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Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

github.com

41–50 of 78 posts

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#41
post #6

We are lucky that they decided to vandalize instead of hiding something. Remember, on Github you can actually submit your commit with another’s email, and github automatically puts the identity associated with the email allowing people to spoof. Always sign your commits!

... and today PGP was poisoned

Link, please?

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#42
post #6

We are lucky that they decided to vandalize instead of hiding something. Remember, on Github you can actually submit your commit with another’s email, and github automatically puts the identity associated with the email allowing people to spoof. Always sign your commits!

> Always sign your commits!

Unfortunately PGP is fundamentally broken. Any identity (email address) can be trivially DoS'd by anyone, because the keyservers are (by design) write-only databases which anyone can add to.

https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d695...

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#44
post #6

We are lucky that they decided to vandalize instead of hiding something. Remember, on Github you can actually submit your commit with another’s email, and github automatically puts the identity associated with the email allowing people to spoof. Always sign your commits!

> Always sign your commits! Unfortunately PGP is fundamentally broken. Any identity (email address) can be trivially DoS'd by anyone, because the keyservers are (by design) write-only databases which anyone can add to. https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d695...

I think that actually means the notion of keyservers are fundamentally broken, not PGP.

I don't need a key server for me to sign or validate that something was signed by who it said it was if exchanged my keys via a secure means.

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#45
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> We are lucky that they decided to vandalize instead of hiding something. How on earth do you know they haven't done both?!

Git commit hashes are pretty safe.

Aren't they changing the hash algorithm specifically because they're no longer safe?

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#46
post #14
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s not just on github. That’s totally a feature of git itself. You can set the email address to whatever you want.

Not knowing the details around this, but if they haven't done so, Github could add something to indicate whether particular commits were signed by the PGP key Github knows to belong to the user the commit claims it was authored by. A user could have a setting to enable Github warnings where there are commits supposedly authored by user but not signed. They could also always warn where there are commits authored by a…

Github already shows signed commits: https://help.github.com/en/articles/signing-commits

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#47
post #22
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not knowing the details around this, but if they haven't done so, Github could add something to indicate whether particular commits were signed by the PGP key Github knows to belong to the user the commit claims it was authored by. A user could have a setting to enable Github warnings where there are commits supposedly authored by user but not signed. They could also always warn where there are commits authored by a…

Github could simply reject commits with email addresses not added to your account. As you need to verify every email you add to your account this problem would be solved instantly.

This would completely break you merging others' patches into your repository outside of GitHub (with git-am(1)).

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#48
post #6

We are lucky that they decided to vandalize instead of hiding something. Remember, on Github you can actually submit your commit with another’s email, and github automatically puts the identity associated with the email allowing people to spoof. Always sign your commits!

... and today PGP was poisoned

PGP still works fine. It's SKS that doesn't, but you don't need SKS to use PGP.

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#49
post #6

We are lucky that they decided to vandalize instead of hiding something. Remember, on Github you can actually submit your commit with another’s email, and github automatically puts the identity associated with the email allowing people to spoof. Always sign your commits!

If they had an SSH key only then signing would be a defense. But if the attackers got OAuth access, stolen credentials, or a personal access token to someone with access to the org, they could do everything through the web interface which is signed by a common Github key.

Commits made via the UI aren’t signed at all. There is no “common github key” for signing commits

Re: Canonical Ltd source code repositories have been compromised

#50
post #40
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Isn't commit signing a bit like NuGet package signing? Not worth it unless _everyone_ does it all the time? Any valid commit doesn't necessarily invalidate unsigned commits. It only means this commit is really done by me , but it doesn't me the other commit wasn't done by me.

When you sign git commit, you do not sign your diff but the whole source tree as you see it. Effectively, you're vetting all prior commits on the branch. Thus maintainers usually sign merge commits and it's their job to confirm that commits don't do anything shady and come from people they claim to come from.

But github encourages merges through the website, which means they are not signed.
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