111–120 of 354 posts
RIP 737Max. I don't see how the airlines can risk flying this PR nightmare again.
When the Boeing CEO had his press conference in April, he said "we've confirmed that the MCAS system as originally designed did meet our design and safety analysis criteria and our certification criteria."[1] I yelled at the screen "you know that means the criteria are flawed , right? If the procedures didn't catch this mistake, that means there are other mistakes that weren't caught!" A flabbergasted reporter then a…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The reason people are outraged is that "don't use a single sensor to decide that the plane should perform an uncontrollable nose-dive" isn't the outcome of new learning. That wasn't competent airworthiness seventy years ago. It's a lesson the industry thought it had already internalized. We shouldn't applaud mistakes of the distant part being repeated recklessly as some kind of improvement.
What amazes me about this whole sorry saga is what appears to be blatant deception on the part of Boeing. Boeing somehow tricked the FAA into believing, from the pilots perspective the 737-MAX and 737 were the exact same plane. That allowed the plane to enter service quickly as it meant the pilots would not require any flight simulator retraining. What we now know is the 737-MAX is nothing like the 737 and the level…
I'm not at all amazed by Boeing's blatant deception and blame shifting. They've done this before, and with this same model of aircraft. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues
Earlier quoted context omitted.
What amazes me about this whole sorry saga is what appears to be blatant deception on the part of Boeing. Boeing somehow tricked the FAA into believing, from the pilots perspective the 737-MAX and 737 were the exact same plane. That allowed the plane to enter service quickly as it meant the pilots would not require any flight simulator retraining. What we now know is the 737-MAX is nothing like the 737 and the level…
I don't think they "tricked [them] into believing". More like "talked them into accepting".
Whether it was intentional to meet the schedule or accidental, we may never know.
I'd be pretty comfortable flying it after all this attention and review. It will probably be the best reviewed passenger plane software developed in America, if not the world once this is over. Boeing deserves a 9-figure fine though, and its shareholders should lose massively to make sure this doesn't happen again.
> It will probably be the best reviewed passenger plane software developed in America, if not the world once this is over. The problem is that this is not actually a software problem. It’s an airplane design problem, and Boeing is trying to convince you that it’s just the software. Even if the software is perfect, this plane remains a flying coffin until it is redesigned from scratch. The only real fix is not to fly…
When doing root cause analysis there is a pyramid with people problems at the top, then deeper technical problems, process problems, culture problems and value problems.
Most root cause analysis stops with people problems, or technical problems while all the root cause analysis I've done never showed that problems end there. Culture and value have often been the underlying causes.
The FAA suffered a major loss of credibility in their handling of the first round of testing/accreditation of the MAX. The FAA can't afford another stuff up this second time around and as such I suspect they will be checking every aspect of the plane in very fine detail. That could spell more trouble for Boeing.
The FAA suffered a major loss of credibility in their handling of the first round of testing/accreditation of the MAX. The FAA can't afford another stuff up this second time around and as such I suspect they will be checking every aspect of the plane in very fine detail. That could spell more trouble for Boeing.
Asking because I legitimately don't know: was the FAA failure here more attributable to the agency, or the funding (and therefore manpower*expertise) available to it?
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Boeing did actually design extendable landing gear for the 737 MAX-10 model, which hadn't shipped yet. That aircraft is longer. To avoid tail strikes, the rear gear becomes longer as the aircraft is taking off. I'm sure that costs more money. If it were on all 737 MAX aircraft, perhaps the engines could be lower. It'd be like a kneeling bus that gets lower when stopped to take on passengers. Another option would be t…
True, there are planes that compress the struts before retracting the gear for the gear to fit, so perhaps something like this could be designed for the 737 too? But that's increased complexity on a non-redundant part that you definitely don't want to fail, so it's not obvious how the trade comes out...
Short video with gear model in action: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4IGl4OizM4
https://www.geekwire.com/2018/boeing-737-max-10-landing-gear...
Scroll down for a nice diagram: http://www.b737.org.uk/737max10.htm
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The FAA suffered a major loss of credibility in their handling of the first round of testing/accreditation of the MAX. The FAA can't afford another stuff up this second time... Because I'll just check with the next air transit regulatory body right?
Like the European Aviation Safety Agency?
[1] feel free to flip flop regulatory agencies if you so desire.
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Boeing's other current big commercial aircraft development program is the 777X. They are working through engine issues before first flight. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_777X
Boeing doesn’t make engines, GE does
But GE don't make "737MAX8 engines" specifically. They make the range of engines they have, and Boeing (and Airbus and Bombadier et al.) get to choose which one they want, given the constraints of their aircraft.
You _could_ fit a 500cu inch big block V8 into a Miata. Bit it's not gonna handle the same as it does with a 2L 4 cylinder in it, and it's gonna stick out the bonnet.