Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem with the airframe is that the shape of the nacelles, and their forward position create extra lifting surface in front of the center of gravity at high AoA. What this results in, is a non-compliant stick force response curve at high AoA. This violates FAA regulations which state that the stick force required to bring a plane to a stall must consistently increase all the way to the stall. No sickening or de…
I appreciate the response but it does not help at all one bit, it's a rehash of everything I've already read. In all of these 737 MAX discussions I'm one of the first to have brought up FAR 25.173(c) (although that whole section is relevant). I do not see how software augmentation can be permitted to compensate for a deviation from FAR 26.173. That section is titled: Static longitudinal stability. Software augmentati…
I absolutely 100% agree. At no point have I intended to imply that any software solution should justify exceptional certification of an unairworthy frame as airworthy; in case that isn't clear.
I've only tried to communicate the fact that the software can physically remedy the behavior enough to apparently bring it within the capability of a human to control (as has been demonstrated by the non-crashed flights, as Boeing will inevitably argue).
I absolutely, unequivocally reject any argument that the software fix is compliant with regulations as written, or should be accepted as an acceptable remedy in it's current form.
I've had my view somewhat shaped by D.P. Davies in regard to the application of "gadgets" for certification. I think that any such system must be essentially bulletproof, and avoided at all costs by engineering the problem out if possible; and if allowed must unquestionably get the point across to the pilot that they are in dangerous waters.
The 727 had it's Stick Pusher in the U.K. This seems to be a modern retreating of the same path, and to be honest, I'm siding more toward the conservative side you hold of not allowing MCAS to remedy these handling faults. It really would be an example of the slippery slope of normalization of deviance in action.
I really hope all pilots, aerodynamicsts, and engineers take notice, and speak up. I can sit in these threads and try to spread understanding to the nine winds; but I'm some dude on the Net, who has no professional affiliation to any of this, but a big fat keg of outrage because this is not Quality damnit.