Earlier quoted context omitted.
The software did exactly as it's supposed to do: If the AOA sensors tells you the plane is tilting too high up, pitch the nose down a little. The main issue was that there was only one AOA sensor connected in standard packages and the hardware for it failed. The pitot tubes failed for the doomed Air France incident which caused the software to read incorrectly and stall. For what it's worth AirBus has a huge engineer…
The problem is that developers also need to understand what they are coding, and fight back when they notice that the design is fundamentally flawed. In this case, the lack of redundancy should have been a red-flagged. This is why domain knowledge is at least as important as coding skills.
Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
121–130 of 166 posts
Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#122Earlier quoted context omitted.
The software did exactly as it's supposed to do: If the AOA sensors tells you the plane is tilting too high up, pitch the nose down a little. The main issue was that there was only one AOA sensor connected in standard packages and the hardware for it failed. The pitot tubes failed for the doomed Air France incident which caused the software to read incorrectly and stall. For what it's worth AirBus has a huge engineer…
You sound suspiciously like every other outsourcer I’ve worked with who breaks something critical. A million reasons why it wasn’t their fault. They did exactly what they were told right and didn’t take one second to validate the assumptions surrounding the systematic nature of the solution. The goal, the mission, the end state solution. That was another departments concern right. That was QA’s concern, that was desi…
Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#123I’m reminded of an article many years ago about when Boeing was outsourcing to to improve return on capital or some nonsense and at some point someone just said to maximize return on capital they should just have someone else design and make the planes and put a Boeing sticker on them
Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#124Earlier quoted context omitted.
Interesting - a completely hypothetical whataboutism
LOL - yeah what about China? If they were making commercial aircraft they might be doing the same thing!
With Boeing trashing its reputation and Airbus sitting on an enormous backlog I can envisage Chinese airliners making inroads in Africa and Asia. But to do so they need to make solid, dependable products; they can't scrimp or cut corners in pursuit of short-term profit.
Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#125How in the world does one hire $9 an hour software engineers?
Without wanting to sound disrespectful, most of the engineers outside US and some EU countries, get paid a lot less from what you’re used to and from what you read in major tech sites. I know a lot of good engineers in many countries (Greece, Croatia, south-east EU, India...) that get paid less than 9$/hr (myself included). The bad thing with all the big companies outsourcing positions and working with external partn…
That need not be a disadvantage, I've seen awesome self-taught coders (and really bad ones too).
Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#126The inescapable problem is that all newer planes from Boeing and likely other manufacturers are suspect in uncountably tens of thousands of ways because they cannot be presently assured (without engineering reviews, inspections and documentation) to be fit for passenger travel due to the lackadaisical regulatory climate in which they were developed and manufactured. The 787, 737 NG (-600 and up) and 737 MAX are just the tips of the known problems. And now Boeing wants a folding wing plane too?
Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#127Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Still, for the 787, HCL gave Boeing a remarkable price – free, according to Sam Swaro, an associate vice president who pitched HCL’s services at a San Diego conference sponsored by Avionics International magazine in June. He said the company took no up-front payments on the 787 and only started collecting payments based on sales years later, an “innovative business model” he offered to extend to others in the indus…
How is that allowed? It is like basically the equivalent of dumping products below market and production price like what China frequently does to steel.
Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#128Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#129Re: Boeing's 737 Max software outsourced to lower-paid engineers
#130Money saved by firing experienced engs and outsourcing the development Why is that so hard to understand? Massive fail at risk management maybe?
The software did exactly as it's supposed to do: If the AOA sensors tells you the plane is tilting too high up, pitch the nose down a little. The main issue was that there was only one AOA sensor connected in standard packages and the hardware for it failed. The pitot tubes failed for the doomed Air France incident which caused the software to read incorrectly and stall. For what it's worth AirBus has a huge engineer…
Firstly, no the software did not do exactly as it's supposed to. It crashed the plane by rendering it unflyable. It's not supposed to do that. And your description of the MCAS specification is vastly over-simplified - it is not an autopilot and its job is to gradually change the behaviour of the plane in different flight modes (which it must detect), not to directly fly the plane as you suggest (and even two AOA sensors would be insufficient for the type of functionality you describe). The behaviour of the MCAS is absolutely in question, in particular the way it kept "re-adding" the correction, with cumulative effect, ending up fully pitched down.
Secondly, if by "the doomed Air France incident" you mean AF447, your description of it is flat-out wrong. The pilot, not software, stalled and crashed the plane by manually holding the stick back for 15 minutes. The pitot tubes briefly iced over (they didn't "fail") which is not an uncommon occurrence, and the only consequence of this was that the software guardrails that would have prevented the pilot from crashing the plane were removed. All instrumentation systems were fully operational at the time of the crash.