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RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

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Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#91
post #65

I want to find a way to run each application I use on its own machine so that memory attacks (like spectre/meltdown, etc.) are theoretically impossible. I still want to have a reasonable computing experience (e.g. copy + paste works and the experience is kind of like using one computer the normal way). Any ideas? I was thinking some kind of remote desktop setup with a bunch of cheap boxes, each running Linux, on a LA…

Run X on one box connected to your programs over SSH running on separate boxes?

I was thinking that. I wonder if it would work well in practice.

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#92
post #65

I want to find a way to run each application I use on its own machine so that memory attacks (like spectre/meltdown, etc.) are theoretically impossible. I still want to have a reasonable computing experience (e.g. copy + paste works and the experience is kind of like using one computer the normal way). Any ideas? I was thinking some kind of remote desktop setup with a bunch of cheap boxes, each running Linux, on a LA…

Plan 9 is really radical about this, but I'm not sure how secure that would be in practice: http://doc.cat-v.org/plan_9/4th_edition/papers/net/ But the computing experience is quite unreasonable - with copy&paste working though ;)

Plan 9 is so cool.

I'm going to guess that it's not actually a practical solution to this problem right now.

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#93
Since the mention of OpenSSH can cause readers to jump to false conclusions: This attack still requires that the attacker's code runs on the victim machine; it is not a remote vulnerability.

(I don't think the authors implied otherwise, I just know that I somehow got confused for a second.)

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#94

Very cool and scary, but in reality actually exploiting this without a cooperative target, and a relatively quiet machine is quite unlikely. Does not mean it shouldn't be looked at, but do not lose sleep over it.

> actually exploiting this without a cooperative target, and a relatively quiet machine is quite unlikely.

... until someone does it somewhat reliably. I always assume my knowledge and imagination does not come close the collective creativity of exploiters.

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#95

Shortly after I joined Microsoft in 2004, all new feature work on Windows Longhorn (Vista) was halted. There had been yet another high profile computer virus on Windows XP caused by a buffer overflow. It was an all-hands-on-deck type moment. Everyone spent weeks adding SAL (source-code annotation language) annotations to the entire Windows code base. SAL annotations enabled automated source code analysis to identify…

I am wondering if/when the first class action lawsuits will fly against the hardware manufacturers.

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#96

Shortly after I joined Microsoft in 2004, all new feature work on Windows Longhorn (Vista) was halted. There had been yet another high profile computer virus on Windows XP caused by a buffer overflow. It was an all-hands-on-deck type moment. Everyone spent weeks adding SAL (source-code annotation language) annotations to the entire Windows code base. SAL annotations enabled automated source code analysis to identify…

Maybe hardware will have to become more programmable in the future so you can fix some of these flaws without needing to replace anything.

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#97
From the speed figures (many hours of setup and runtime, very low read rate) I can suggest that restarting your important service often, and moving it between VMs, would prevent an attack like that.

In many deployments, automatic scaling and failover already provide the necessary mechanics. Then the Chaos Monkey suddenly becomes a security enforcement tool :)

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>technology and techniques for extracting information from EM radiation Whats known to the public, you mean. I suspect even the nuttier conspiracy theorists don't have a solid grasp of just what capabilities might exist among well funded secret institutions.

There have been many demos at security conferences of doing these kinds of things, "simple" things like key logging from a laptop with only a nearby radio.

how about extracting pgp keys with a smart phone microphone from 6 feet away?

https://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#99
post #96

Shortly after I joined Microsoft in 2004, all new feature work on Windows Longhorn (Vista) was halted. There had been yet another high profile computer virus on Windows XP caused by a buffer overflow. It was an all-hands-on-deck type moment. Everyone spent weeks adding SAL (source-code annotation language) annotations to the entire Windows code base. SAL annotations enabled automated source code analysis to identify…

Maybe hardware will have to become more programmable in the future so you can fix some of these flaws without needing to replace anything.

It can't just be turtles all the way down.

Re: RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

#100
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You usually need an antenna, yes. Does that matter?

it matters because if the hardware is difficult and expensive to obtain, an attack can be costly, and hence, won't affect the common man. Industrial espionage or state level espionage hardly changes for the common man, and since most of the hardware in use is by the common man, it's unlikely to get a real fix.

Effective antennas are reasonably easy to build from scratch (depending on the frequency band), and are commercially available in an insane number of variations. Either way is very cheap - as little as a few dollars.

Software defined radios can be had for as little as $10-20 for simple receive only types, up to several hundred for substantially nicer transceivers. They can also be $1000+ for special applications or R&D.

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