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The case against plant consciousness

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Re: The case against plant consciousness

#91

Post by tempguy9999 »

mikeg8 wrote: post #88
sixplusone wrote: post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How do you determine whether the tree releases pheromones to warn others -vs- it happens to release pheromones and it induces a response in the others? i.e., the former requires intent, whereas the latter simply evolutionary pressure (since the trees with the response would fare better, thus reproduce more successfully).

Good question and a difficult one for me to answer as I am no expert here. I believe it was the discovery that trees were using pheromones during an acute external event, with or without "intent" as we understand it, to alter neighboring trees, that was surprising to the researchers as we typically associate pheromones with animals. If a single tree under duress is using its resources and energy to signal to other tr…

The trees were acacias (there may be other species that do this, I don't know) and the pheromone was ethylene, which is a very simple gas that's used in development of other things in plants, famously like fruit ripening but likely more (can't remember, prob bud development).

" rel="nofollow">https://asknature.org/strategy/leaves-signal-presence-of-pre...

> If a single tree under duress is using its resources and energy to signal to other trees that have no way of directly helping the tree in question, what evolutionary advantage is being provided to the tree releasing the pheromones?

Its genetic legacy is being enhanced, if the trees it's protecting are related, which likely they are (very elegant phrasing though! upvoted just for that)

> thus reproduce more successfully", and that awareness may be a form of consciousness different than our own

Hmm. Be careful here. I need to sit down and read and understand this so please recognise I'm dumping this on you, but

"Michie’s design, called MENACE, was a large pile of matchboxes that contained a number of beads and learned to play tic-tac-toe."

...

"MENACE could never win against the perfect algorithm, but ended up drawing every time after about 90 games, making it equally as perfect"

" rel="nofollow">https://opendatascience.com/menace-donald-michie-tic-tac-toe...

I dunno. Where do you draw the line? HTH anyway.

Re: The case against plant consciousness

#92

Post by MaxBarraclough »

anon_z88 wrote: post #20

While I agree with his reasoning based on his definition of consciousness, I am not sure if this is the most appropriate way of defining consciousness. We still do not properly understand it, thus we cannot define it. While I try to stray from vague or ambiguous interpretations, I do think it's significant to point that out. Let's look at the generic definition: * consciousness - "the state of being awake and aware o…

You might like this TED talk, The Real Reason for Brains. It goes in a similar direction to the article.

Life forms that don't move don't need brains. Sophisticated decision-making isn't a challenge that a plant has to meet. I think this is a strong point against the idea of plants being conscious.

https://www.ted.com/talks/daniel_wolpert_the_real_reason_for...

Re: The case against plant consciousness

#93

Post by solipsism »

ta1234567890 wrote: post #83
solipsism wrote: post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Then you could also say that Earth (and any planet or star), is also conscious, and at a way higher level than we (humans) are. What's the point of the word "conscious" if it's just a synonym of the word "complex"? If it doesn't add anything, it's not worth having the word.

Good point. Don't have a good answer to that. However, this happens very frequently in humans, we have multiple different languages and even multiple synonyms for a lot of (most?) words in every one of those languages. At the same time, would correlation of two things make one of them worthless to have/know/understand?

Synonymous != Correlated.

If you're saying they're synonymous, then it doesn't make sense to ask whether you can have one without the other.

So ask yourself, could you imagine something being complex but not conscious, or conscious but not complex? If so, then they're not synonymous and you have something interesting to talk about.

Re: The case against plant consciousness

#94

Post by aidoejebrji »

anon_z88 wrote: post #20

While I agree with his reasoning based on his definition of consciousness, I am not sure if this is the most appropriate way of defining consciousness. We still do not properly understand it, thus we cannot define it. While I try to stray from vague or ambiguous interpretations, I do think it's significant to point that out. Let's look at the generic definition: * consciousness - "the state of being awake and aware o…

Following Thomas Nagel, I understand 'x is conscious' to mean roughly 'there is something that it is like to be x'. In this sense, a system can be intelligent without being conscious. Consciousness, intelligence, and self-awareness might all be orthogonal. We currently know vastly more about how to build an intelligent machine (extremely low as the level of intelligence may be) than about how to build a conscious machine (we know nothing at all about that).

Imagine waking up from deep sleep. In the first few seconds, there is virtually no intelligence present other than basic autonomous body survival intelligence, which is also present during deep sleep. So what has changed? What is the difference between being in deep sleep and being in the state of unintelligent awareness a second after waking from deep sleep? There is not something that it is like to be in deep sleep. There is something that it is like to be just awakened from deep sleep.

There is a lot of confusion in most conversations between consciousness, intelligence, and self-awareness. The three are different concepts and the relationships between them are poorly understod.

I can imagine a human-level intelligence that lacks consciousness (this is sort of what is meant by the term 'p-zombie'). I can imagine a being that almost or completely lacks intelligence (in the sense of problem-solving ability, pattern recognition, etc.), yet is conscious.

Humanity currently has a lot of knowledge about how various material phenomena (drugs, being hit in the head with a brick, etc.) affect consciousness, but as far as I know humanity currently has zero knowledge about the mechanisms by which material phenomena affect consciousness. Consciousness in its essence is not understood at all and may be fundamentally beyond the reach of science.

There is no reason to assume that it is in principle possible to objectively evaluate whether some entity is conscious.

Re: The case against plant consciousness

#95

Post by sixplusone »

mikeg8 wrote: post #88
sixplusone wrote: post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How do you determine whether the tree releases pheromones to warn others -vs- it happens to release pheromones and it induces a response in the others? i.e., the former requires intent, whereas the latter simply evolutionary pressure (since the trees with the response would fare better, thus reproduce more successfully).

Good question and a difficult one for me to answer as I am no expert here. I believe it was the discovery that trees were using pheromones during an acute external event, with or without "intent" as we understand it, to alter neighboring trees, that was surprising to the researchers as we typically associate pheromones with animals. If a single tree under duress is using its resources and energy to signal to other tr…

> that awareness may be a form of consciousness different than our own

the response requires no consciousness, only a mechanical operation

> what evolutionary advantage is being provided to the tree releasing the pheromones?

natural selection works in perpetuity; "this" tree benefited from the action/reaction it has, thanks to its parents having the same reaction/action. The reified response then promulgates because it helps the bearers survive, and becomes self-reinforcing.

Re: The case against plant consciousness

#96

Post by evancox100 »

baddox wrote: post #72
hn_throwaway_99 wrote: post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> At the most abstract interpretation I think consciousness can be defined as a closed system that contain both input and output, in which information is gathered and alters some component of the system itself. This seems like a reductio ad absurdum definition of consciousness, to echo rotrux's "By this definition my air conditioning system is conscious" comment. Consciousness may be hard to define, but it certainly…

I'm not so against considering an air conditioning system to be conscious. If the goal is to define "consciousness" deliberately in such a way that you get to keep considering only a certain set of things to be conscious, then you might as well just define it as exactly that set of things.

That's a straw man, no one has that goal. And it's pretty clear a definition of consciousness that would include a thermostat is so broad as to be nearly worthless.

Re: The case against plant consciousness

#97

Post by xkcd-sucks »

hathawsh wrote: post #74
anon_z88 wrote: post #20

While I agree with his reasoning based on his definition of consciousness, I am not sure if this is the most appropriate way of defining consciousness. We still do not properly understand it, thus we cannot define it. While I try to stray from vague or ambiguous interpretations, I do think it's significant to point that out. Let's look at the generic definition: * consciousness - "the state of being awake and aware o…

The word "consciousness" has important connotations that are not captured by the generic definition. As others noted, an air conditioner with a built in thermostat can fit the generic definition of consciousness. When I say an entity is conscious, I mean to say it not only has the ability to react to stimuli, but it can also abstractly choose how to react. It can rewire its own reactions, not just in a Pavlovian sens…

Plants engage actively with their environment, and communicate with other plants. Usually by secreting some kind of chemical ("secondary metabolite"), which makes sense given they don't move very fast.

Things that don't move very fast are at an advantage where energy efficiency is important. The general trend is that low-energy things modify their environment chemically and high-energy things modify their environment mechanically. Compare the diversity of human-discovered secondary metabolites from plants/fungi (low power), insects/reptiles/amphibians (medium power), mammals/birds (high power)

https://www.mpg.de/15791/Plants_and_environment

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plant_communication

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6b23/df2807a0fb8e77c4922377...

Re: The case against plant consciousness

#98

Post by naasking »

hathawsh wrote: post #74
anon_z88 wrote: post #20

While I agree with his reasoning based on his definition of consciousness, I am not sure if this is the most appropriate way of defining consciousness. We still do not properly understand it, thus we cannot define it. While I try to stray from vague or ambiguous interpretations, I do think it's significant to point that out. Let's look at the generic definition: * consciousness - "the state of being awake and aware o…

The word "consciousness" has important connotations that are not captured by the generic definition. As others noted, an air conditioner with a built in thermostat can fit the generic definition of consciousness. When I say an entity is conscious, I mean to say it not only has the ability to react to stimuli, but it can also abstractly choose how to react. It can rewire its own reactions, not just in a Pavlovian sens…

> When I say an entity is conscious, I mean to say it not only has the ability to react to stimuli, but it can also abstractly choose how to react. It can rewire its own reactions, not just in a Pavlovian sense, but it can also develop internal thought frameworks and route its reactions through the frameworks it prefers.

These are just reactions with a memory component. This would include any computers, and so is too broad. I think consciousness will end up being a specific type of information process, with certain properties including those you describe, but it must have more properties and so be more specific than what you outline.

Re: The case against plant consciousness

#100

Post by naasking »

aidoejebrji wrote: post #94
anon_z88 wrote: post #20

While I agree with his reasoning based on his definition of consciousness, I am not sure if this is the most appropriate way of defining consciousness. We still do not properly understand it, thus we cannot define it. While I try to stray from vague or ambiguous interpretations, I do think it's significant to point that out. Let's look at the generic definition: * consciousness - "the state of being awake and aware o…

Following Thomas Nagel, I understand 'x is conscious' to mean roughly 'there is something that it is like to be x'. In this sense, a system can be intelligent without being conscious. Consciousness, intelligence, and self-awareness might all be orthogonal. We currently know vastly more about how to build an intelligent machine (extremely low as the level of intelligence may be) than about how to build a conscious mac…

> Consciousness, intelligence, and self-awareness might all be orthogonal.

Maybe, but probably not!

> I can imagine a human-level intelligence that lacks consciousness (this is sort of what is meant by the term 'p-zombie'). I can imagine a being that almost or completely lacks intelligence (in the sense of problem-solving ability, pattern recognition, etc.), yet is conscious.

I can imagine living forever, but it's actually impossible. The p-zombie argument depends upon a rhetorical trick that exposes our ignorance, much like Zeno's paradox.

> There is no reason to assume that it is in principle possible to objectively evaluate whether some entity is conscious.

Whatever argument you might use to to justify this, would also suggest that it is not possible in principle to objectively evaluate whether something is healthy, or alive or feels pain. And yet we seem quite adept at this.

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