going to push out a brand new regex engine with an ETA of 2 weeks. Can anyone say testing in prod? The constant use of 'I' and 'me' (19 occurrences in total) deeply tarnishes this report, and repeatedly singling out a responsible engineer, nameless or not, is a failure in its own right. This was a collective failure, any individual identity is t…

This report is written by me, the CTO of Cloudflare. I say "I" throughout because organizational failings are my responsibilty. If I'd said "we" I imagine you'd be criticizing me for NOT taking responsibility. If you read the report you'd see I do not blame the engineer responsible at all. Not once. I made that perfectly clear.

I wonder if you are able to talk a bit about the development of the Lua-based WAF. I imagine the possible unbounded performance of feeding requests into PCRE must have occurred to you or others at the time - or at least, long before this outage.

I don't mean this as some sort of lame 'lol shoulda known better' dunk - stories about technical organizations' decision-making and tradeoff-handling are just more interesting than the details of how regexes typed in a control panel grow up to become Jira tickets.

Re: Details of the Cloudflare outage on July 2, 2019

#49
9. We had difficulty accessing our own systems because of the outage and the bypass procedure wasn’t well trained on.

Suggestion for future, learned from bitter experience: separate your control plane from your data plane. In this case, make sure that the tools you use to manage your infrastructure don't depend on that infrastructure being functional.

That way you won't have to remember how to use a bypass procedure -- it will just be your normal procedure.

Re: Details of the Cloudflare outage on July 2, 2019

#50

Always appreciate the transparency from you and Cloudflare. :) My main fright during this outage wasn't really the outage itself, but the fact that I couldn't log into the dashboard and simply click the orange cloud to bypass Cloudflare in the meantime. I'm assuming that this is now covered by this mitigation: >> 6. Putting in place an emergency ability to take the Cloudflare Dashboard and API off Cloudflare's edge.…

>> 6. Putting in place an emergency ability to take the Cloudflare Dashboard and API off Cloudflare's edge.

> If so, and if this would have prevented the dashboard outage even during the WAF fiasco

It wouldn't prevent the initial dashboard outage. However, in a similar situation where the main issue can't be resolved quickly, it would allow them to restore dashboard access.

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