FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes • Hacker News Board

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#271

Post by magduf » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:32 PM UTC

tropo wrote: post #62

GiorgioG wrote: post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because they would have to redesign the parts of the fuselage that holds the landing gear when they are retracted - as far as I know, there's not enough room to house taller landing gear.

Boeing did actually design extendable landing gear for the 737 MAX-10 model, which hadn't shipped yet. That aircraft is longer. To avoid tail strikes, the rear gear becomes longer as the aircraft is taking off. I'm sure that costs more money. If it were on all 737 MAX aircraft, perhaps the engines could be lower. It'd be like a kneeling bus that gets lower when stopped to take on passengers. Another option would be t…

You're talking about changes that would cause the plane to be a very different plane than the 1967 737, and would then need a new type rating. If you're going to do that, you might as well just throw out the 737 design altogether and make an all-new clean-sheet design. Boeing wanted to avoid that because that costs a lot more money and pilots would need retraining on the new type. They wanted to be able to call this piece of junk a "737" and claim that pilots didn't need any new training to fly it.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#272

Post by WhiteOwlLion » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:33 PM UTC

colonelcanoe wrote: post #257

ddalex wrote: post #251

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it probably wouldn't if you cut corners on engineering to reduce costs and nothing bad happens, that good engineering actually

It's not necessarily good engineering, it could also be selection bias. It depends on how much risk is added by cutting corners. If too many corners are cut, but it didn't fail just due to luck, it's still bad engineering.

Its also bad for perception of the aviation industry if people die from faulty hardware. Many people don't like to fly already because they don't feel safe. These type of incidents don't help calm those fears.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#273

Post by pas » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:37 PM UTC

rjvehn wrote: post #27

There are a myriad of issues that put the planes at risk, but I think that the fact that when the control system (MCAS) is engaged causes it to ignore feedback is the biggest issue of all. "But with the MCAS activated, said Fehrm, those breakout switches wouldn’t work. MCAS assumes the yoke is already aggressively pulled back and won’t allow further pullback to counter its action, which is to hold the nose down. Fehr…

The problem was that because it was an unknown component its failure mode was not known, which created/exacerbated the panic.

There is a simple procedure, which is already part of the standard memory checklists. What to do in case of runaway trim. The pilots must/should be able to notice the trim wheels spinning, they then can disable trim motors and fall back to manually cranking them.

The problem is, panic makes a mess of almost anybody. Sure, pilots shouldn't be anybody, but we know how much cost cutting has been going on.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#274

Post by magduf » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:37 PM UTC

tremon wrote: post #199

cmurf wrote: post #122

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's the problem with the airframe? What's the problem with the larger engine nacelle causing a different pitching moment? I've yet to read either of those violate any portion of FAR 25. There is still an open question whether the MAX should have or will have a separate type certificate from other 737's, thereby requiring pilots of a type rating to fly the MAX, thereby requiring full disclosure and training on all…

What's the problem with the airframe? The #1 problem with the airframe is that it is not identical to the original 737 airframe. Therefore it shouldn't have been certified as a 737, and it should have required pilot training. Boeing has been using software to emulate a 737 airframe to avoid the pilot training costs. This approach itself is fraught with problems, and I hope the FAA puts a hard stop to these non-soluti…

I'd like to see the European and Chinese aviation authorities put a hard stop to these non-solutions if the FAA doesn't. At this point, I don't think the FAA is at all trustworthy; they've proven themselves untrustworthy with the way they handled the certification of this turkey and how they were literally the last aviation authority in the world to ground the plane.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#275

Post by nolok » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:41 PM UTC

moftz wrote: post #228

BorRagnarok wrote: post #189

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I still don't trust the FAA at all. They've been sourcing out their own work to Boeing since the 787 Dreamliner [0]. That's seven years ago. I don't think this will make them change their practices. The 787 fiasco certainly didn't. Personally I'd be happiest if the world just scrapped all the Max-es. Just scrap 'em, let Boeing go out of business, it's what they deserve now, they shouldn't exist anymore as a company.…

It's not footage but that angle of attack is absolutely nuts. I don't think my brain would have been able to process that kind of image out my window if I was a passenger on that plane. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fIunpQQpzs0

It's especially important, while seeing that sequence starting around 5:20, both the crazy scary angle and the speed of it, to remember the way people defended Boeing and said the pilots could have dealt with it using arguments along the lines of "if they took a step back and though rationally" or "if they read the full procedure manual they have access to" or "if they connected the dots and realized it was similar to other system X".

Those people, pilots included, were thrown to the grounds.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#276

Post by Fezzik » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:42 PM UTC

laythea wrote: post #264

timeisapear wrote: post #260

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure I buy the risk/market trade-off. You could replace Boeing with any car manufacturer that still has publicly traded shareholder needs.

The car industry is not as advanced as the aviation industry. It will come a time, where the level of complexity of a car means that in order to build and test it properly, it will be a ever-increasing easy business decision to take shortcuts.

And we have already seen glimmers of such behavior with all the emissions scandals around diesel cars... the outcome is not immediate death of passengers, but car companies were/are skirting health regulations to increase profits.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#277

Post by nolok » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:44 PM UTC

taneq wrote: post #129

sopooneo wrote: post #104

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think they "tricked [them] into believing". More like "talked them into accepting".

The only difference between these two descriptions is whether the FAA implicitly understood that the MAX is NOT the same as the 737. If yes, then they were talked into accepting it anyway. If no, then they were tricked (unless Boeing genuinely believed that there was no difference, which is clearly false.)

The kind of people who work at the FAA jobs where those decision are made know enough about planes to realize that a different engine placement is not without effect. That alone means they should at least have done extensive testing internally, which they didn't since it was pretty much clear they used the older 737 simulators / didn't have 737 MAX simulators.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#278

Post by fredgrott » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:45 PM UTC

laythea wrote: post #264

timeisapear wrote: post #260

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure I buy the risk/market trade-off. You could replace Boeing with any car manufacturer that still has publicly traded shareholder needs.

The car industry is not as advanced as the aviation industry. It will come a time, where the level of complexity of a car means that in order to build and test it properly, it will be a ever-increasing easy business decision to take shortcuts.

that has already happened...see the legal cases in last century via Gerry Spence for example ford pinto etc..

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#279

Post by ceejayoz » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:46 PM UTC

magduf wrote: post #270

avar wrote: post #201

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The alternative isn't a repeat of 9/11. You're assuming that passengers aren't a whole lot more motivated to overpower hijackers after 9/11 than before. One reason 9/11 could happen is that passengers generally assumed a hijacking was mostly a scary inconvenience, not a life-or-death situation.

Exactly; another 9/11 situation is impossible now. They just need to keep doing screenings of passengers and their carry-ons to make sure no one can bring obvious weapons on board; anything else is unnecessary and possibly counterproductive. If someone tries to hijack the plane using razor blades or whatever, the passengers will literally murder them.

It still doesn't hurt to keep them out of the cockpit, though. Quickly stabbing the pilot to death is likely to at least kill or injure a plane's worth of passengers.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#280

Post by salawat » Thu, Jun 27, 2019, 2:46 PM UTC

sopooneo wrote: post #104

jussij wrote: post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What amazes me about this whole sorry saga is what appears to be blatant deception on the part of Boeing. Boeing somehow tricked the FAA into believing, from the pilots perspective the 737-MAX and 737 were the exact same plane. That allowed the plane to enter service quickly as it meant the pilots would not require any flight simulator retraining. What we now know is the 737-MAX is nothing like the 737 and the level…

I don't think they "tricked [them] into believing". More like "talked them into accepting".

This is a very common phenomena that as Quality Assurance you specifically have to work around when talking to regulators, and there are in fact, white collar cultural norms in place which shape the way most corporations I've worked at talk about potential regulatory risks.

For one thing, if you bring up any questions regarding an issue at all, the preferred medium of communicating it until a decision is made tends to be direct person to person with no electronic paper trail. (This insulates the company from getting caught out by E-Discovery in case of legal troubles).

Secondly, there's the practice I call anchoring. This is where you go to the regulator with a very narrow, refined question looking for an answer, explain why you think it's a good idea, and hope they don't think too much into it before saying yes you can do it. If it works, you have a document stating the regulator told you it was okay when you asked. To prevent this, you have to go to your regulator and give them a high and wide view.

A) What is the problem B) What are the relevant regulations impacted C) What additional risks are created with both answers

Businesses can be a bit squirmy when engineering folks start getting too chummy with compliance. I know I've found a good one when I don't get funny looks when asking if something questionable sounding has been run passed Compliance.

Everything I've read in this investigation reeks of anchoring toward the FAA. Especially given the whistleblower testimony as reported in the 60 Minutes Expose on the MAX.

[1]https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2...