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First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

krebsonsecurity.com

161–170 of 171 posts

Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#161

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s why they usually have backup keys that you physically keep in a safe place.

That sounds decent but I've not seen this a lot. Its often just "give us your phone number and we'll SMS you an access key when you log in"

Unfortunately I see this all too often on systems that have enabled 2FA but not TOTP.

Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#162
post #12

I did a penetration test for $NATIONALINSURER and they had an FTP site with weak credentials where all the remote offices uploaded claims. Millions of records and scans of SSNs, home addresses, bank information, etc. Their mitigating controls were: we put it behind a firewall. Then again I didn't expect much, their MSSQL in prod had SA/SA credentials active.

I'm currently fighting against management dragging their feet on using 2FA. On HIPAA PHI. (I know HIPAA doesn't actually mandate 2FA, but it's recommended by many best practices and guides.) Apparently some tech folks don't like the inconvenience of 2FA.

Maybe not a popular or shared opinion (so nobody take this as advice), but IMO 2FA (especially phone-based) is overrated while being a serious inconvenience to users and developers.

Many of the recent attacks I've seen simply bypass it altogether in favor of phishing or other traditional techniques.

Clients (Ansible?) simply don't work with it or do it well, which leads to hacks that undermine your 2FA deployment anyway-- rogue admins opening reverse tunnels to allow file transfers, webshells, etc.

Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#163
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Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#164
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Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#165
post #100

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this gets to the crux of the issue. It's not about using hard-to-guess UUIDs[0], but restricting access to the underlying data[1]. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Access_control

It's not really security through obscurity. In these case I understand the ids where related to data that the company was making available to users through email links. A cryptographically secure 128bit UUID is impossible to guess, no more than a cryptographic access token. Now of course, you would probably rather want to have an authentication scheme on top of that, but that comes at a support cost in term of custom…

It's still an access control issue in that case. The user should never be aware of the UUID's. Only the backend should deal with it. If you have a _public_ API that deals with UUIDs, therein lies the issue.

And a side note: I wouldn't trust that the prng for your UUIDs are cryptographically secure. That's not a part of the spec.

Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#166
post #84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

that is a good idea but most of the time I need to hand over my actual ID, and not just a scan of it

Yeah, like most doctors offices will take my license with my insurance card, and they scan them into their own systems to associate with my record. No opportunity to insert my own add on content. Just hope whatever SaaS based patient management system they have is iron-clad secure. (But it isn't)

I guess you could stick a very small sticker on it

Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#167

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In my experience, many tables don't have a userid on the table that would be associated with the user. It would be a table join or two or three away. So the developer may think it is safe to say select value from stock positions left join account on account.id = stock position.id left join user_accounts on user_accounts.accountid == account.id left join users on user_accounts.userid == user.id where user.id == sessio…

If the cookie is spoofed and someone got another clients authorization token, then they would get any documents that user was authorized to see anyway. But you don’t do cookie.userid. You send the username and password to an authentication service which generates a token with a checksum. The token along with the username and permission is cached in something like Redis. On each request, middleware gets the user infor…

I'm familiar with that process. I was trying to illustrate a picture of how a poor developer might stumble their way into this situation. It's technically possible to store the userid in the cookie rather than using JWTs, but obviously it's not secure in the slightest.

Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#168

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Depending on how weak those credentials were, this sounds like something you should report to Krebs as well.

I'll bet client4 is already breaking an NDA or two just by posting this.

Security by NDA, cheapest infosec.

Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#169

Where does one go to learn how to not cause this one day?

OWASP Top 10 list. OWASP's website is kind of a mess in my opinion, but there are numerous external write-ups about the top vulnerability types. https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/security/threats/owasp-t... Also this github repo maintained by OWASP seems pretty exhaustive. The cheatsheets directory has a lot of different vulnerability classes. https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheats... This "In…

Thanks!

Re: First American Financial Corp. Leaked Hundreds of Millions of Insurance Records

#170

Programmers fault? Audits fault? Securities fault? Pentesters fault? It fault? Listen until C-level funds these programs properly and security is taken seriously by all issues like this will forever be in the news. I would be willing to bet their security like most have a long list of security gaps they cant get fixed because resource issues just hope they documented or it could fall on them. Most coding classes just…

If the financial penalty was high enough they would increase budgets. There is no accountability for losing customers personal information. If you can make a strong business case behind the average risk a company takes on it would help this discussion more. For each example of "company X had a major financial impact" you need to average it out against "company Y lost hundreds of millions of SSNs and had zero penalty".
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