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Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

cl.cam.ac.uk

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Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#41

Post by bhickey »

cperciva wrote: post #40
bhickey wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Felony Treason Act 1848 is still on the books. Sure, a couple of Lords may have said that expressing anti-monarchist sentiment won't be punished, but where is the line drawn? [1] Can you be transported to Australia for poking the Duchess of Cornwall with a stick? What about shouting "Off with their heads!" at the Prince of Wales? [2] The absence of a constitutional guarantee of free speech, and the persistence of…

Can you be transported to Australia for poking the Duchess of Cornwall with a stick? What about shouting "Off with their heads!" at the Prince of Wales? No, and no. The British constitution is not a computer program applied by an automaton; issues are decided by experienced judges who, above all else, apply common sense. (The British constitution isn't even self-consistent: The supremacy of parliament is absolute, bu…

Perhaps I've been unclear. I am not alleging that English law is adjudicated by a FSM.

I don't think that anyone will be convicted of Felony Treason. No one thinks that James Hewitt will be put to death under the Treason Act of 1351. This doesn't make the existence of such laws any less absurd or offensive.

In the US, there seems to be a proud tradition of using archaic or seldom applied laws to harass those who fail to show deference. (For example, jaywalking as a pretext for a walking-while-black offense, or wiretapping for filming police brutality.) We might as well keep a clean house to forestall that sort of nonsense.

Edit: There's also the matter of British libel law and the jurisdiction shopping that it encourages as a mechanism for harassing those who might exercise their speech rights.

Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#42

Post by anamax »

cperciva wrote: post #18
pyre wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But an unwritten constitution is easier to change, because there is nothing written down to refer to as a 'base.'

Canadian constitutional law has something called the 'living tree doctrine', which states that the constitution can grow and evolve over time, being reinterpreted in new contexts. To push the metaphor a bit further, I'd point out that a living tree is considerably more resilient than a dead tree, and is likely to adapt to conditions which might otherwise destroy it. I don't think anyone can seriously claim that the c…

> To push the metaphor a bit further, I'd point out that a living tree is considerably more resilient than a dead tree, and is likely to adapt to conditions which might otherwise destroy it.

Trees that grow in unexpected ways get cut down.

Explicit amendments are far more legitimate.

The US has amended its constitution several times. If something really is a good idea, the amendment process is no real obstacle.

Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#43

Post by pyre »

cperciva wrote: post #18
pyre wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But an unwritten constitution is easier to change, because there is nothing written down to refer to as a 'base.'

Canadian constitutional law has something called the 'living tree doctrine', which states that the constitution can grow and evolve over time, being reinterpreted in new contexts. To push the metaphor a bit further, I'd point out that a living tree is considerably more resilient than a dead tree, and is likely to adapt to conditions which might otherwise destroy it. I don't think anyone can seriously claim that the c…

I find it extremely disingenuous to say that because the Canadian (or British) Constitution can easily be re-interpreted in different contexts, that it will always be interpreted in 'the correct way.' You seem to be pointing to examples of the US Constitution being interpreted poorly, making the implication that a 'dead tree' constitution can only be interpreted poorly, and a 'living tree' constitution can only be interpreted in a good way.

A constitution that can be easily re-interpreted may allow for your government to 'turn on a dime,' but it makes no claims to whether your government is turning in a good or bad direction.

As to the US Constitution:

* The US Constitution can be re-interpreted by the US Supreme Court through the setting of legal precedent.

* The US Constitution can be amended by Congress. (Prohibition was a Constitutional Amendment).

* The current interpretation of the commerce clause could be overturned by the US Supreme Court should a case come before them, and the make-up of the justices leans towards overturning the current state of affairs.

Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#45

Post by pmjordan »

LabSlice wrote: post #34
StavrosK wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't really understand the logic behind chip and pin cards. Do you really want me to disclose my card and my PIN to a completely untrusted machine a stranger hands to me? How do I know the vendor won't just record both and replay them, charging me for things I didn't pay?

I am quite certain that the EMV chip, which is the chip on your card, must authenticate the POS machines it talks to. The authentication is done using public key cryptography. So it's not sufficient just to host a fake machine and expect it to be accepted within the EMV infrastructure (cards, POC machines and backend processors).

Of course, extracting the entered PIN is trivial to do with a covertly modified terminal. (skimming) Short of the card being stolen, that shouldn't let anyone access your account, assuming the crypto implementation is sound. Likewise, the card without the PIN is designed to be equally useless, though support for legacy payment systems partially undermines all of this. I suspect a modified terminal which records entered PINs and clones the magnetic strips would let you withdraw cash from the victim's account via Cirrus/Visa Plus.

Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#46

Post by Someone »

huhtenberg wrote: post #37
StavrosK wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't really understand the logic behind chip and pin cards. Do you really want me to disclose my card and my PIN to a completely untrusted machine a stranger hands to me? How do I know the vendor won't just record both and replay them, charging me for things I didn't pay?

Chip cards cannot be "replayed" or cloned, that's why there's a chip in the first place. The chip stores card's private key that is used to digitally sign a (purchase) transaction. Each transaction is a multi-message exchange in real-time between the terminal and the bank and it includes an unique ID generated by the bank, which is covered by the signature. This effectively prevents a replay. The private key cannot b…

Each transaction is a multi-message exchange in real-time between the terminal and the bank and it includes an unique ID generated by the bank

That may or may not be case (there is no way for customers to check that), but the problem is that this encrypted communication is between some third party's terminal and my bank, not between my chip and my bank. IIRC correctly, the protocol in the end boils down to:

- bank asks terminal 'Can you verify that the customer is who he claims to be?'

- terminal asks user for PIN

- terminal asks chip: is this PIN correct?

- chip replies: yes.

So, I have to trust that the terminal will not e.g. put my PIN on Twitter.

Worse, that terminal-chip communication is not encrypted. Hence, it is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. That is what 'chip and PIN is broken' demonstrated.

Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#47

Post by daxelrod »

pyre wrote: post #43
cperciva wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Canadian constitutional law has something called the 'living tree doctrine', which states that the constitution can grow and evolve over time, being reinterpreted in new contexts. To push the metaphor a bit further, I'd point out that a living tree is considerably more resilient than a dead tree, and is likely to adapt to conditions which might otherwise destroy it. I don't think anyone can seriously claim that the c…

I find it extremely disingenuous to say that because the Canadian (or British) Constitution can easily be re-interpreted in different contexts, that it will always be interpreted in 'the correct way.' You seem to be pointing to examples of the US Constitution being interpreted poorly, making the implication that a 'dead tree' constitution can only be interpreted poorly, and a 'living tree' constitution can only be in…

There are other basic protections built in to attempt to prevent turning on a dime in a bad direction, as decided by the legislative and executive branches. Since the Court has no enforcement powers of their own, an unpopular turn away from the appearance of consistency could result in a toothless ruling and a constitutional crisis.

Let's use your example, the Court suddenly ruling to overturn the current interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Assuming "current" means "1964 and later", this would also overturn the Civil Rights Act. The CRA was based upon the Commerce Clause, and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964) upheld its broad definition of interstate commerce [1].

I would have a hard time believing Congress would follow along with a ruling that simultaneously overturned a hugely popular law and decreased their powers. (However, I am aware that there have been a few rulings that might be counterarguments.)

[1]Epstien, Walker. Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice 5th ed. Page 658.

Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#48

Post by mjac »

Reading that letter makes me proud of the Security Group at Cambridge University. Ross Anderson took us for a couple of Security courses in second/third year Computer Science and was interesting, direct and completely no-nonsense. He emphasised that policy and ignorance were often the main causes of failures, especially with LAS, NHS centralisation (UK government projects). I find strong individuals like Anderson inspiring when they take on organisations who attack knowledge rather than being hands-on and fixing their systems.

The Security II course is especially relevant. I am not sure that everyone can access these resources but the lecture notes cover a variety of modern hardware approaches to security (including chip-and-pin). Try: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/teaching/1011/SecurityII/

I highly recommend Anderson's Security Engineering, the first edition is available online: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html

Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#49

Post by rlpb »

huhtenberg wrote: post #37
StavrosK wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't really understand the logic behind chip and pin cards. Do you really want me to disclose my card and my PIN to a completely untrusted machine a stranger hands to me? How do I know the vendor won't just record both and replay them, charging me for things I didn't pay?

Chip cards cannot be "replayed" or cloned, that's why there's a chip in the first place. The chip stores card's private key that is used to digitally sign a (purchase) transaction. Each transaction is a multi-message exchange in real-time between the terminal and the bank and it includes an unique ID generated by the bank, which is covered by the signature. This effectively prevents a replay. The private key cannot b…

Sure, an attacker can't easily sign a fake transaction, but he can compromise the terminal and get hold of the PIN, and then use the PIN somewhere else where a signed transaction isn't required.

This has actually happened: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article71...

Re: Prof. Ross Anderson's response to a takedown request about security research

#50

Post by marshray »

subway wrote: post #30
pshapiro wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It seems that the point is that Wikileaks apparently broke no laws.

You don't have to break a law to violate an AUP.

You have to live up to more than your own AUP to be worthy of respect in my book. I'd go so far as to say anyone who does only the minimum required by policies they themselves wrote and defers the rest to extra-constitutional influence from the likes of Sen. Lieberman is pretty darn low.

So sure, do whatever you can get away with under your AUP, just don't expect me to respect you for it (or trust you with my data).

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