Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you want to crack passwords ultrafast, you make a look-up table of the hashes of all probable passwords. Without a salt, this is rather a smaller table. A 7-bit salt makes the table larger, but not hugely larger, and not troublesomely larger. The 128-bit salt used by bcrypt makes the table intractably hugely large. You cannot precompute it. Of course, you know the salt (because it's stored right there in /etc/shad…
Those password crackers that are belting through billions and billions of passwords an hour with just a couple of video cards aren't using rainbow tables, are they? You could have zero bit salt: you're still boned. Bcrypt is not better because it has a better salt . It's better because one iteration of bcrypt takes a long time, and millions of iterations take an intractably long time .
Obviously, the variable-cost key scheduler is the central notion to the thing, but not having a large salt completely nerfs it.
bcrypt uses a 128-bit salt, and it uses it for good reason. See the paper, sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.