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Security Update

stackoverflow.blog

111–120 of 207 posts

Re: Security Update

#111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would like to hope Stack Overflow of all companies doesn't store passwords in plaintext, but you never know.

I work on an enterprise infosec tool that just demonstrated 48 trillion MD5s per second using AWS GPUs. Hashed passwords are cracked so easily it is a minor obstacle at this point. It is a question of when not if a hash table is fully cracked.

And how does it do on hashes that are not known to be useless, eg bcrypt or argon2?

Re: Security Update

#113
post #86
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The attack surface of a browser makes it a perfect target - I would not advise storing any critical passwords with the browser or in close reach to the browser.

You're going to be entering these passwords into a browser most of the time so if a compromised browser is your problem, no password manager is really going to help you.

There are many different ways to get compromised. Reducing attack surface is always a good idea.

And, yes I do close all browser windows/processes before login, and after logout of important websites for instance to make sure cookies and passwords are gone from browser memory.

Re: Security Update

#114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would like to hope Stack Overflow of all companies doesn't store passwords in plaintext, but you never know.

I work on an enterprise infosec tool that just demonstrated 48 trillion MD5s per second using AWS GPUs. Hashed passwords are cracked so easily it is a minor obstacle at this point. It is a question of when not if a hash table is fully cracked.

Well, nobody should be using MD5 (nor should they have been using it 20 years ago with the introduction of bcrypt). In fact, nobody should be using any hash function that was designed for speed (such as the SHA family) because you don't want fast hashing of passwords.

Modern cryptographic hash functions that are tailored for password hashing (such as scrypt or Argon2) are much harder to brute-force and have tunable knobs to allow you to increase the memory or CPU hardness. Obviously you cannot be safe forever but if you have a database dump of Argon2id-hashed passphrases with very strong parameters you aren't going to break it any time soon.

Re: Security Update

#115
post #106

> We have not identified any breach of customer or user data. As usual, this is a meaningless statement. It could mean they have full packet captures they've completely audited, or it could just as easily mean "we don't keep logs of any kind so we have no fucking clue".

I take it to mean that they've looked into their logfiles and accesses to their resources as closely as they can and so far haven't spotted anything. So, not exactly meaningless, but also not entirely reassuring.

At any rate, I still have some degree in trust in the people running things over there to tell us if the reality is different.

Re: Security Update

#116
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That depends on time between compromise and detection. With password manager you'll lose only passwords for sites you actually logged in to. While with browser, you'll lose all passwords instantly.

I'm not sure I follow. If your browser is compromised that's it - it's compromised for everything. Your system is compromised. If I have control over your browser, I don't really need your passwords although I can likely get them out of whatever local password manager you have, to boot.

That's not how it works always. There are tons of compromises that do not imply system compromise, like XSS, or arbitrary browser process memory reads, or extension bugs, or java ghost scripts, etc...

Re: Security Update

#117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I work on an enterprise infosec tool that just demonstrated 48 trillion MD5s per second using AWS GPUs. Hashed passwords are cracked so easily it is a minor obstacle at this point. It is a question of when not if a hash table is fully cracked.

MD5 is one thing as a password can be retrieved from a hash table. But pulling out passwords from a hashed + salted value (e.g. via bcrypt) is many orders of magnitude more infeasible, no?

I would be impressed if SO's user password table is in bcrypt.

Re: Security Update

#118
post #113
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're going to be entering these passwords into a browser most of the time so if a compromised browser is your problem, no password manager is really going to help you.

There are many different ways to get compromised. Reducing attack surface is always a good idea. And, yes I do close all browser windows/processes before login, and after logout of important websites for instance to make sure cookies and passwords are gone from browser memory.

I don't think this really addresses my point. You're saying the in-browser password manager is somehow more dangerous than some external password manager. I don't think this is true. And the browser presents the same attack surface if you're, you know, using the browser. If your browser is a vector for successful compromise, you're boned if you use the browser, whatever elaborate protective ritual you follow while using it.

Re: Security Update

#119
post #114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I work on an enterprise infosec tool that just demonstrated 48 trillion MD5s per second using AWS GPUs. Hashed passwords are cracked so easily it is a minor obstacle at this point. It is a question of when not if a hash table is fully cracked.

Well, nobody should be using MD5 (nor should they have been using it 20 years ago with the introduction of bcrypt). In fact, nobody should be using any hash function that was designed for speed (such as the SHA family) because you don't want fast hashing of passwords . Modern cryptographic hash functions that are tailored for password hashing (such as scrypt or Argon2) are much harder to brute-force and have tunable…

There are plenty of publicly leaked hash tables running MD5 and the like. Just because modern hash functions exist does not mean they are in use. [1]

Also you do not need the hash table of a hardened system to get useful passwords. You need a reused password from a weak one.

[1] https://hashes.org/leaks.php

Re: Security Update

#120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I work on an enterprise infosec tool that just demonstrated 48 trillion MD5s per second using AWS GPUs. Hashed passwords are cracked so easily it is a minor obstacle at this point. It is a question of when not if a hash table is fully cracked.

And how does it do on hashes that are not known to be useless, eg bcrypt or argon2?

It is running on top of hashcat, and at the above-mentioned compute it was benchmarking 45 million bcrypts per second. At that point it is more about the attack plan than the compute.

https://imgur.com/a/DXQMsM1

edit: here is the demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnD4f8N1_OE

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