Sounds to me like the main failure here is that Boeing went
too far with optimising cost, in the sense that MCAS was not properly designed.
I'm certain correctly designed software can safely control critical functions, otherwise failure in a large category of aircraft systems would result in many more MCAS unrelated accidents.
This particular MCAS control philosophy seems to be a flawed control system. With reference to the the graph (link provided by obituary_latte):
https://i.imgur.com/WJuhjlO_d.jpg?maxwidth=1640&shape=thumb&...
With only one sensor being "looked at" at any time, and with the system not having the sense to know to stop commanding pitch down after 26 times with attempted pilot overrides, it would seem almost beyond belief that any competent team of on-the-ground engineers (as per Boeing) would not see that the system is flawed.
Would be interesting to see if this was the case, and how the likely good engineering decision was overridden by the commercial aspect.
With increased tech, comes increased scope for this kind of cost optimisation, and we must be careful in many more industries. Eg Automotive self driving cars.