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FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

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Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#71

Post by rosege »

mantap wrote: post #64
rfugger wrote: post #59

I'd be pretty comfortable flying it after all this attention and review. It will probably be the best reviewed passenger plane software developed in America, if not the world once this is over. Boeing deserves a 9-figure fine though, and its shareholders should lose massively to make sure this doesn't happen again.

I'm not convinced. The pressure on Boeing to fix this ASAP is immense. That is not a good environment for writing safety critical software. Especially if they are doing a "broader software redesign". I don't believe that software quality can be enforced from the outside.

Yes, having to use your employee car parking for these jets is not a good look that I'd imagine they are keen to have going on for long. https://www.flyertalk.com/articles/boeing-has-so-many-ground...

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#72

Post by bigiain »

blackflame7000 wrote: post #48
ralph84 wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Boeing doesn't make a lot of the components on their planes. The plane doesn't fly until Boeing is satisfied with how those components work.

Ok but having to overcome an engine problem isn't boeings problem its the manufacturers.

That depends a bit on the "engine problem".

This is, to my layman's understanding, could be considered an "engine problem" because how the newer more fuel efficient engines with their bigger bypass fans don't fit under the wings of the 737. That's not an engine manufacturers problem.

(It makes more sense to classify it as an airframe design compromise problem, but it's about those big fat geared turbofans not working with the little landing gear legs which let them get the doors down nice and low, but put the wings too close to the ground to fit the more modern engines.)

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#73

Post by CydeWeys »

caf wrote: post #45
chrisseaton wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why can’t they change the ground clearance and remove the constraint?

They could, but it would mean that a lot of the supporting infrastructure at airports would have to change, essentially negating much of the advantage from avoiding a new clean-sheet design. As long as it remains sufficiently 737-shaped airlines can keep flying it to all the place they've been flying 737s for decades.

What supporting infrastructure would have to change? Jetways are compatible across a wide variety of planes. Yes, you can't use the same jetway on an A380 as a 737 (the A380 is just way too big), but you certainly can use the same jetway on a 737 as on an A320, and many other planes besides.

The reason they didn't want to do a clean sheet redesign of the 737 was to avoid pilot recertification, not because of ground infrastructure. Airports are already used to servicing dozens of different types of planes. Adding one more to the mix wouldn't materially change anything.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#74

Post by hanniabu »

jussij wrote: post #41

The FAA suffered a major loss of credibility in their handling of the first round of testing/accreditation of the MAX. The FAA can't afford another stuff up this second time around and as such I suspect they will be checking every aspect of the plane in very fine detail. That could spell more trouble for Boeing.

Yeah I wouldn't be surprised if this was an issue somebody knew about but with the recent attention they're forced to disclose it before somebody else discovers it.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#75

Post by cyberferret »

th0ma5 wrote: post #51
rjvehn wrote: post #27

There are a myriad of issues that put the planes at risk, but I think that the fact that when the control system (MCAS) is engaged causes it to ignore feedback is the biggest issue of all. "But with the MCAS activated, said Fehrm, those breakout switches wouldn’t work. MCAS assumes the yoke is already aggressively pulled back and won’t allow further pullback to counter its action, which is to hold the nose down. Fehr…

To be fair, ignoring user input could have potentially have saved Air France 447... I mean I actually can't think of an automated fool proof system that would've fixed 447, but incorrect input was a major factor.

Basic rudimentary 'stick and rudder' flying skills was a big factor in AF447's crash. All old school pilots know that when you aircraft is in a nose high stall condition, you never keep pulling back on the stick, but instead push it forwards to lower the nose and get the wings flying again.

The fact that the co-pilot in question kept holding the stick to the back stops was the main reason that the aircraft wallowed into the sea. Weirdly, he did let go of the stick for a brief few seconds, which was the only time during the harrowing descent that the aircraft started to behave normally, but then he pulled it back and held it back right up until impact.

Yep, the aircraft could have ignored these inputs, but the inputs are counter to what any reasonably skilled pilot would have done. (Note: Different to the MAX crashes where pulling back on the stick under speed IS the accepted way to stop a descent.)

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#76

Post by mantap »

cjbprime wrote: post #66
brentm wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think overall we should consider this process a very positive thing, FAA and Boeing (and Airbus as well) are all going to learn a lot from this process which will make air travel safer in the future. It's unfortunate that it took two tragedies to get us here but if you look at the history of aviation improvements this isn't the first and it won't be the last time.

The reason people are outraged is that "don't use a single sensor to decide that the plane should perform an uncontrollable nose-dive" isn't the outcome of new learning. That wasn't competent airworthiness seventy years ago. It's a lesson the industry thought it had already internalized. We shouldn't applaud mistakes of the distant part being repeated recklessly as some kind of improvement.

What seems to have happened is that the system was originally designed with more conservative parameters. Testing showed that these parameters were insufficient to prevent a stall so they "turned it up to 11", and didn't re-evaluate the original design.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#77

Post by salawat »

mantap wrote: post #76
cjbprime wrote: post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The reason people are outraged is that "don't use a single sensor to decide that the plane should perform an uncontrollable nose-dive" isn't the outcome of new learning. That wasn't competent airworthiness seventy years ago. It's a lesson the industry thought it had already internalized. We shouldn't applaud mistakes of the distant part being repeated recklessly as some kind of improvement.

What seems to have happened is that the system was originally designed with more conservative parameters. Testing showed that these parameters were insufficient to prevent a stall so they "turned it up to 11", and didn't re-evaluate the original design.

It wasn't that it wasn't sufficient.

It was that they found similar behavior happening in a low-speed part of the flight envelope. That required increasing the authority and losing the G-load safeguard.

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#78

Post by iClaudiusX »

rossdavidh wrote: post #42
rjvehn wrote: post #27

There are a myriad of issues that put the planes at risk, but I think that the fact that when the control system (MCAS) is engaged causes it to ignore feedback is the biggest issue of all. "But with the MCAS activated, said Fehrm, those breakout switches wouldn’t work. MCAS assumes the yoke is already aggressively pulled back and won’t allow further pullback to counter its action, which is to hold the nose down. Fehr…

Of all the many problems of the Boeing 737Max situation, and there are several, for once I don't think the media reporting is one of the biggest. But, your basic point stands.

The root problem is the culture at Boeing and the FAA has shifted from safety first to profit first.

The investigative reporting from The Seattle Times[0] indicates that safety engineers were pressured to avoid delays to rush out a competitor to the A320. Furthermore, their safety analysis was based on flawed assumptions to meet an artificial constraint of not requiring pilot simulator training in order to appease the airlines they were selling to. Finally, the FAA is allowing industry to self-certify critical systems with lax oversight.

It is easy to get lost in the technical details of why a particular catastrophe happens. The common throughline is a broken culture where deviance is normalized and those who speak out are ignored. It's the same story with Chernobyl, Fukushima, the El Faro, the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain, Air France 447, and now the 737 Max.

[0] - https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the...

Re: FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes

#79

Post by jussij »

cjbprime wrote: post #66
brentm wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think overall we should consider this process a very positive thing, FAA and Boeing (and Airbus as well) are all going to learn a lot from this process which will make air travel safer in the future. It's unfortunate that it took two tragedies to get us here but if you look at the history of aviation improvements this isn't the first and it won't be the last time.

The reason people are outraged is that "don't use a single sensor to decide that the plane should perform an uncontrollable nose-dive" isn't the outcome of new learning. That wasn't competent airworthiness seventy years ago. It's a lesson the industry thought it had already internalized. We shouldn't applaud mistakes of the distant part being repeated recklessly as some kind of improvement.

What amazes me about this whole sorry saga is what appears to be blatant deception on the part of Boeing.

Boeing somehow tricked the FAA into believing, from the pilots perspective the 737-MAX and 737 were the exact same plane.

That allowed the plane to enter service quickly as it meant the pilots would not require any flight simulator retraining.

What we now know is the 737-MAX is nothing like the 737 and the level of deception that seems to have occurred is concerning.

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