Live data from Hacker News

Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

moonofalabama.org

61–70 of 72 posts

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#61
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

See edit 2, citing regulation which must be met by all transport aircraft. I think also §25.255 Out-of-trim characteristics, (b) (1) The stick force vs. g curve must have a positive slope at any speed up to and including VFC/MFC

I don’t see how the FAAs assessment that the 737 MAX was easier to put into a stall for greater that 12 degrees AoA is the same as a “reversal of controls” or a “sudden or excessive reduction of elevator control” stipulated in 25.253 What am I missing? I am not an aviation expert in any sense.

"Reversal of control force", not "reversal of controls". There's also section 25.175, which stipulates "The stick force curve must have a stable slope at speeds"... and gives speed ranges for climb, cruise, approach, and landing. For example:

§25.175 Demonstration of static longitudinal stability.

Static longitudinal stability must be shown as follows:

(a) Climb. The stick force curve must have a stable slope at speeds between 85 and 115 percent of the speed at which the airplane—

(1) Is trimmed, with—

(i) Wing flaps retracted;

(ii) Landing gear retracted;

(iii) Maximum takeoff weight; and

(iv) 75 percent of maximum continuous power for reciprocating engines or the maximum power or thrust selected by the applicant as an operating limitation for use during climb for turbine engines; and

(2) Is trimmed at the speed for best rate-of-climb except that the speed need not be less than 1.3 VSR

These are transports, not fighters. The basic idea is that you want it to be harder work to make a sharper maneuver, and want the aircraft to naturally level out. If the force required decreases for a steeper pitch/roll/yaw, then the plane will naturally want to intensify the maneuver. It's like a car with oversteer--let go of the steering wheel and it will make a sharper turn. As the article cited said, the FAA and Boeing's test pilots weren't happy with the yoke forces in certain situations.

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#62
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don’t see how the FAAs assessment that the 737 MAX was easier to put into a stall for greater that 12 degrees AoA is the same as a “reversal of controls” or a “sudden or excessive reduction of elevator control” stipulated in 25.253 What am I missing? I am not an aviation expert in any sense.

"Reversal of control force", not "reversal of controls". There's also section 25.175, which stipulates "The stick force curve must have a stable slope at speeds"... and gives speed ranges for climb, cruise, approach, and landing. For example: §25.175 Demonstration of static longitudinal stability. Static longitudinal stability must be shown as follows: (a) Climb. The stick force curve must have a stable slope at spee…

[deleted]

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#63
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don’t see how the FAAs assessment that the 737 MAX was easier to put into a stall for greater that 12 degrees AoA is the same as a “reversal of controls” or a “sudden or excessive reduction of elevator control” stipulated in 25.253 What am I missing? I am not an aviation expert in any sense.

"Reversal of control force", not "reversal of controls". There's also section 25.175, which stipulates "The stick force curve must have a stable slope at speeds"... and gives speed ranges for climb, cruise, approach, and landing. For example: §25.175 Demonstration of static longitudinal stability. Static longitudinal stability must be shown as follows: (a) Climb. The stick force curve must have a stable slope at spee…

Thanks for clearing that up.

Now is it unusual for sensors and computer controls to help meet the airworthiness requirements?

I’m guessing it’s definitely not preferable.

I also think everyone is agreed that Boeing (the company and decision makers) really fucked up here, but it seems like a chain of bad decisions at every stage has played a part in this disaster.

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#64
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ironically, I believe that your information is also inaccurate. MCAS is required in order to meet federal airworthiness requirements . Without it, in certain flight conditions the back-pressure on the control yoke gets less as the yoke is pulled further back. It's like over-steer in a car, and is simply not allowed. Yes, the plane is dynamically stable; if you leave the yoke in one position it won't pitch up even mor…

"MCAS is required in order to meet federal airworthiness requirements" Cite this. Specifically this. The rest of your comment agrees with mine without this being true, and I have not seen any evidence of this being true.

Hmm. OK, better wording would be "Handling mitigation such as MCAS is required in order...". I've seen several news articles, such as the one cited, which reported that the yoke forces decreased near stall AoA in certain flight regimes. Here's one from the NYT: [0] Originally MCAS was implemented for rather extreme maneuvers, and required both the AoA sensor and a G-force sensor to agree. Later, it was discovered that low-speed stalls also had yoke-force problems, and the control authority was increased, and the G-force requirement dropped.

[0] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-c...

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#65
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"MCAS is required in order to meet federal airworthiness requirements" Cite this. Specifically this. The rest of your comment agrees with mine without this being true, and I have not seen any evidence of this being true.

Hmm. OK, better wording would be "Handling mitigation such as MCAS is required in order...". I've seen several news articles, such as the one cited, which reported that the yoke forces decreased near stall AoA in certain flight regimes. Here's one from the NYT: [0] Originally MCAS was implemented for rather extreme maneuvers, and required both the AoA sensor and a G-force sensor to agree. Later, it was discovered tha…

And as stated in countless well cited articles, this was done in order to maintain the 737 type rating and make the MAX 8 handle like other 737. Not to meet regulations that were otherwise unmet.

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#66
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Reversal of control force", not "reversal of controls". There's also section 25.175, which stipulates "The stick force curve must have a stable slope at speeds"... and gives speed ranges for climb, cruise, approach, and landing. For example: §25.175 Demonstration of static longitudinal stability. Static longitudinal stability must be shown as follows: (a) Climb. The stick force curve must have a stable slope at spee…

Thanks for clearing that up. Now is it unusual for sensors and computer controls to help meet the airworthiness requirements? I’m guessing it’s definitely not preferable. I also think everyone is agreed that Boeing (the company and decision makers) really fucked up here, but it seems like a chain of bad decisions at every stage has played a part in this disaster.

There's all kinds of these artificial enhancements in aircraft. They range from "stick shakers" [0] (which cause the control stick/yoke to shake when the plane detects a near-stall) to yaw dampers (which counteract "Dutch Roll" in swept-wing planes) [1] to full-blown "you tell me what you want and I'll keep the plane from tumbling out of the sky" control systems for fighters [2]. There are also "flight envelope protection" systems which prevent pilots from overstressing aircraft. What's uncommon is for them to lack redundancy. Yeah, Boeing has much bigger problems than just MCAS.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stick_shaker

[1] https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/6391/what-is-th...

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_F-117_Nighthawk#cite_...

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#67

As has been discussed on HN, this whole 737 MAX flaw is not a software problem. Boeing wants you to believe it is. The flaw is actually a physical design problem of the aircraft. Even if the software were to work perfectly, the plane is still flawed. The only real fix is not to fly the 737 MAX.

This is entirely false. Stop spreading disinformation. Myth: the 737 MAX 8 is not inherently stable, has relaxed stability, etc. Fact: it's very much inherently stable. Myth: the 737 MAX 8 is easier to stall than other planes. Fact: no it isn't. The pitch-up characteristic of the MAX 8 is less strong than of e.g. the 757 and that plane flies just fine. The actual problem with the MAX 8 is that Boeing added MCAS to al…

> The pitch-up characteristic of the MAX 8 is less strong than of e.g. the 757 and that plane flies just fine.

The 757 ( and 737NG etc ) has constant pitch rate. The Max does not, which is the root of the problem.

The actual forces involved aren't pertinent.

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or admit it's a hardware and aircraft design problem and go through the exponentially more expensive process of fixing it.

What’s that old quote... “It Is Difficult to Get a Man to Understand Something When His Salary Depends Upon His Not Understanding It.”

That explains so much.

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#69
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A simpler solution would be to use the same CPU done with a slightly newer process to allow a higher clock rate. That would ease the recertification process. If you think they are at best 40 MHz 286 parts, the best that was available by then, running software derived from previous releases that ran on slower chips, there is plenty of room for improvement. IIRC, you can get a modern 65816 (the 16-bit descendant of the…

Yes, I'm familiar with second-source 6502. Also, I've seen the Rabbit2000 processor, it's basically a Z80 running at 50 MHz. But I wasn't aware that 80286 has any modern second-source clones. Are there?

I don't know, but it wouldn't be too hard. Or expensive, in relation to bleeding edge semiconductors.

Fun thing: I remember a 40 MHz 286 desktop at one point. Wikipedia tells me they only went to 25 MHz. That's some overclocking...

Fun fact #2: with a feature size of 1.5 µm, one could fit an entire 6502 done in 7 nm process on top of a single 80286 transistor.

Re: Boeing's software fix for the 737 Max overwhelms the plane's computer

#70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

AFAIK, Airbus has stockpiled huge amounts of legacy CPUs in climate controlled conditions. Boeing must have done the same

Was really curious as to what Airbus was using, thanks for this! Why not just use the latest CPUs though? I can't imagine the cost would be relatively significant in the greater scheme of things. Are the legacy CPU's really better for this use-case?

I was trying to investigate this about Airbus but without much luck. I even found they use a 80186 with another Motorola processor for cross checking values. I also wonder does maybe Airbus have "more" processors for different tasks? I also read their A340 uses 80386. That might mean they have expertise and groundwork set to migrate the A320 to the i386, of they already haven't (hard to find data). The 'bus is a much more digitalised plane and 20 years younger, I would guess they've got something different or a bit more modern.
Post reply on HN