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Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

theregister.co.uk

51–60 of 128 posts

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#51
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Have you ever tried this? Yes. It used to be the industry standard method for recording TV programmes prior to the invention of videotape recorders. If you know what you're doing and use the right equipment, the generational quality loss is very minor. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinescope

>It used to be the industry standard method for recording TV programmes prior to the invention of videotape recorders. Back when everything was analog and low-resolution, had noise and artifacts anyway, sure. Do you have a video that compares modern digital 1080p with its best "Kinescoped" version? You have to deal with parallax, mismatched frame frequencies, pixels and differences between natural light and whatever…

We're talking about faked videos here though, often of things where the quality is already quite questionable. If it shows something that looks 480p good enough and gets the green checkmark it's game over for this concept of video verification. No one needs perfect 1080p or 4k video to believe politician or celebrity is sleeping around.

If it gets it to the point where it takes years of experience with this to figure out what is and isn't fake... I doubt that's any better than the situation without such a video verification system at all. In fact, I'd argue it's worse due to the fake seal of approval being given to the video.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#52
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're not thinking this through. The problem isn't that creators can make fake videos (which would be analogous to DRM). Let them. There is no harm in it. The problem is that users have no way of verifying true videos. This can be solved with cryptography, because both parties involved (creators and viewers) would want this to work. In other words, DRM is about forcing everyone to do a thing. Verification is about a…

I'm sorry, but you're not thinking this through. Being able to prove that a video file is the unaltered output of a particular camera is in no way a useful protection against fake videos. Proving that file A is genuine tells us nothing about whether file B is fake. Let's say I want to create and circulate a fake sex tape featuring a senior politician. In a world where signed sensors are common but not mandatory, the…

You don't need to be able to prove the video is raw footage, you just need to be able to verify that a publisher you trust says they recorded it. An HMAC allows you to verify that a message (like a video file) was not modified after the author signed it.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm sorry, but you're not thinking this through. Being able to prove that a video file is the unaltered output of a particular camera is in no way a useful protection against fake videos. Proving that file A is genuine tells us nothing about whether file B is fake. Let's say I want to create and circulate a fake sex tape featuring a senior politician. In a world where signed sensors are common but not mandatory, the…

You don't need to be able to prove the video is raw footage, you just need to be able to verify that a publisher you trust says they recorded it. An HMAC allows you to verify that a message (like a video file) was not modified after the author signed it.

I was under the impression that the whole point of such a system was you could trust any video from any (non-cracked) camera.

If we're at the point of trusting videos only from select providers, well, that's not really much of an improvement over just finding the video on that provider's website over HTTPS.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#55
post #46
post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can have the camera record metadata as well, like focus settings and super speed. That will make it harder.

And you can build a camera that lies about this.

Not quite as you can't necessarily clone the keys from an existing camera without some difficulty, however you can say, replace those sensors with your own inputs fed using a cheap microcontroller you wrote the firmware for. There's a time and effort investment but it's not exactly high...

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm sorry, but you're not thinking this through. Being able to prove that a video file is the unaltered output of a particular camera is in no way a useful protection against fake videos. Proving that file A is genuine tells us nothing about whether file B is fake. Let's say I want to create and circulate a fake sex tape featuring a senior politician. In a world where signed sensors are common but not mandatory, the…

You don't need to be able to prove the video is raw footage, you just need to be able to verify that a publisher you trust says they recorded it. An HMAC allows you to verify that a message (like a video file) was not modified after the author signed it.

Hypothetical: An anonymous source releases CCTV footage that appears to show a public figure urinating on a homeless person. Do you really believe that we'll all ignore that footage because the signature doesn't belong to a major news organisation?

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#58

Articles like these make me eager for advances made in the 'authenticity' market. I recently learned of a company called Truepic[0] that specializes in photo and video verification. From the New Yorker article I read: "Truepic, a startup in San Diego, aims at producing a new kind of photograph—a verifiable digital original. Photographs taken with its smartphone app are uploaded to its servers, where they enter a kind…

How does Truepic work? What's stopping me from spoofing sensor data on my client?

This is why I think a dolution will involve hardware signing, and maybe some integration with a.photoediting suite

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#59
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're not thinking this through. The problem isn't that creators can make fake videos (which would be analogous to DRM). Let them. There is no harm in it. The problem is that users have no way of verifying true videos. This can be solved with cryptography, because both parties involved (creators and viewers) would want this to work. In other words, DRM is about forcing everyone to do a thing. Verification is about a…

I'm sorry, but you're not thinking this through. Being able to prove that a video file is the unaltered output of a particular camera is in no way a useful protection against fake videos. Proving that file A is genuine tells us nothing about whether file B is fake. Let's say I want to create and circulate a fake sex tape featuring a senior politician. In a world where signed sensors are common but not mandatory, the…

I believe what HN User gambler was getting at is a world far more insidious. One where no one cares whether or not file B is fake. No one cares whether transcoded file C is fake. He's talking about a world where the power elites have effectively set themselves up as the only source of cryptographically secure and verified image feeds.

ie - A world where so much fake image data has flooded into the zeitgeist that people only believe the feeds that are announced to be "real" by their cryptographically secure devices. They can play the fake video, even play video that may not be fake, but was not cryptographically validated. Their devices will just be flashing a huge warning sign right next to each such image feed. (Or even worse, it will only flash a "real" sign next to the image feeds it and the central have concerted to cryptographically validate.) It'd be kind of like the huge warning dialogs that always popped up at a certain point when people went somewhere with an ActiveX plugin in the page. After a while, it wasn't just ActiveX, it was everything. People just got conditioned to believing that every plugin, no matter the source, was horribly bad for them. (Every plugin probably was, but that's a separate issue.)

Only this time, the powers that be will be the only ones capable of delivering data that is guaranteed to be pure. Everything else will be either, not validated by their cryptography standard. Transcoded, (and consequently the masses will dismiss it out of hand). Or out and out fake, (which, yes, the masses should dismiss out of hand. I get that).

But I'm just saying that people should think a little further ahead here when they are trying to solve this problem. If we want to use cryptography to solve this problem, that's perfectly reasonable. (And yes, it would work. It would work only too well, and that's the entire problem.) I'm only saying that we should do what we can to make sure that cryptographically validated image feeds are not uniquely identifiable, for instance. Because when you go down this road you need to realize that with hardware cryptography, the hardware makers and those with power over them become de facto arbiters. And they can potentially use distribution to control the masses. Because they have the only pure sources. They could potentially even use attribution to control the masses. (You sure you want to video tape that police beating and mail it to the media "anonymously" with one of these devices?)

I'm just saying. Stop and think it through a bit.

And having a plan based on, "Oh... We're smart enough to get around it!" Is a very foolish plan for two reasons. First, because we won't be able to get around it, and second because it's the same as having no plan at all.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#60
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're not thinking this through. The problem isn't that creators can make fake videos (which would be analogous to DRM). Let them. There is no harm in it. The problem is that users have no way of verifying true videos. This can be solved with cryptography, because both parties involved (creators and viewers) would want this to work. In other words, DRM is about forcing everyone to do a thing. Verification is about a…

I'm sorry, but you're not thinking this through. Being able to prove that a video file is the unaltered output of a particular camera is in no way a useful protection against fake videos. Proving that file A is genuine tells us nothing about whether file B is fake. Let's say I want to create and circulate a fake sex tape featuring a senior politician. In a world where signed sensors are common but not mandatory, the…

Apparently, we're talking about different problems. I am talking about the problem of content creators being able to demonstrate that what they post is real footage. You're talking about the problem of someone being fooled by some arbitrary video online. If you think that the latter is somehow a fundamentally new threat created by AI, you must live in a parallel universe, to put it politely.
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