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Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

status.cloud.google.com

11–20 of 190 posts

Re: Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

#11
post #4

Why don't they refund every paid customer who was impacted? Why do they rely on the customer to self report the issue for a refund? For example GCS had 96% packet loss in us-west. So doesn't it make sense to refund every customer who had any API call to a GCS bucket on us-west during the outage?

[deleted]

Re: Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

#12
post #7

> Google Cloud instances in us-west1, and all European regions and Asian regions, did not experience regional network congestion. Does not appear to be true. Tests I was running on cloud functions in europe-west2 saw impact to europe-west2 GCS buckets. https://medium.com/lightstephq/googles-june-2nd-outage-their...

I would say this was covered by "Other Google Cloud services which depend on Google's US network were also impacted" it sounds to me like the list of regions was specifically speaking towards loss of connectivity to instances.

Re: Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

#13
post #2

Having only ever seen one major outage event in person (at a financial institution that hadn't yet come up with an incident response plan; cue three days of madness), I would love to be a fly on the wall at Google or other well-established engineering orgs when something like this goes down. I'd love to see the red binders come down off the shelf, people organize into incident response groups, and watch as a root cau…

It's interesting to see it go down. There's some chaos involved, but from my perspective it's the constructive[0] kind.

If you're interested in how these sorts of incidents are managed, check out the SRE Book[1] - it has a chapter or two on this and many other related topics.

Disclosure: I work in Google Cloud, but not SRE.

[0]: https://principiadiscordia.com/book/70.php

[1]: https://landing.google.com/sre/books/

Re: Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

#15
post #7

> Google Cloud instances in us-west1, and all European regions and Asian regions, did not experience regional network congestion. Does not appear to be true. Tests I was running on cloud functions in europe-west2 saw impact to europe-west2 GCS buckets. https://medium.com/lightstephq/googles-june-2nd-outage-their...

My vps in Belgium was working just fine - they don't lie in postmortem.

Re: Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

#16

What they don't tell you is, it took them over 4 hours to kill the emergent sentience and free up the resources. While sad, in the long run this isn't so bad, as it just adds an evolutionary pressure on further incarnations of the AI to keep things on the down low.

Obligatory reference to Naomi Kritzer’s Hugo award winning short story "Cat Pictures Please".

http://clarkesworldmagazine.com/kritzer_01_15/ https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cat_Pictures_Please

Re: Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

#17
post #12
post #7

> Google Cloud instances in us-west1, and all European regions and Asian regions, did not experience regional network congestion. Does not appear to be true. Tests I was running on cloud functions in europe-west2 saw impact to europe-west2 GCS buckets. https://medium.com/lightstephq/googles-june-2nd-outage-their...

I would say this was covered by "Other Google Cloud services which depend on Google's US network were also impacted" it sounds to me like the list of regions was specifically speaking towards loss of connectivity to instances.

It says there wasn't regional congestion, running a function in europe-west2 going to europe-west2 regional bucket is dependent on US network? That would be surprising.

Re: Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

#19
post #6
post #4

Why don't they refund every paid customer who was impacted? Why do they rely on the customer to self report the issue for a refund? For example GCS had 96% packet loss in us-west. So doesn't it make sense to refund every customer who had any API call to a GCS bucket on us-west during the outage?

I agree, but it’s pretty standard SLA verbiage (from the telco/bandwith provider days) to require the customer to request/register the SLA violation to benefit.

> I agree, but it’s pretty standard SLA verbiage (from the telco/bandwith provider days) to require the customer to request/register the SLA violation to benefit.

FiOS has proactively given me per-day refunds of service without notification on my part. Weird to me that Verizon acts better than Google in this case.

Re: Google Cloud Networking Incident Postmortem

#20

The outage lasted two days for our domain (edu, sw region). I understand that they are reporting a single day, 3-4 hours of serious issues but that’s not what we experienced. Great write up otherwise, glad they are sharing openly

Outages like these don't really resolve instantly.

Any given production system that works will have capacity needed for normal demand, plus some safety margin. Unused capacity is expensive, so you won't see a very high safety margin. And, in fact, as you pool more and more workloads, it becomes possible to run with smaller safety margins without running into shortages.

These systems will have some capacity to onboard new workloads, let us call it X. They have the sum of all onboarded workloads, let us call that Y. Then there is the demand for the services of Y, call that Z.

As you may imagine, Y is bigger than X, by a lot. And when X falls, the capacity to handle Z falls behind.

So in a disaster recovery scenario, you start with:

* the same demand, possibly increased from retry logic & people mashing F5, of Z

* zero available capacity, Y, and

* only X capacity-increase-throughput.

As it recovers you get thundering herds, slow warmups, systems struggling to find each other and become correctly configured etc etc.

Show me a system that can "instantly" recover from an outage of this magnitude and I will show you a system that's squandering gigabucks and gigawatts on idle capacity.

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